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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Although perceived changes in political participation patterns amongst young people in 
recent  years  have  attracted  much  academic  research  in  established  democracies  this 
remains an understudied area in the newer post-communist democracies of Central and 
Eastern Europe. In established democracies, researchers have shown that although many 
young people are increasingly shunning traditional forms of political involvement, such 
as  voting  and  political  party  membership,  instead  they  are  turning  to  more  direct 
methods such as volunteering and protest. Despite evidence that young people in newer 
democracies may also have low levels of electoral participation and party membership, 
there  is  little  understanding  of  whether this  is  due  to  communist  legacies  of forced 
participation,  economic  and  social  hardship  or  indeed  reflects  trends  in  established 
democracies. As active political participation plays a vital role in the improvement of 
the quality of democracy, this represents an important gap in our knowledge.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to start to address this by analysing the logics behind youth 
political participation in two contrasting newer democracies, Poland and Romania. To 
do this,  I  employ  a multi-method comparative  approach which  combines qualitative 
findings  of  fieldwork  and  quantitative  data  on electoral  turnout.  The  thesis assesses 
electoral  participation,  party  membership  and  involvement  in  informal  forms  of 
participation such as volunteering and protest. It finds that many young people in post-
communist democracies choose to opt out of traditional forms of political participation 
because, as in established democracies, they feel alienated from formal political agents. 
However, this exit from formal methods of participation is not generally coupled with 
active participation in informal forms of involvement. The thesis concludes that despite 
sharing some important characteristics with young people in established democracies, 
legacies  of  communism  and  the  rapid  nature  of  post-communist  political  and 
socioeconomic  transformation  continue  to  negatively  influence  youth  political 
participation in Poland and Romania.  
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Youth Political Participation in Context  
 
The observation that people in established democracies are appearing to shun traditional 
methods of political participation, such as voting and party membership has attracted a 
great deal of recent scholarly attention (Putnam 1993, 2000, Norris 2002, Mair and Van 
Biezen 2001, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, 2005, Stoker 2006). This perceived shift 
away  from these  formal types of political involvement is deemed to be particularly 
acute in the case of young people who are often seen to be apathetic about or alienated 
from formal political processes (Putnam 2000, Norris 2002, 2003, Henn et al. 2002, 
2005, Marsh et al. 2007, Sloam 2007). Indeed this has led some observers to identify the 
political disengagement of young people as a key element in the so-called ‘crisis’ of 
modern day liberal democracy (Russell 2005).  
 
The  importance  of  active  citizen  participation  in  politics  for  the  building  of  strong 
democracy has also been the focal point of much debate amongst scholars and policy 
makers focusing on the newer democracies of post-communist Eastern Europe. Here 
emphasis has often been on explaining the remarkably low rates of formal and informal 
political involvement amongst the population as a whole (Rose and Munro 2003, Van 
Biezen 2003, Millard 2004, Howard 2003). However, in these countries also, youth 
appear to be generally the least likely to vote or join a political party (Szczerbiak 2001, 
Fieldhouse et al. 2007, Rotariu and Comşa 2002).     
 
Despite  this,  political  participation  of  young  people  as  a  specific  group  in  post-
communist countries has attracted scarcely any in-depth academic study. Understanding 
of  the  interactions  between  political  agents,  institutions  and  young  people  in  these 
countries remains extremely limited. Given that the social and political experiences of 
present day youth in post-communist countries vary importantly from those of the older 
generations  who  grew  up  during  the  communist  regimes,  and  that  current  political 
engagement habits will likely influence the nature of political involvement chosen by 
future generations, this represents a serious gap in our knowledge. This is information 12 
 
which is required for the drawing up of viable initiatives to encourage greater youth 
political engagement in these countries in the future.  
  
The central aim of this thesis is to begin to address this issue and through a comparative 
case study provide a detailed outline of the nature of youth political participation and 
non-participation in two contrasting post-communist countries, Poland and Romania. 
By  further  comparing  these  findings  to  those  of  existing  studies  in  established 
democracies I seek to identify important similarities and differences. Despite the low 
levels of youth political involvement in these countries this thesis intentionally focuses 
on  both  participation  and  non-participation.  This  is  based  on  the  contention  that  to 
understand the wider issue of political disengagement it is also necessary to study the 
characteristics and motivations of those who choose to participate.  
 
The central question underpinning this thesis is; how do the reasons behind the political 
participation patterns of young people in newer post-communist democracies compare 
to  those  behind  youth  political  engagement  in  established  democracies?  More 
specifically  it  asks  to  what  degree  the  political  participation  patterns  of  the  current 
generation of  young people in Poland and Romania, the first generation to have no 
personal experience under communism, are influenced by legacies of the communist 
past  or  whether  significant  parallels  can  now  be  drawn  between  the  political 
participation habits of these young people and those in established democracies.  
 
1.1a Outline of Chapters in the Thesis 
 
This first chapter sets out the main definitions employed in this thesis. The first section 
outlines and explains why I have chosen a broad interpretation of the activities which 
constitute  political  participation  and  analyses  the  importance  of  active  political 
engagement for strengthening democratic quality, especially in newer democracies. The 
subsequent  section  presents  the  main  explanations  for  youth  political  participation 
patterns identified in research in established democracies and assesses specific post-
communist factors which could be expected to have a continuing influence over youth 
political engagement in newer democracies in Eastern Europe.  
 13 
 
In chapter two I first set out the methodological basis for the study. In particular, I detail 
and explain the logics behind the paired country comparison of Poland and Romania 
and present  the  sub-national  units  studied  within  these  countries.  These  are used to 
formulate  a  set  of  comparative  hypotheses  which  are  tested  throughout  the  thesis. 
Second, I explain the rationale behind the multi-method approach taken, and detail the 
qualitative and quantitative research methods employed in the study.  
 
The subsequent three chapters present and analyse the core research in the thesis. In 
each,  I  focus  on  a  specific  form  of  political  involvement.  Chapter  three  employs 
qualitative and quantitative data to build up a model for youth electoral participation 
and  non-participation  in  Poland  and  Romania.  Chapter  four  focuses  on  youth  party 
membership and using qualitative data and party materials analyses the logics behind 
participation  in  each  country.  Chapter  five  then  employs  descriptive  statistics  and 
qualitative data to outline and analyse youth political participation and non-participation 
in informal forms (volunteering and protest activities).  
 
In chapter six, I bring together the main findings of the thesis and assess the wider 
implications  of  these  for  understanding  youth  political  participation  and  non-
participation in newer East European democracies. I also question what this means for 
the future improvement in the quality of democracy in Poland and Romania.  
 
1.2 What is Political Participation? 
 
Although  the  study  of  political  participation  plays  a  central  role  in  many  political 
science studies, the meaning of the concept itself is disputed. To explain how political 
participation is understood in this study and which activities I have chosen to include 
under this heading, I therefore first give an outline of how scholars have interpreted and 
modified this concept over time and briefly review the main debates on which activities 
should be recognised as political participation. I then present the interpretation I choose 
to adopt.  
 
Although voter turnout remains the activity most readily associated with the study of 
political participation, the variety of acts undertaken by citizens to influence politics is 
actually much more diverse and can include, for example, party activism, signing a 14 
 
petition, attending a demonstration, contacting an official or wearing a campaign badge. 
Faced with such a wide range of potential activities, various significant attempts have 
been made by researchers to categorise these.  
 
The classic typology used in the seminal studies of participation by Verba and Nie 
(1972)  and  Barnes  and  Kaase  (1979)  distinguished  between  conventional  and 
unconventional  participation.  This  categorised  activities  conducted  through  official 
channels such as voting or party activism as conventional and others, organised outside 
such  channels  such  as  demonstrating  or  occupying  a  building,  as  unconventional. 
However,  the  continued  relevance  of  this  distinction  has  been  questioned  by  more 
recent studies of political involvement in established democracies. For instance, Norris 
(2003) argues that, in recent decades, the ways that citizens choose to interact with 
politics  have  changed  significantly.    These  changes,  she  claims,  are  evident  in  the 
repertoires (types of participation), agencies (the organisations through which citizens 
participate) and the targets (who or what the participant aims to influence) of political 
participation.  
 
For Norris and others (Verba et al. 1995, Van Deth 2001, Van Deth et al. 2007) this has 
meant that the distinction between conventional and unconventional participation has 
become increasingly blurred. In the past unconventional participation was seen to be 
activity  undertaken  by  a  rebellious  few  against  actions  by  the  state.  Yet  nowadays 
protest  activities  such  as  boycotting  and  demonstrating  have  become  much  more 
widespread (Tarrow 1998, Putnam 2000) and have a much larger range of potential 
targets which may include local businesses and international organisations as well as 
seeking to influence public opinion and behaviour (Norris 2002, 2003). At the same 
time,  the  agencies  of  participation  have  also  become  much  more  diverse.  New 
technology,  in  particular,  offers  opportunities  for  communication  and  organisation 
which were unavailable a few decades ago. 
 
These fundamental changes in the ways in which citizens engage politically mean that 
providing a universal definition as to which activities constitute political participation 
and which fall outside this has become increasingly problematic. This is particularly the 
case when scholars attempt to draw a line between activities which belong in political 
society and ones which fall under civil society.  15 
 
Notions  of  the  ‘political’  sphere  within  which  participation  takes  place  have  also 
required rethinking. In their study of democratic consolidation, Linz and Stepan (1996, 
p.8),  make  a  clear  distinction  between  political  society  which  constitutes  the  ‘core 
institutions’  of  ‘political  parties,  elections,  electoral  rules,  political  leadership, 
interparty alliances, and legislatures’ and economic and civil society. According to this 
rigid  distinction,  only  those  activities  which  are  overtly  ‘political’,  in  that  they  are 
plainly  directed  towards  influencing  state  policy,  would  fall  under  the  heading  of 
political society. However as discussed above, many activities in which citizens engage 
are not directly related to political parties or elections but may still aim to influence 
political decision-making.  These ‘overlaps’ between political and civil society have 
been  recognised  to  different  degrees by  scholars  (Potter  et  al.  1997,  Millard 1999). 
Howard (2003. pp.32-38), for example, distinguishes between political and civil society 
based on both the character of the actors and aims of various organisations. He argues 
that political society is mainly made up of elite actors and institutions while civil society 
is the ‘realm of ordinary citizens’ and that although civil society organisations may also 
seek political influence, unlike those in political society their main goal is not to gain 
political power. Despite this, he does nonetheless acknowledge a ‘small but significant 
overlap’ between the two groups. Thus, although he places organisations such as youth 
groups  and  community  groups  firmly  within  civil  society,  political  parties,  political 
interest groups and NGOs can be found in both civil and political society. 
 
Although such a distinction between civil and political society may be useful for studies 
of civil society, it has less value for political participation research. This is because 
attempting  to  delineate  political  society  and  civil  society  effectively  excludes  many 
activities from being seen as forms of political participation by placing them under the 
heading  of  civil  society.  For  instance,  under  this  distinction,  many  contrasting 
organisations  can  be  grouped  together  as  civil  society  organisations.  Environmental 
movements  are  one  example  of  this  problem.  The  contrast  between  large  scale 
environmental organisations which act against government policies to expand airports 
or develop nuclear power and a local group which aims to clean up a village pond is 
striking. In the first example, it is likely that the group’s aims to change state policy 
may mean that some of its participants come from other more formal organisations and 
could even include members of political parties.  In comparison, the second group’s 
activities may not aim to alter state policy but here also the participants may constitute 16 
 
local politicians or members of other local organisations. This is an inherent difficulty 
in specifying activities as belonging to civil society as opposed to political society and 
in turn excluding them from being considered as political participation activities
1.  
 
For this reason, I choose to employ a broader interpretation of political participation 
which  takes  into  account  the  fundamental  changes  in  the  repertoires  of  political 
engagement and how this relates to the participation patterns of young people. Thus, I 
intentionally avoid categorisation of activities as conventional or unconventional or as 
part of political or civil society. Instead, an activity is included as political participation 
if it aims to engender some type of political or behavioural change, is focused towards 
the  public  domain  and  is  voluntary.  This  includes  the  traditional  forms  of  political 
engagement, such as electoral participation and party membership but it is also broad 
enough to include a wide range of informal forms of participation such as activity in 
contentious politics
2 and voluntary organisations.  
 
In  employing  such  an  inclusive  interpretation,  my  intention  is  to  reach  a  fuller 
comprehension of how and why young people in Poland and Romania are involved or 
abstain from political engagement. Given the lack of current  research  on this issue, 
deliberately excluding activities on the grounds of being unconventional or part of civil 
society  could  seriously  limit  understanding  of  the  interrelated  influences  and  logics 
behind youth political participation patterns in these countries. 
 
 
1.3 Why does Political Participation Matter? 
 
Political participation is an important component of any democracy and the nature and 
amount of citizen political involvement can impact significantly on levels of democratic 
quality.  
 
                                                           
1 For a concise assessment of the problems in defining the boundaries of civil society see Kopecký 
(2003). 
2 Here I employ the definition of contentious politics given by Tarrow (1998, p.2), ‘Contentious politics 
occurs when ordinary people, often in league with more influential citizens, join forces in confrontations 
with elites, authorities, and opponents’. This I take to include activities such as demonstrating, petitioning 
and boycotting.  17 
 
1.3a Political Participation and Democratic Theory 
 
From the time of the city states in ancient Greece, the role citizen participation should 
play in a democracy has been the subject of intense debate (Behrouzi 2006, Held 2006). 
For some, models of direct democracy, as practised in the Greek cities, were seen as the 
ideal
3. These advocated the need for full participation of citizens in public decision-
making.  For  others,  a  more  restrictive  model  was  preferred  in  which  citizen 
participation was deemed less important than the need for a strong state which could 
enforce the law
4.  
 
Since the start of the twentieth century, however, the prevailing model of democracy in 
the  West  has been  of  liberal  democracy.  Underpinning  this  model  are  the ideals of 
individual liberty, citizen’s rights and the free market. Yet, within the liberal democracy 
model, views on the optimum amount and substance of citizen participation continue to 
vary greatly.    
 
At  one  extreme,  minimalist  or  procedural  theories  of  democracy  argue  that  citizen 
involvement in politics should be limited to electoral participation (Schumpeter 1976). 
Having  chosen  their  representatives,  citizens  should  then  leave  them to  their job of 
decision-making without further interference. Elections would therefore act as the sole 
guard against corrupt or bad leadership. During the 1960s and 1970s this approach came 
under heavy criticism by theorists who stressed the need for an active citizenry both at 
and  between  elections  to  legitimise  democratic  decision-making  (Pateman  1970). 
Unlike minimalist conceptions of democracy, which see ordinary citizens as unable to 
participate  effectively  in  politics,  advocates  of  participatory  democracy  stress  the 
benefits of such involvement for both the participants and democratic accountability 
(Pateman 1970, Macpherson 1983)
5. This was also the underlying logic of Barber’s 
(1984) strong democracy in the 1980s where he argued that active citizen participation 
would  ensure  against  ‘thin’  democracy,  as  championed  by  Schumpeter.  Instead, 
                                                           
3  Direct  democracy  was  first  proposed  in  the  Greek  City  States,  was  then  central  to  the  theories  of 
Rousseau and renewed by Marx and Engels during the industrial revolution. See Held (2006) or Behrouzi 
(2006) for discussion of the works of these theorists.  
4  See  Held  (2006)  for  a  detailed  analysis  of  these  models  where  he  explains  the  various  restrictive 
democracy models favoured by Machiavelli and Montesquieu.  
5 Participatory democracy is influenced by the theories of Rousseau and the notions of individual liberty 
advocated by J S Mill. See Held (2006) for discussion.  18 
 
decisions  made  as  a  result  of  political  talk  and  deliberation  would  strengthen  links 
between  citizens  and  elected  representatives  and  help  develop  civic  consciousness 
(Barber 1984, Tam 1998).  
 
However,  as  populations  have  increased  and  diversified,  the  possibilities  of 
implementing  such  a  ‘participatory  society’  appear  increasingly  unrealistic.  Indeed, 
theories of participatory democracy also assume that citizens desire to participate. This 
is  a  notion  which  has been  questioned  most  recently by  Hibbing  and  Theiss-Morse 
(2002, 2005), who argue that most citizens would prefer not to participate actively in 
politics.  Instead  many  would  opt  for  a  ‘stealth’  democracy  in  which  elected 
representatives  make  decisions  on  their  behalf,  leaving  them  free  to  pursue  other 
activities.  In  a  time  of  falling  levels  of  formal  political  engagement  in  established 
democracies,  this  theory  appears  to  correspond better  with  reality  than  participatory 
democracy. However, although the thesis is well supported by evidence that people are 
uninterested  in  and  apathetic  about  politics,  like  earlier  theories  of  minimalist 
democracy,  ‘stealth’  democracy  still  fails  to  address  the  question  of  how  to  ensure 
elected representatives do not abuse their power. If citizens only participate at elections, 
it could mean extended time periods in which the activities of elected representatives 
are left unchecked. Thus, although Hibbing and Theiss Morse (2002, 2005) offer an 
interesting argument against the unrealistic demands of a participatory society, they do 
not convincingly challenge the underpinning reasons for encouraging active political 
participation (Bowler et al. 2003, Gamson 2003).  
 
Deliberative  democracy  is  a  modernisation  of  the  ideals  proposed  by  advocates  of 
participatory democracy in the 1960s and 1970s. It is a school of thought which has 
developed  over  the  last  few  decades  specifically  in  response  to  the  perceived 
inadequacies  of  modern  day  liberal  democracy  (Behrouzi  2005,  Held  2006).    In 
particular, the increasing celebrity and professionalism surrounding party politics which 
is said to alienate citizens and detract from in-depth and serious political discussion. 
The need for a new type of political participation to address these issues is central to 
accounts of deliberative democracy. This is based on encouraging citizens to deliberate, 
discuss and argue about political issues in an informed manner (Fishkin 1991, Bohman 
1998, Cooke 2000, Dryzek 2002). The emphasis of this approach on increasing the 
quality  rather  than  the  amount  of  participation  is  an  important  contrast  with  earlier 19 
 
accounts  of  participatory  democracy.  However,  opinions  differ  greatly  amongst 
advocates of deliberative democracy about how to implement and assess the success of 
deliberation (Bohman 1996, Behrouzi 2005, Held 2006). Indeed, these concerns also 
underpin much of the general criticism levelled at deliberative democracy. Some argue 
that the demands it places on equality and rational agreement are unrealistic (Ryfe 2005, 
Stoker 2006). For example, Stoker (2006) agrees that deliberation amongst citizens can 
be  valuable  for  increasing  the  quality  of  democratic  decision-making  but  that  its 
emphasis  on  formal  techniques  can  also  exclude  many  potential  participants. 
Consequently,  instead  of  improving  access  to  participation,  it  potentially  furthers 
inequality.  
 
In response to this, Stoker (2006) proposes that informal deliberative techniques should 
form  a  part  of  a  larger  package  of  ways  designed  to  improve  interactions  between 
political agents and citizens. He takes the arguments presented by Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse (2002, 2005) seriously and accepts their concerns that many citizens simply do 
not want to become politically involved. However, he does not agree that this means 
political  participation  cannot  be  made  more  attractive  to  citizens.  His  approach  is 
therefore to suggest a ‘politics for amateurs’ which aims to initiate citizens into political 
engagement through methods to which they can relate. This is premised on the belief 
that active participation can be beneficial to democracy,  yet it also demands less in 
terms of quantity of participation than older theories of participatory democracy and is 
more inclusive than many accounts of deliberative democracy. This strikes a convincing 
balance  between  participatory  and  minimalist  theories  of  democracy  which  is  more 
attuned to the characteristics of liberal democracies today.  
 
1.3 a(i) Models of Democracy in Practice  
 
In recent decades, the trend in governmental and non-governmental practice towards 
citizen participation has been to increasingly favour a participatory element over stricter 
minimalist  approaches  to  democracy.  Much  of  this  is  directly  in  response  to  the 
perceived  fall  in  voter  turnout  and  political  party  membership  and  is  particularly 
prevalent  in  relation  to  youth  political  participation.  Many  initiatives  to  encourage 
greater youth political involvement are thus guided by this belief in the educative and 20 
 
habit-forming nature of participation (International IDEA 1999, Electoral Commission 
Research Report 2002).  
 
Academics,  however,  remain  less  convinced  about  the  ability  to  encourage  greater 
youth political participation through top-down initiatives engineered by governments 
and NGOs.  For instance, a study by Ødegård (2007) of an initiative to promote youth 
political participation through local youth councils in Norway was found to have had 
mixed results. Although he found that those young people who did get involved in the 
councils became significantly more politically integrated, the ability of the project to 
involve otherwise non-politically participative youth was limited. These findings have 
also been mirrored in studies conducted in the USA on initiatives to encourage interest 
amongst young people in elections (Shea and Green 2006). This corresponds with the 
criticisms  levelled  by  Stoker  (2006)  at  formal  schemes  designed  to  increase 
participation in ways which are very demanding in terms of participants’ resources. This 
means that the most likely to participate will be those who possess the requisite time 
and  interest.  In  turn  this  does  little  to  readdress  the  unequal  balance  as  to  who 
participates.  
 
These questions surrounding the best ways to encourage and improve youth political 
participation  are  particularly  relevant  to  the  situation  in  the  newer  democracies  of 
Eastern Europe. As young people are often the least politically participative age group 
in  these  countries  (Wallace  and  Kovatcheva  1998),  many  schemes  which  aim  to 
increase participation have been started by NGOs over the last few years. However, 
these are mostly implemented in a top-down manner and often by international level 
organisations
6. This means that these are also likely to be most accessible to young 
people who are already participative.  
 
This is especially problematic in post-communist countries where the role of political 
participation in strengthening the current state of democracy remains a topic of debate. 
The  process  of  democratisation  since  the  fall  of  communism  has  meant  that  the 
institutional or procedural aspects of democracy are now securely in place. However, 
                                                           
6 See for instance the UNICEF and World Bank 2002 Report ‘Youth in South Eastern Europe’, The 
International Youth Foundation 2005, ‘What Works in Youth Engagement in the Balkans’ or Factory of 
Future Warsaw, World Bank and Council of Europe, 2007, ‘Youth 4 Diversity’ Project. 21 
 
the absence of widespread citizen involvement has called into question how ‘good’ this 
democracy  is  as  regards  accountability  and  representativeness  of  elected  officials 
(Morlino 2004, Berg-Schlosser 2004). 
 
1.3b Political Participation and Democratisation  
 
The fall of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s meant 
an unprecedented number of countries simultaneously taking major steps to implement 
the institutions of liberal democracy. In turn this also sparked a renewal in the debate on 
the degree to which political participation is necessary  for a functioning democracy 
(Huntington 1991, Linz and Stepan 1996). Although initial approaches by researchers 
mainly  focused  on  determining  the  success  of  democratisation  in  each  country  by 
measuring the implementation of procedural or minimalist aspects of democracy such as 
free elections and institution building, it has become increasingly apparent that despite 
the  existence  of  these basic  democratic  institutions  the  quality  of  democracy  across 
these countries varies greatly (Huntington 1991, Wiarda 2002, Carothers 2002, Bunce 
2003,  Merkel  and  Croissant  2004)
7.  As  a  result,  work  concerned  with  assessing 
democratic  consolidation  on  procedural  grounds  alone  has  come  under  criticism 
(Schedler 1998, Millard 2004, Berg-Schlosser 2004). The main point being that the 
emphasis consolidation places on outcome rather than process means it equates multi-
party elections with democracy whilst largely ignoring the need for horizontal building 
of democracy through active citizen participation.  
This  is  particularly  problematic  given  the  findings  of  numerous  studies  of  citizen 
participation in newer democracies which find citizens to be notably disengaged not 
only  from  the  formal  types  of  political  participation  such  as  elections  and  political 
parties
8, but also from informal forms such as protest politics (Ekiert and Kubik 1998, 
Vanhuysse  2004)  and  involvement  in  interest  groups  (Mudde  2003,  Howard  2003). 
Therefore although procedural democracy may have been achieved, there exist obvious 
weaknesses in accountability and representativeness of elected officials (Merkel 2004). 
This has prompted theorists to rethink the relationship between political participation 
                                                           
7 Although the main focus of studies of democratic consolidation has been on procedural aspects of 
democracy, this has been expanded at times to include other more substantive aspects (Linz and Stepan 
1996). However, this approach has been criticised for lack of clarity and confusion of the issues involved 
(see Collier and Levitsky 1997 and Schedler 1998).  
8 For electoral participation see Tworzecki (2003), Rose and Munro (2003), Millard (2004). For party 
activism see Szczerbiak (2001), Toole (2003), Van Biezen (2003). 22 
 
and democratisation and to start to assess the quality of democracy in a country based 
on  a  much  larger  range  of  possible  criteria  than  those  offered  by  the  literature  on 
democratic consolidation. Thus, unlike consolidation, the study of democratic quality is 
primarily  concerned  with  the  processes  of  democratisation  rather  than  its  outcome 
(Croissant and Merkel 2004, Svetlozar 2005). Generally studies of democratic quality 
look not only at whether institutions of democracy exist but also at how effectively 
these  operate  to  ensure  accountability,  encourage  participation  and  to  progressively 
improve social, economic and political equality (Morlino 2004, Svetlozar 2005)
9.  
 
Within the expanded criteria used by democratic quality, active political participation by 
citizens is often seen as an important measurement of a ‘good democracy’ (Croissant 
and Merkel 2004, Faundez 2005, Svetlozar 2005). This is exemplified by the definition 
of democratic quality given by Diamond and Morlino (2004 pp.23-24). They state:  
 
‘democratic quality is high when we in fact observe extensive citizen participation not 
only through voting but in the life of political parties and civil society organisations, in 
the  discussion  of  public  policy  issues,  in  communicating  with  and  demanding 
accountability from elected representatives, in monitoring official conduct and in direct 
engagement with public issues at the local level’ 
 
By stressing the importance of a variety of horizontal links between citizens and elected 
representatives, it is plain that this approach goes beyond the stricter procedural based 
indicators used by many accounts of democratic consolidation and moves some steps 
towards the stance taken by advocates of participatory democracy. However, despite 
this wider scope, democratic quality has been primarily used by scholars to draw up 
typologies of different categories of democracy (Berg-Schlosser 2004, Merkel 2004). 
This has mainly been done by using quantitative based indicators which remain much 
better suited to measuring the degree to which a country has implemented procedural 
democracy rather than assessing the more complex nature of links between citizens and 
government.  As  a  result,  many  of  these  studies  tell  us  little  about  the  relationship 
                                                           
9 Morlino (2004) distinguishes three groups of factors which should be considered in assessing the level 
of democratic quality in a given country. These are procedure, content and outcome. Procedure includes 
the existence of the rule of law and assesses accountability. Content includes whether policy progresses 
the rights of freedom and equality.  Outcome assesses how well policy responds to the needs of citizens. 
For a detailed discussion of Democratic Quality see Svetlozar (2005). 23 
 
between political participation and the processes of democratisation. In particular, by 
relying on data which measures the quantity of political engagement in a given country 
compared  to  a  multinational  scale,  these  studies  lack  the  capacity  to  give  detailed 
information about country and age specific political participation patterns and how these 
are influenced by and impact upon the processes of democratisation.   
 
Understanding  how  and  why  young  people  participate  or  abstain  from  politics  is 
particularly relevant for strengthening the quality of democracy in the future. Studies in 
established democracies have found that the political interests of young people often 
differ significantly from those of older people and that the failure of governments to 
acknowledge their interests can lead to feelings of alienation and exclusion (Kimberlee 
2002,  Henn  et  al.  2005,  Fahmy  2006).  This  could  represent  a  breakdown  in  the 
correspondence between citizens and policy makers and also questions the long-term 
responsiveness  of  policy  to  citizens  needs.  These  are  key  factors  for  improving 
democratic  quality  (Morlino  2004,  Svetlozar  2005).  In  newer  democracies,  young 
people  often  appear  even  more  uninvolved  in  politics  than  youth  in  established 
democracies (Roberts and Jung 1995, Wallace and Kovatcheva 1998, Roberts 2003). 
This reflects the low level of citizen participation in post-communist populations as a 
whole  but  it  is  unclear  whether  the  reasons  for  disengagement  stem  from  the 
fundamental  social,  economic  and  political  changes  caused  by  democratisation  or 
whether  they  also  compare  with  trends  in  youth  participation  found  in  established 
democracies. This is a question which must be addressed in order for policy makers to 
respond to the needs of young people in newer democracies and thus to improve the 
quality of democracy for future generations.   
 
1.4 Youth Political Participation – A Special Case?  
 
As young people have been found to participate in politics in differing ways to older 
people, the specific theoretical and methodological challenges raised by this finding 
have generated a distinct sub-literature. This mainly focuses on the questions of youth 
abstention from formal types of political participation and identifying alternative modes 
of youth political engagement. 
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1.4a Explanations for Patterns of Youth Political  (Dis)engagement in Established 
Democracies 
 
Studies of political participation in established democracies have long found that age 
acts as an important factor in explaining the likelihood of an individual being politically 
involved. Thus, being young or very old is most associated with a lower likelihood of 
turning  out  to  vote  or  joining  a  political  party  (Verba  and  Nie  1972,  Dalton  1996, 
Franklin 2004, Henn et al. 2002, 2005, Sloam 2007, Fieldhouse et al. 2007, Russell 
2005, Cross and Young 2008). In recent decades the gap between young voters and 
older  has  apparently  widened  in  many  established  democracies  (Wattenberg  2002, 
Franklin  2004,  Fieldhouse  et  al.  2007)
10.  Additionally,  studies  of  political  party 
membership have found youth membership to have decreased sharply over the last few 
decades  in  various  countries  including  Canada  (Cross  and  Young  2008),  Belgium 
(Hooghe  et  al.  2004)  and  the  UK  (Whiteley  and  Seyd  2006).  In  contrast, however, 
studies have suggested a greater propensity for young people to participate in informal 
forms  of  political  involvement  such  as  demonstrating  and  volunteering  than  older 
generations (Roker et al. 1999, Youniss et al. 2002, Shea and Green 2006, Quintelier 
2007). That age matters for political participation is therefore indisputable, however it 
has proven much more complex to reach consensus on the roots to these patterns. 
  
Traditional explanations for lower turnout and party membership amongst young people 
focus on life-cycle factors. These dictate that young people face a number of so-called 
‘start-up’ problems such as finding employment, housing and starting a family which 
mean that they have less time and interest in becoming involved in politics than older 
cohorts (Verba and Nie 1972, Norris 2003, Kimberlee 2002, Fahmy 2006, Quintelier 
2007). They may also be more mobile than older people and this prevents them from 
becoming integrated in a particular community. Other theorists have also stressed the 
feelings of powerlessness which shortages of money and being at the bottom of the job 
market  can  engender  (Shea  and  Green  2007).  The  argument  follows  that  as  young 
people age and these initial problems are resolved, then they will be more likely to 
participate.  This  is  because  the  resources  available  to  them  in  terms  of  money, 
                                                           
10 However as Wattenberg (2002, p. 85) reports this gap may vary considerably from one country to 
another. He found Japan to have the largest gap between youngest and oldest cohorts at 37 points. This 
was closely followed by the USA and Switzerland at 31 points and 30 points respectively. Yet, the gap 
was only 8 points in Spain and 6 points in the Netherlands.  25 
 
education, time and interest will be greater. This explanation can therefore be used to 
account  for  a  curvilinear  pattern  in  voter  turnout  and  party  membership  where 
participation peaks in middle age (Norris 2003).  
 
Although studies continue to find evidence to support life-cycle explanations (Norris 
2003,  Blais  et  al.  2004),  this  rationale  also  suffers  from  some  very  significant 
weaknesses. The first of these is that it fails to account for the general decline in voter 
turnout and party membership in many established democracies across recent decades 
(Mair and Van Biezen 2001, Plutzer 2002, Hooghe et al. 2004, Franklin 2004). If indeed 
progressively greater numbers of people are failing to become engaged in traditional 
forms  of  political  participation  as  they  reach  middle  age,  it  signifies  that  life-cycle 
explanations alone are insufficient. In response, some observers have stressed that there 
are also important generational factors at stake (Lyons and Alexander 2000, Kimberlee 
2002, Blais et al. 2004, Henn et al. 2005). This dictates that socio-demographic and 
political changes over time influence participation of generations or cohorts differently.  
 
Important changes in socio-demographics across established democracies have meant 
that  the  boundary  between  where  youth  ends  and  adulthood  begins  has  become 
increasingly  blurred.  Traditionally,  adulthood  coincided  with  leaving  education, 
commencement of employment and starting of a family. Today, people often stay in 
education longer, face greater uncertainties in employment, start families later and are 
more mobile. It is argued that these factors delay adulthood and in turn mean that the 
changes in political participation expected by life-cycle effects, are also delayed or do 
not happen at all (Kimberlee 2002, Quintelier 2007)
11. However, researchers have found 
the most persuasive explanations for the decline in political involvement are due to the 
changing relationship between political agents and citizens (Kimberlee 2002, Blais et al. 
2004, Henn et al. 2005, Quintelier 2007). Particularly, they emphasise the increasing 
professionalisation and top-down nature of modern politics which has weakened links 
between  citizens  and politicians,  rendering parties  and politicians  ever  more remote 
from and irrelevant to the everyday lives of citizens.  
                                                           
11 One important socio-demographic change across established democracies has been the rise in level of 
educational  attainment.  In  a  time  where  political  participation  levels  are  declining,  this  appears  to 
contradict the usual correlation between education levels and political engagement. However, studies 
have found that education acts as a stronger indicator of political engagement for the youngest cohorts 
than older, suggesting that lesser educated young people are even less likely to be politically involved 
than in the past (Lyons and Alexander 2000, Blais et al. 2004).  26 
 
It is argued that this altered political culture has particularly impacted upon the political 
participation of young people (Kimberlee 2002, Blais et al. 2004, Henn et al. 2005). For 
instance, in their study of four generations of voters across seven elections in Canada
12, 
Blais et al. (2004) found that although life-cycle effects still partly account for the low 
propensity of young people to vote, more compelling was the way in which political 
cultural changes have made young people less likely to pay attention to politics and to 
feel  a  moral  obligation  to  vote.  This  finding  is  supported  by  studies  in  the  UK 
(Kimberlee 2002, Henn et al. 2005, Sloam 2007) which argue that as links between 
political agents and  citizens have weakened,  young voters have become specifically 
marginalised. Kimberlee (2002) contends that not only are the concerns of young people 
largely ignored by politicians and political parties but also the power of youth wings 
have weakened. This decreases the possibilities for youth representation in parties. In 
addition, as parties have become more professional and rely less on the support of grass 
roots members, campaigning for support has become mainly targeted at those groups 
most likely to give support, namely middle-aged and older voters. This argument was 
endorsed by the findings of Henn et al.’s (2005, p.574) survey of 705 first-time voters in 
the UK.  They found that the most persuasive reasons for non-participation were due to 
changes  in  political  culture  and  concluded  that  many  of  their  respondents  found 
politicians ‘unrepresentative and unresponsive to the needs of young people’.  
 
As well as accounting for low rates of participation in traditional forms of political 
participation such as voting and party activism, changes in political culture have also 
been cited as a reason for the increased engagement by young people in informal forms 
of participation (Norris 2002, 2003, Kimberlee 2002, Shea and Green 2006, Quintelier 
2007, Sloam 2007). Young people are said to have developed a different set of political 
values from older generations which make them more receptive to more informal types 
of  participation  including  single-issue  politics,  social  movement  activity  and 
volunteering.  
 
The findings of these recent studies represent an important shift of emphasis in the 
debate on youth political participation in established democracies. Although they accept 
                                                           
12 Blais et al. (2004) distinguish 4 generations or cohorts in their study. These are the Pre-Baby Boomers 
(born  before  1945),  the  Baby  Boomers  (born  1945-1959),  the  Generation  born  in  the  1960s  (or 
Generation X) and the Generation born in the 1970s.   27 
 
that life-cycle effects can still account, in part, for the lower propensity of young people 
to engage in traditional forms of participation, they also find that changes in political 
culture  have  significantly  altered  the  way  in  which  the  youngest  cohorts  relate  to 
politics. Thus they argue that young people are not necessarily apathetic or uninterested 
in politics but that instead they are alienated from formal politics. As a result, it has 
become common to frame explanations for low rates of youth political participation as 
an apathy versus alienation argument (O’Toole et al. 2003, Henn et al. 2005, Sloam 
2007, Quintelier 2007).  
 
1.4b Don’t care or don’t like? Apathy versus Alienation 
 
Recent  studies  in  established  democracies  have  stressed  that  there  is  a  continuing 
mismatch  between  popular  discourse  and  qualitative  academic  research  on  the 
disengagement of youth from politics (Wattenberg 2002, Kimberlee 2002). They give 
examples of how youth apathy about politics is blamed by the media and politicians for 
the declining  rates of participation.  In contrast, they show that qualitative academic 
studies  which  investigate  how  young  people  actually  feel  about  politics  find  young 
people to be interested in political issues but alienated from formal politics. However, 
such a bipolar approach could also be misleading.  
 
The first difficulty with this approach is that it allows little space for coexistence of 
apathy and alienation whereby  young people may  exhibit characteristics of political 
apathy together with those of political exclusion. Another problem with this argument 
arises when it is applied to understanding motivations behind young people becoming 
involved in informal forms of political participation. By understanding non-participative 
young people as being ‘turned-off’ from formal political agents as a result of feelings of 
alienation and exclusion rather than apathy, it can appear logical to conclude that these 
young people are instead becoming involved in alternative forms of participation which 
they  find  more  inclusive  and  relevant  to  their  everyday  lives  (Quintelier  2007). 
However, this is a bold claim.  
 
Even if involvement in informal forms of political participation has increased amongst 
youth  in  established  democracies,  the  causal  link  between  this  and  alienation  from 
formal  political  agents  remains  largely  untested.  Indeed,  the  young  people  who  are 28 
 
engaged in such informal forms of participation often form a small, particularly active 
group and may have become involved for a large variety of different reasons of which 
dissatisfaction with political agents is only one (Shea and Green 2006). As such, this 
group could be seen to represent the minority of young people in any society who will 
be predisposed to become involved in public activity rather than the largely inactive 
majority. Therefore, in any study of youth political participation, there is a need for very 
careful  assessment  of  both  participants  and  non-participants  in  order  to  unpack  the 
complex web of influences and motivations behind engagement and abstention.  
 
1.4c Explaining Youth Political (Dis)engagement in Newer Democracies 
 
That young people in the newer democracies of Eastern Europe are even less politically 
participative  than  their  counterparts  in  established  democracies  has  caused  alarm 
amongst  international  and  NGO  observers.  There  is  particular  concern  that  this 
disengagement appears not only to comprise the formal types of participation such as 
voting  and  party  activism  but  also  extends  to  involvement  in  informal  forms  of 
participation (Wallace and Kovatcheva 1998, Civitas Foundation 2002, UNICEF and 
the World Bank 2003). However, these very low levels of youth participation are also 
set  against  a  background  of  notably  low  rates  of  political  involvement  across  post-
communist societies as a whole where voter turnout levels have generally fallen since 
the first free elections of the early 1990s, party membership numbers remain weak and 
widespread activity in protest and voluntary organisations appears lacking
13. As a result 
the  question  of  whether  the  patterns  of  youth  political  participation  in  newer 
democracies  are  a  product  of  specifically  post-communist  factors  or  those  affecting 
young people in established democracies or indeed a mixture of both is a timely one.  
 
1.4c(i) Existing Study on Youth Political Participation in Newer Democracies 
 
The  academic  literature  on  political  participation  patterns  in  newer  democracies  is 
mainly concerned with trends in the population as a whole with little regard for different 
age groups. Nonetheless, the explanations offered by such research can be used as a 
starting point for more detailed analysis of youth participation patterns.  
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Explanations for widespread political disengagement in newer democracies often focus 
on the large-scale alterations to politics, economics and society brought on as a result of 
the transformation to democracy from communism. In particular, citizen disappointment 
with free-market reforms, perceived political instability and corruption are said to have 
led  to  disillusionment  with  politicians  and  decision-makers  (Rose  and  Munro  2003, 
Tworzecki  2003,  Howard  2003).  Equally,  the  experience  of  authoritarian,  one-party 
systems during communism is thought to have contributed to a continued distrust and 
fear of politicians and political parties. The combination of these two major factors has 
meant that not only are many people ‘turned off’ from voting and party activism, but 
that they also have little interest in entering the public sphere through protesting or 
volunteering (Howard 2003, Vanhuysse 2003). The specific relevance of these two sets 
of factors in explaining youth political participation patterns deserves greater analysis.  
 
1.4c(ii) A Post-Communist ‘Period’ Effect?  
 
The vast changes in politics, economics and society after 1989 in the post-communist 
countries of Eastern Europe can be seen as constituting a period effect. Norris (2003, p. 
9) defines a period effect as a ‘particular major historical event which had a decisive 
impact  upon  all  citizens  in  a  society  at  one  point’.  Established  democracies  have 
experienced period effects too, such as the political and societal changes exemplified by 
the aftermath of the economic depression of the 1920s and the mass student protests of 
the  1960s.  However  these  have  not  had  the  same  universal  impact  on  the  entire 
population as caused by the end of communism and transformation to democracy in 
Eastern Europe. In particular, democratisation in post-communist countries has meant 
the development largely from scratch of the institutions required for voluntary political 
participation by citizens, namely a multi-party system, free elections and civil society 
organisations.  This  represents  a  reversal  of  the  way  in  which  these  developed  in 
established democracies in the 19
th century, where parties and other organisations were 
created as an answer to societal needs and demands rather than a top-down, elite centred 
response  to  the  requirements  of  procedural  democracy  (Rose  and  Shin  2001,  Van 
Biezen 2003).  
 
This ‘democratisation backwards’ (Rose and Shin 2001) has seen political parties in 
newer democracies largely characterised by a small, urban-based elite leadership which 30 
 
has little need or interest in mobilising mass membership (Szczerbiak 2001). Equally 
civil  society  organisations,  although  prolific  in  the  first  stages  of  post-communism 
typically lack a grass-roots membership base (Mendelson and Glenn 2002, Kopecký 
2003). In turn, this lack of everyday political participation is also deemed to have had an 
adverse  effect  on  electoral  participation,  where  citizens  often  identify  a  separation 
between their private lives and public institutions and do not feel that their involvement 
can make much difference (Rose and Munro 2003).  
 
That these fundamental changes in political, economic and social life have impacted 
importantly on political participation patterns of post-communist citizens is thus clear. 
However,  less  is  understood  about  whether and  how  these  changes  have  influenced 
political involvement patterns of age groups differently. This is a question which is 
largely ignored by existing study on post-communist youth which tends to be either 
outdated or focused primarily on economic and social changes rather than detailing and 
understanding youth political involvement.  
 
Much existing published research on youth political participation in the post-communist 
countries of Eastern Europe dates from the first phase of post-communism (Roberts and 
Jung 1995, Wallace and Kovatcheva 1998). Due to their involvement in the collapse of 
communism, it appears the behaviour of youth was initially seen as a test case for how 
democratic political participation would develop in these countries. However, as time 
passed, and young people were not showing signs of mass mobilisation, the interest in 
their participation habits seems also to have ebbed.  
 
Given the rapid nature of social, economic and political changes in newer democracies, 
studies conducted in the early period of post-communism can offer little information on 
the  specific  behaviour  patterns  of  young  people  in  these  countries  in  the  early  21
st 
century. Especially, given that the political socialisation of the present young cohort has 
taken place within the context of Europeanisation rather than communism and early 
democratic transition. In particular, up-to-date information is required on whether trends 
identified in youth political participation in established democracies are also visible in 
newer democracies and, if so, how these patterns and influences compare.  
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Secondly those academic studies which do exist on young people in post-communist 
countries have tended to focus primarily on the economic and social situation of youth 
and to a lesser extent on how they participate politically (Wallace and Kovatcheva 1998, 
Roberts 2003, Roman 2003)
14. This is not to say that the economic and social situation 
of young people is unimportant for the understanding of their political involvement and 
indeed  the  findings  of  this  research  are  very  valuable  for  political  science–oriented 
research.  Specifically,  recent  study  has  found  that  young  people  occupy  a  unique 
position as regards economic and social life in post-communist countries which means 
that  they  are  often  the  best  and  worst  placed  in  society  to  take  advantage  of 
opportunities (Blokker and Dallago 2008). Young people often face a greater degree of 
economic insecurity than other age groups but at the same time they are also frequently 
better situated to take advantage of employment and business opportunities as many 
have  greater  flexibility  and  are  better  educated
15  than  older  people.  This  complex 
situation could therefore also be expected to be reflected in the political participation 
patterns of young people in these countries. On the one hand, the social and economic 
insecurities they face may leave them with fewer resources, like time and money, to 
participate in politics in comparison with older age groups.  On the other hand, their 
relative flexibility and higher education levels could also conceivably have the opposite 
effect on their availability and motivation to engage politically.  
 
1.4c(iii) A Legacy of Communist Experience? 
 
The second main argument commonly used to account for the lack in active political 
participation in post-communist countries is based on the role of communist political-
cultural  legacies.  These  mainly  stress  that  attitudes  shaped  by  experiences  under 
communism  have  a  continuing  negative  influence  on  political  participation  today 
(Smolar 1997, Kunovich 2000, Rose and Shin 2001, Howard 2003, Tworzecki 2003).  
 
The  first  aspect  of  this  is  the  role  that  official  political  participation  had  under 
communist  regimes.  Although  these  were  effectively  one-party  states,  there  was 
                                                           
14 In contrast to academic studies, youth issues in newer democracies have attracted considerable attention 
from both international and national NGOs working in the area (For examples see footnote 6). Although 
the information contained in such reports is very useful, they often cover a very wide scope of youth 
social,  political  and  economic  issues  and  thus  cannot  offer  the  rigorous  academic  analysis  which  is 
required if we are to reach a more detailed understanding of youth political participation patterns. 
15 See section 2.2d(ii) 32 
 
pretence of democracy which was perpetuated by the holding of uncompetitive elections 
and  the  existence  of  a  vast  array  of  communist-led  social  organisations.  However, 
participation in these elections and organisations was often a result of coercion. The 
result  of  this  was  that  the  communist  regime  sought  to  permeate  many  aspects  of 
citizens’ lives, both public and private. Scholars have since identified this prolonged 
period  of  compulsory  political  participation  as  an  important  factor  in  the  choice  to 
abstain from political involvement during post-communism arguing that this experience 
has not only left citizens distrustful of public institutions and civil society organisations 
but has also meant that many have opted to retract into their own private networks of 
friends and family (Smolar 1997, Kunovich 2000, Rose and Shin, 2001, Howard 2003). 
Further, as Tworzecki (2003) points out, the realisation that after the fall of communism 
political  participation  had  become  a  voluntary  activity  was  coupled  with  another 
realisation  that  voluntary  abstention  was  also  now  possible,  a  choice  which  many 
citizens therefore chose to embrace.  
 
The role of communist legacies in influencing political participation patterns in Eastern 
European  countries  is  convincing.  However  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the 
importance of this factor will vary depending on age group. Particularly, it is necessary 
to consider this argument very carefully when analysing youth political participation. 
Indeed, scholars have emphasised that generational replacement may be one of the only 
ways in which the influences of communist legacies on political participation can lessen 
(Sztompka 1996, Howard 2003). This is based on the argument that until the majority of 
the population is made up of citizens who are young enough to have been socialised 
entirely under democratic regimes, experiences under communism will inevitably have 
a continuing influence on political involvement (Sztompka 1996). However, Howard 
(2003) is also careful to stress that generational replacement is a slow and complex 
process and although young people may have had no direct involvement in communist 
structures, they will likely be influenced by those who did, namely parents and teachers. 
Thus  the  patterns  of  political  participation  behaviour  induced  by  the  communist 
structures may endure and reproduce themselves for some time.  
 
However,  the  lack  of  in-depth  study  into  youth  political  participation  in  post- 
communist  countries  means  that  there  is  little  understanding  of  the  role  communist 
legacies may play in influencing youth political participation. Indeed Howard (2003) 33 
 
has specifically emphasised the need for such specific youth-oriented studies, stressing 
that given rapidly changing circumstances in these countries, this research should be on-
going  in  order  to  pinpoint  new  trends  in  youth  political  participation.  Of  particular 
interest is the first completely ‘post-communist generation’, namely those young people 
who are too young to have had any political socialisation through communist structures 
such  as  youth  organisations.  The  unique  position  of  this  group  in  post-communist 
societies means that their political engagement patterns represent a vital resource for 
analysing the interaction of the enduring influences of communism and post-communist 
political changes as well as the possible convergence of political participation trends 
with those observed in established democracies. This age group is the subject of this 
thesis and their distinctive position in post-communist societies therefore merits further 
discussion.  
 
1.4c(iv)  A  Framework  for  the  Political  Participation  Patterns  of  the  New  Post-
Communist Cohort 
 
The empirical focus of this study is the political participation patterns of young people 
between the ages of 16 and 25 in Poland and Romania. As even the eldest of this group 
were  too  young  at  the  time  of  the  fall  of  communism  to  have  had  any  personal 
experience  of  communist  political  socialisation  through  youth  organisations  and 
communist backed media, and as they are the first to have benefited from the wider 
opportunities offered by an enlarged European Union, in many ways these young people 
can be said to make up the first ‘true’ post-communist generation. This places them in a 
unique position which differentiates them from the older generations in post-communist 
countries, however at the same time it does not mean that they necessarily share the 
characteristics of their counterparts in established democracies. Particularly, although 
they did not experience communism first-hand, they have been politically socialised in a 
time  of  great  political,  economic  and  social  flux  where  attitudes  towards  political 
participation inherited from the communist era coexist with political and socioeconomic 
insecurities brought on by post-communist transformation. This means that it is very 
difficult to predict how this young generation will participate politically and how the 
contrasting  influences  from  older  generations  and  from  more  general  Europe-wide 
trends in youth political involvement have impacted on their participation patterns.  
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Thus, in order to address the question of how this post-communist generation in Poland 
and Romania participate in politics and how this compares to older generations and to 
the  political  involvement  of  young  people  in  established  democracies,  I  employ  a 
framework based on the theoretical constructs of exit, voice and loyalty drawn up by 
Hirschman  (1970).  These  concepts  can  provide  a  useful  way  of  approaching 
comparative based research into youth political participation.  
 
Hirschman’s  framework  is  particularly  apt  for  this  study  because  of  its  ability  to 
combine economic and sociological approaches to understanding political institutions 
and individual choice to participate politically or abstain from involvement. Although 
the framework itself derives from economics, Hirschman does not demand the strict 
application  of  a  purely  rational  choice  approach  to  understanding  individual 
participation (Dowding et al. 2000, Pfaff 2006). That is, where individual decisions to 
participate  or  abstain  are  based  on  a  cost-benefit  calculation  where  benefits  of 
participation  must  outweigh  any  costs  incurred  (Shepsle  1989,  Koelble  1995).  As a 
result, this approach argues that those individuals who choose to participate politically 
do so because involvement is judged to be in their self-interest (Olson 1971)
16. This 
method of understanding participation however has a number of shortcomings (Shepsle 
1989, Koelble 1995). One of these is that the rational choice approach does not allow 
for the possibility that individual decisions may also be influenced by the society around 
them (Granovetter 1985, Shepsle 1989). This contrasts starkly with the views of some 
sociologists  who  contend  that  wider  cultural  and  societal  trends  are  key  to 
understanding individual behaviour. Indeed, some argue that an individual cannot make 
a rational decision, as the degree of ‘embeddedness’ in wider society means that, despite 
an  appearance  of  rationality,  decisions  are  actually  determined  for  us  (Granovetter 
1985). However, by dismissing the possibility for rational choice entirely, this approach 
has also attracted critics (Hall and Taylor 1996 p.21) who claim that this concentration 
on the macro-level over simplifies the relationship between individuals and the society 
around them.  
                                                           
16 Olson’s (1971) study provided a response to the so-called ‘paradox of participation’, namely why 
rational individuals should choose to participate in collective action which is aimed towards the collective 
good. He argued that individuals will only participate in collective action when they consider that this 
participation will offer them some ‘selective incentives’. Otherwise, they will simply choose to ‘free-ride’ 
meaning that they will allow others to do the work and they will merely take advantage of the collective 
goods  gained.  For  a  detailed  overview  of  the  relationship  between  rational  choice  and  political 
participation see Whiteley (1995).  35 
 
 
More recently, scholars have attempted to find a balance between these economic and 
sociological  standpoints.  For  instance,  Koeble  (1995)  provides  an  overview  of  how 
studies increasingly combine aspects of these two approaches to further understanding 
of relationships between institutions and individuals. Importantly, instead of arguing 
that individual choice is ‘determined’ by society and rejecting rational choice altogether, 
they  contend  that  individual  rational  decisions  are  rather  ‘influenced’  by  society. 
Shepsle (1989) also acknowledges the ways in which the rational choice approach can 
benefit  from  borrowing  elements  of  the  behaviouralist  sociological  approach.  In 
particular, he argues that understanding the political context surrounding institutions is 
vital  to  explaining  how  individuals  come  to  make  decisions  on  participation.  Thus 
political institutions may initially be created by the rational choices of individuals but 
are then shaped and modified by wider societal trends and contexts.  
 
Hirschman’s framework can also be seen to compromise between the economic and 
sociological  models.  Indeed,  although  his  original  thesis  was  based  on  explaining 
differing individual reactions to a decline in product quality, it has proven to have a 
much wider scope in comparative politics (Dowding et al. 2000). Originally, exit could 
be understood as the decision not to buy a product or to leave an organisation, voice was 
to complain or protest against a change in product quality or organisational strategy and 
feelings of loyalty to a product or organisation were thought to diminish the likelihood 
of exit and increase the possibility of voice (Hirschman 1970). In this form, the link to 
economics is relatively clear, as individual decisions to exit or to use voice appear as an 
outcome of rational decision making. However, over time, as the framework has been 
applied to various political events, the influence of society, structure and culture over 
these decisions has become clearer.  
 
One example of this is given by Hirschman (1993) himself who used his framework to 
analyse the events which led to the breakdown of communism in Eastern Germany 
(GDR)  in  1989.  Here  he  acknowledged  that  the  specific  historical  and  structural 
differences  between  Eastern  Germany  and  its  communist  neighbours  (Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary) meant that the possibilities for exit and voice differed. In 
particular, he highlighted the greater ability for people in Eastern Germany to exit the 
country  physically  through  emigration.  However,  it  was  also  this  possibility  to  exit 36 
 
which challenged his previous conceptions for the relationship between exit and voice. 
Whereas  the  original  thesis  suggested  that  this  was  a  inverse  relationship,  where 
possibilities for exit would be likely to decrease the likelihood for voice, the protests at 
the end of communism in Eastern Germany meant that exit and voice were both present 
at the same time.  
 
This relationship was explored further by Pfaff (2006) in his detailed, multi-method 
approach to analysing the collapse of Eastern Germany. He showed that possibilities to 
exit  through  emigration  served,  in  this  case,  to  trigger  voice  within  the  country. 
Although  voice  generally  has  higher  costs  than  exit,  meaning  it  is  often  the  least 
attractive option, Pfaff (2006) found that the specific social and political contexts were 
crucial to understanding why exit and voice worked in a complimentary manner in the 
East German case. Importantly, he illustrated how the strong social networks within 
Eastern Germany were essential to both initiate and sustain protest. Thus, even though 
exit possibilities meant many people who could have been instrumental in exercising 
voice left the country, these strong social networks survived.  By placing emphasis on 
networks, Pfaff (2006) effectively borrows from social movement literature which is 
based in sociology to help explain and expand Hirschman’s originally economic-based 
framework.  
 
This ability for the expansion of Hirschman’s framework into one which combines both 
economic  and  sociological  approaches  to  understanding  individual  decisions  to 
participate politically makes it particularly appropriate for this study which analyses 
three  distinct  forms  of  youth  political  participation.  Each  of  these,  electoral 
participation,  party  membership  and  involvement  in  informal  modes  of  political 
participation  such  as  social  movements,  draw  from  separate  literatures  which  have 
different approaches to understanding involvement. Whereas electoral participation has 
often been understood in terms of rational choice, the literature on social movements 
derives mainly from sociology. By employing a broad framework such as exit, voice 
and loyalty, my aim is to be able to combine the findings from each of these approaches 
in order to reach a greater understanding of youth political participation in Poland and 
Romania. More precisely I seek to use the framework to identify possible trade-offs 
between the different forms of participation and to compare this with existing study in 
established democracies.  37 
 
 
My interpretation of exit, voice and loyalty and how these apply to the question of 
youth political involvement is as follows; Exit refers to the choice made by a young 
person  to  not  only  abstain  from  involvement  in  the  traditional  forms  of  political 
participation, voting and party membership, but to also opt out of informal forms such 
as volunteering and contentious politics. Voice refers to the choice made by a young 
person,  to  become  involved  in  political  actions  which  have  as  their  aim  changing 
current policy or public opinion. This is most likely to take the form of involvement in 
informal modes of participation, and in particular in protest activities, but could also be 
evident in the choice to participate in elections. Loyalty refers to the choice made by a 
young person to engage in traditional forms of political participation, particularly by 
becoming a member of a political party
17.  
 
 If the exit, voice, loyalty framework is applied to the recent findings of studies of youth 
participation in established democracies, we find that although party membership and 
voter turnout  has been seen to decrease, this does not necessarily mean that young 
people are exiting political life altogether. Indeed, as outlined in Section 1.4a, some 
studies contend that instead of opting out of political involvement completely, young 
people may be showing a greater interest and participation in voice, through alternative 
modes of participation such as volunteering and contentious politics. This suggests that 
there may be a trade-off between loyalty, exit and voice, where  young people have 
increasingly  weaker  ties  with  traditional  political  agents  and  processes.  In  turn  this 
increases their likelihood of exit from political participation altogether or alternatively 
to exercise voice against traditional politics. It also suggests that exit and voice, as was 
suggested by Hirschman (1993) and Pfaff (2006) in their studies of Eastern Germany, 
can coexist.  
 
In newer democracies however, as shown in Section 1.3b, studies have found older 
generations to have very low levels of voter turnout, party membership and also forms 
                                                           
17  It  could,  however,  be  expected  that  different  people  would  demonstrate  varying  types  of  loyalty, 
depending  on  the  political  and  social  context.  For  instance,  loyalty  to  a  political  party  could  differ 
depending on the form of selective incentives made available to members (Pfaff 2006). If members are 
loyal because of access to material benefits they are less likely to retain this loyalty and indeed try and 
reform from within than members who are loyal due to expressive concerns such as ideological or policy-
seeking beliefs. This is analysed further in Chapter four, section 4.5.  
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which  use  voice.  Indeed,  these  countries  are  characterised  by  what  appears  to  be 
widespread exit from all forms of political involvement. If this also extends to young 
people,  this  suggests  that  the  trade-offs  between  exit,  voice  and  loyalty  in  post-
communist  countries  may  differ  significantly  from  these  found  in  established 
democracies. To determine whether this is the case and to analyse the reasons behind 
individual decisions to participate politically or to abstain, it is necessary to assess how 
different  social  and  political  contexts  influence  individual  level  rational  decision-
making.  
 
1.5 Conclusions  
 
This  chapter  has  presented  the  main  definitions  and  questions  which  underpin  the 
research contained in this thesis. In particular, I have shown that the employment of a 
wide definition of political participation is necessary in order to attempt to reach an 
understanding of the interrelations and connections between different modes of political 
involvement. This is especially relevant to the question of youth political participation 
as young people have been found to have a different conception of politics from older 
generations and appear to show greater interest in informal forms of participation than 
in traditional methods. Equally, such an inclusive definition is also necessary to explore 
political  participation  patterns  in  newer  democracies,  where  the  existence  of  active 
citizen participation is particularly vital to the improvement in the quality of democracy. 
Young people play an important role in ensuring this for the future, and given the lack 
of existing study on youth political participation and non-participation in newer East 
European  democracies  this  is  an  issue  which  urgently  needs  to  be  addressed. 
Particularly, we need to understand whether the political participation patterns of the 
young post-communist generation continue to follow those of older generations in these 
countries or whether there is evidence that these are  also beginning to reflect more 
general trends in youth political involvement in established democracies. In order to 
address this question, I presented the framework of exit, voice and loyalty within which 
the research in this thesis is analysed.  
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CHAPTER TWO – A MULTI-METHOD COMPARATIVE 
APPROACH 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
As  explained  in  chapter  one,  the  research  questions  of  this  thesis  focus  on  the 
comparison between the extent and nature of youth political participation in established 
democracies and newer democracies. To address these questions, I chose to compare 
youth political engagement across two contrasting Eastern European post-communist 
countries and to use the findings of this study as a basis for comparison with existing 
studies in newer democracies. In order to further contextualise these findings and to 
control for local level variation, I also conducted a series of sub-national comparisons in 
each country which were selected on the basis of political and social make up.  
 
Following existing studies of youth political participation in established democracies, I 
chose  to  employ  a  multi-method  approach  in  my  research  design.  This  meant  that 
although the main focus was on qualitative methods, quantitative methods were also 
used,  when  appropriate,  to  strengthen  and  provide  standardisation  when  comparing 
findings across differing countries. The first part of this chapter sets out and explains 
my  choice  of  paired  country  comparison  and  sub-national  units  within  Poland  and 
Romania. The following section then presents a rationale for the multi-method approach 
taken and details the various qualitative and quantitative methods used in the research.  
 
2.2 The Comparative Approach 
 
2.2a. Why a Paired Country Comparison?  
 
I  chose  to  conduct  a paired  country  comparison  for  this  study because  of  the clear 
advantages  such  an  approach  offers  over  both  large  ‘N’  studies  and  single  country 
studies. This is appropriate for the study of youth political participation which remains a 
relatively under-researched area in newer democracies. First, in comparison to a large 
‘N’  study  which  attempts  to  categorise  and  research  many  contrasting  countries,  a 40 
 
paired country comparison allows more intensive study into the case countries under 
scrutiny. In this way, it can help to avoid the ‘conceptual stretching’ which is often seen 
as a danger in large ‘N’ studies (Sartori 1970, Landman 2004). Second, as explained in 
section 2.3, this is especially relevant for the study of youth political participation where 
the findings of large ‘N’ studies risk being compromised as they fail to take into account 
the different ways in which young people conceive of politics.  
 
Equally, a paired country comparison offers distinct advantages over a single country 
case study. Instead of focusing on ‘thick description’ of one national case, it allows for 
observations to be tested across contrasting political, economic and social contexts and 
therefore is able to generate more robust general conclusions (Hague et al. 1992).  Thus, 
by  holding  the  dependent  variable  (youth  political  participation)  constant  and 
comparing  it  across  two  contrasting  post-communist  countries,  the  study  seeks  to 
unpack the various factors which impact youth political engagement. In particular, this 
approach allows us to distinguish the influence of specific post-communist factors on 
youth  political  engagement  and  to  question  the  extent  to  which  findings  on  youth 
political  participation  in  Poland  and  Romania  resemble  those  in  established 
democracies.  Given  the  current  lack  of  in-depth  study  into  this  subject  in  post-
communist countries and that existing research is mainly made up of large ‘N’ studies 
(Wallace and Kovatcheva 1998, Riordan et al. 1995, Roberts 2003) or single-country 
studies (Machacek 2001, Roberts and Jung 1995), a paired country comparison offers a 
different and useful perspective.  
 
2.2b Why Poland and Romania?  
 
To  address  the  research  goals  of  this  study,  it  was  necessary  to  choose  two  post-
communist  countries  in  Eastern  Europe  which  contrasted  importantly  on  several 
independent  variables  which  underpin  the  logics  behind  political  participation.  This 
would allow for both an in-depth study of youth political participation in these countries 
and  for  a  revealing  comparison  with  findings  of  existing  studies  in  established 
democracies.  For  this  reason,  I  chose  Poland  and  Romania  on  the  basis  that  these 
countries are representatives of the ‘most-different’ cases within the post-communist 
region (Przeworski and Teune 1970). On the surface Poland and Romania do appear to 
share  some  obvious  similarities.  Geographically  they  are  the  largest  of  the  post-41 
 
communist states in Eastern Europe, have large agrarian populations and both comprise 
a number of distinct historical regions. However, despite these similarities, contrasting 
communist  experiences  and  present  socioeconomic  and  political  contexts  mean  that 
Poland  and  Romania  vary  considerably  in  terms  of  socioeconomic  resources  and 
political opportunity structures. These are differences, which could be expected to have 
important  influences  on  the  level  and  forms  of  youth political participation in each 
country. Thus, by firstly comparing findings across these countries and secondly by 
comparing these with findings of existing studies in established democracies, it will be 
possible to first identify common factors which influence youth political participation in 
newer Eastern European democracies and second to assess how this compares with the 
situation in established democracies.  
 
Poland and Romania can be considered ‘most-different’ cases within post-communist 
Eastern  Europe  on  the  basis  of  two  main  sets  of  independent  variables.  These  are 
communist experience and the political opportunity structures and resources embodied 
in  their  post-communist  political  and  socioeconomic  contexts.  These  variables  have 
potentially important consequences for youth political participation in each country. In 
the following sections, I detail these factors and explain why they are significant for an 
assessment of youth political engagement.  
 
2.2c Communist Experience 
 
Although outwardly the communist systems which developed across Eastern European 
countries  after  the  Second  World  War  appeared  alike,  they  actually  differed 
significantly across the region. This was reflected in the degree of control exercised 
over society, the way in which people interacted with the one-party state and ultimately 
in the style of transition to democracy (Kitschelt 1995, Linz and Stepan 1996). These 
differences are made clear when we contrast the communist experiences of Poland and 
Romania.  
  
Kitschelt  (1995)  distinguishes  this  variance  as  being  between  National  Consensus 
Communism  (Poland)  and  Patrimonial  Communism  (Romania).  National  Consensus 
Communism relates to the fact that throughout Poland’s experience with Communism, 
state-society  relations  in  Poland  were  characterised  by  attempts  by  the  regime  to 42 
 
appease the ever more demanding and well mobilised population (Kubiak 1999). This 
was the case from after 1956 when the Polish communist elite succeeded in separating 
itself from total Soviet control and embarked on a move towards ‘national socialism’. In 
practice this meant some concessions were granted to the population in return for basic 
compliance with the communist party. However, despite these allowances, the Polish 
communist elite continued to fail to satisfy or suppress the population who by the 1980s 
had become a mass, organised dissident force. The famous trade union, Solidarity, was 
the culmination of this dissidence
18. Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 263) state that by the 
early  1980s  Solidarity  ‘possessed  hegemony  in  civil  society’  and  that  only  military 
strength  and  the  spectre  of  the  Soviet  Union  allowed  for  the  communist  party  to 
maintain control.  
 
Such  was  the  degree  of  Polish  social  mobilisation,  that,  unlike  in  other  Eastern 
European  cases,  in  Poland  the  communist  regime  arguably  fell  short  of  becoming 
totalitarian and instead can be described as ‘authoritarian’ (Linz and Stepan 1997). As 
such the divided communist elite had produced a set of political opportunity structures
19 
which were seized by the opposition and used in order to form organised dissidence 
(Gamson  and  Meyer  1996,  Tarrow  1998).  The  outcome  of  this  was  a  negotiated 
settlement between the communist elite and the dissidents which then culminated in 
semi-free elections of 1989.    
 
In contrast, Kitschelt (1995) describes the Romanian situation as having been one of 
‘Patrimonial Communism’ while others speak of it as a ‘sultanistic’ regime (Linz and 
Stepan  1997).  Unlike  in  Poland,  the  Romanian  regime  was  one  which  thrived  on 
‘hierarchical chains of personal dependence between leaders and entourage’ (Kitschelt 
1995, p.453), allowing little room for opposition within the elite and severely repressing 
the general population thus preventing any degree of independent social mobilisation. 
Particularly  from  the  early  1970s,  Ceauşescu,  the  increasingly  autocratic  Romanian 
President,  exhibited  a  ‘Stalinist  obsession’  (Datculescu  1999,  p.  100)  towards  mass 
industrialisation  and  centralisation  of  the  economy.  This  tyrannical  regime  almost 
                                                           
18 By 1981, its membership reflected all strata of society including workers, intellectuals, students and 
church members and counted some 10 million members (Castle and Taras 2002, p. 56) although this fell 
considerably after Solidarity was forced underground by Martial Law in 1981 (see Holzer 1991). 
19 Here I employ the notion of political opportunity structures to refer to the various possibilities which a 
division in elite control can  offer or be seen to offer potential activists (see Tarrow  1998 for a full 
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completely controlled society through a strong secret police (Deletant 1995) and party 
members  often  enjoyed  a privileged  existence  at  the  expense of  Romanian citizens. 
Indeed,  Hall  (2004,  216)  states  that  political  culture  in  Romania  by  the  1980s  was 
characterised  by  ‘fear,  suspicion….avoidance,  withdrawal’  and  that  the  totalitarian 
nature of the regime had atomised society so much that it became dependent on hidden 
informal networks which did not join together in any organised form of dissidence
20.  
 
The revolution which then ousted Ceauşescu differed considerably from the negotiated 
transition  in  Poland.  It  was  characterised  by  violence  and  a  mobilisation  of  people 
which was supported by a shallow organisational network (Tismăneanu 2004). Indeed 
in retrospect it has been tarred with the image of being more of a  coup by former 
communist party  elites  than  a  spontaneous  mobilisation  of  civil  society  (Stan 1997, 
Pridham 2001, Tismăneanu 2004). 
 
2.2c(i) Youth and Communist Experience 
 
These differences between the communist experiences in Poland and Romania are also 
evident in the extent to which youth was controlled by the communist regime and the 
involvement of young people in organised dissidence. It is necessary to consider both 
these types of political participation of young people during communism as they may 
have left important legacies for the youth of today.  
 
2.2c(ii) Communist Youth Organisations 
 
The consequences of communist era forced participation for post-communist political 
involvement  across  newer  democracies  have  been  well  documented.  Studies  have 
shown high levels of distrust of political parties and politicians, low levels of voter 
turnout  and  a  reluctance  to  get  involved  in  informal  forms  of  participation  such  as 
volunteering (Szczerbiak 2001, Norris 2002, Howard 2003, Van Biezen 2003, Kopecký 
2006) These general findings are therefore also likely to apply to youth in Poland and 
                                                           
20 In comparison to Poland there were only two known independent movements in Romania by 1989, 
whereas in Poland there were 60 (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 352). On top of this Romania was the only 
country in Eastern Europe where there was not even ‘one full-blown samizdat publication’ recorded (Linz 
and Stepan 1996, p.353).  
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Romania, yet it is also important to consider whether the contrasting Communist regime 
styles have also had a lasting impact on the ways in which young people in each country 
interact with politics.  In particular, whether the differences between the Communist 
youth organisations in terms of membership, coercion and incentives in the 1980s have 
had a lasting legacy for the political participation of youth of today in formal types of 
participation such as parties and elections.  
 
Officially youth under all Central and East European communist systems was strictly 
organised into specific ideologically motivated groupings. Young people were seen as 
‘the builders of the bright communist society’ (Wallace and Kovatcheva 1998, p.68). 
This  ideological  control  over  youth  was  embodied  in  the  official  state  youth 
organizations (in Poland this was called The Union of Socialist Polish Youth, and in 
Romania, The Union of Communist Youth). In each country, this organisation had sub-
groupings based on age, ranging from a very young age to the most senior group which 
incorporated young people from around the age of 15 to 30 (Wallace and Kovatcheva 
1998, p.68, Cioflanca 2006).  
 
The purpose of this formal organisation of youth by the Communist state was twofold. 
It was meant to indoctrinate young people into the system and train them to become the 
next socialist leaders as well as providing the Party with the means to monitor young 
people’s activities (Wallace and Kovatcheva 1998, pp. 68-71, Paczkowski 2003 pp.227-
228).  The  general  incentives  to  become  members  of  these  organisations  were 
significant. They provided facilities such as sports centres, swimming pools and travel 
opportunities (Machacek 2001, p.287) as well as securing access to higher education or 
as ‘a stepping-stone to a political career, and therefore social mobility’ (Wallace and 
Kovatcheva 1998, p.73)
21.  
 
The membership of these groups varied across time and country. In Poland the Union of 
Polish Youth had more than one million members in 1949, and this had increased to two 
million by 1955. Paczkowski (2003, p.227) states that this constituted half of all young 
workers and sixty percent of secondary school pupils. In 1979 the numbers had risen 
again to almost three million (Magner 2005, p.57). However, in the period 1982-1988 
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membership fell to around one and a half million (Magner 2005, p.57) and less than five 
percent of students belonged to the communist student associations (Paczkowski, 2003, 
p.  473).  In  contrast,  the  membership  of  the  Romanian  Union  of  Communist  Youth 
continued to grow over time, from around two million members in 1960 to around four 
million by the end of the 1980s. By this time it was one of the most influential mass 
organisations  in  the  country  and  constituted  around  ninety-eight  percent  of  school 
students in their ninth grade by 1988. Membership of the Union for older school pupils 
was automatic and compulsory. The consequences for dissidence within the Union were 
severe for both the members and their  family  and regular purges of  members were 
carried out (Cioflanca 2006). 
 
Thus, the differences between the National Consensus version of Communism as seen 
in Poland and Patrimonial Communism as experienced in Romania, were also present to 
a  degree  in  the  formal  Communist  Youth  Organisations.  The  totalitarian  nature  of 
Romanian  political  institutions  meant  that  by  the  1980s  young  people  were  largely 
coerced  into  joining  the  Union  of  Communist  Youth  and  deviance  from  this  was 
severely punished (Cioflanca 2006). In such a patrimonial state, the Union could also 
provide  its  members  with  benefits  such  as  jobs.  By  the  1980s  in  Poland,  divisions 
within  the  communist  regime  meant  that  organisations  such  as  the  Union  of Polish 
Youth  were  losing  the  power  to  control  their  members.  Equally,  the  incentives  the 
Union could offer its members were increasingly unimportant as political opportunities 
to  challenge  the  system  were  seen  to  be  opening  up.  As  a  result  membership  fell 
dramatically.  
 
These  differing  communist  experiences  provided  contrasting  legacies  for  post-1989 
youth. In Poland, where the Communist youth organisation had already lost much of its 
membership and control by the 1980s, its collapse arguably left less of a ‘vacuum’ in 
terms of providing structure and educational and social goods for young people than 
was the case in Romania (Riordan 1995, Roberts and Jung 1995, Machacek 2001).  
 
2.2c(iii) Youth and Dissidence  
 
During  the  1980s  in  Poland,  independent  youth  organisations  which  contradicted 
official communist ideology began to appear. These took the form of ecology groups 46 
 
and student groups, Freedom and Peace, the ‘flying university’ and the Independent 
Students Association being some of the most well-known (Gliński 1994, Ramet 1995, 
Wallace and Kovatcheva 1998). These produced a number of Samizdat publications and 
some worked directly with Solidarity and were involved in the Round Table discussions 
at the fall of the regime (Ramet 1995, Rose–Ackerman 2005). Youth therefore can be 
seen as having played an important and central part in the fall of communism in Poland. 
Despite  the  fact  that  the  present  cohort  of  young  people  in  Poland  have  no  direct 
experience of communism or anti-communist dissidence, the significant involvement of 
youth in successful protest movements at the end of communism may still have an 
important legacy for the participation of youth today. This is because cultural traditions 
of political protest in a given country can continue to have a central role in the perceived 
opening of political opportunities to participate in the future (Gamson and Meyer 1996).  
In particular, scholars have highlighted the possibility that repertoires and experiences 
of contentious politics are likely to diffuse across cohorts, meaning that new cohorts 
will  be  more  equipped  to  recognise  political  opportunities  to  participate  when  a 
contentious issue arises (Meyer and Tarrow 1997, McAdam 1999).   
 
In Romania, although young people were a large feature of the mass demonstrations in 
December 1989, this dissidence was not supported by a deep organisational structure 
and  was  confined  to  the  large  cities  (Tismăneanu  2004).  Unlike  in  Poland,  the 
Communist regime was able to effectively suppress alternative organisations until the 
very end of its existence and the absence of obvious divisions within the communist 
elite meant that in comparison to Poland, political opportunities for dissent were largely 
lacking
22.  The  capture  of  political  power  by  the  National  Salvation  Front  (NSF),  a 
political group of Communist Party insiders formed in the last days of Communism 
which then orchestrated the trial and execution of Ceauşescu, has also left a difficult 
legacy (Gallagher 2005).  This new regime inherited the structure and organisation of 
the Communist Party making it a considerably stronger force than any other potential 
political  opposition.  In  the  first  democratic  elections  held  in  May  1990  the  NSF 
therefore easily obtained a majority over opposition parties. However many of those 
who  had  been  involved  in  the  dissidence  in  1989  were  disappointed  with  this 
continuation  of  the  same  regime  under  a  different  name.  Sporadic  protest  therefore 
                                                           
22 See Tarrow (1998, p.79) for a discussion of how divided elites can help provide dissidents with 
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continued, however the political opportunities for longer term protest were suppressed 
in June 1990 when student demonstrations against the new government were violently 
crushed by miners from Jiu Valley (Vasi 2004, Gallagher 2005). 
 
These  legacies  of  youth  involvement  in  dissidence  could  be  expected  to  have  a 
potentially  different  effect  on  youth  political  participation  to  that  in  Poland.  Two 
elements are important to this. First, the deeper organisational structure of dissidence in 
Poland could be expected to have left the population with a greater pool of resources 
such as networks and political experience to organise than in Romania. Second, the 
success  of  the  Polish  dissident  movement  continues  to  offer  an  example  to  today’s 
young people of how peaceful political participation can have far reaching results. In 
Romania,  the  capture  of  political  power  by  former  communists  and  the  following 
violent  suppression  of  dissidence  is  likely  to  have  acted  as  a  constraint  on  future 
political opportunities to participate in protest movements (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 
Tarrow 1998). 
 
This leads to the first comparative hypothesis (H1) to be tested in this study concerning 
the  contrasting  impacts  on  youth  political  participation  by  the  legacies  of  differing 
communist experiences: the involvement of young people in organised and successful 
dissidence in Poland at the end of Communism would be expected to mean that Polish 
youth  would be (H1.1) more likely to become more intensively involved in informal 
forms of participation such as protest today. In Romania, it is hypothesised (H1.2) the 
shallow organisational basis of dissidence during communism and violent suppression 
of political dissent in the early period of post-communism is likely to have the opposite 
effect on today’s youth.  
 
2.2d. Post-Communist Political Opportunity Structures and Resources 
 
The second set of variables on which Poland and Romania differ significantly are post-
communist political  and  socioeconomic  contexts.  These  are particularly  relevant for 
political participation of youth in these countries today. In the following section, I set 
out and explain the main contrasting factors between Poland and Romania.  
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2.2d(i) Political Contexts 
 
Two  interrelated  factors  highlight  the  differences  between  post-communist  political 
contexts  in  Poland  and  Romania.  These  are  decentralisation  of  administrative  and 
political power and the development of contrasting party systems. Both of these could 
be  expected  to be  significant  in  explaining  the  logics behind formal  youth political 
participation.  
 
a. Decentralisation 
 
Over  recent  decades,  the  process  of  administrative  and  political  decentralisation  in 
established democracies, that is granting greater powers to local authorities, has often 
been seen as an important method of trying to increase citizen participation in politics 
(Barber 1984, Parry 1992, Oxhorn 2004, Saito 2008). The logic behind this is that by 
allowing people to have a say in local level decision-making they would become more 
inclined to participate as they would have more personal interest in the issues involved. 
In turn, this would make local decision-makers more responsive to the needs of citizens 
and increase accountability (Barber 1984, Saito 2008).     
 
Decentralisation has also been a feature of  recent  youth policy in many  established 
European  democracies  (Schillemans  and  Bouverne-De  Bie  2005).  This  means 
devolving responsibility and finance for local youth policy to local authorities with the 
aim of making young people more participative at community level. Despite debate as 
to  the  extent  which  decentralisation  can  increase  political  participation  and 
accountability of decision-makers, it is seen as a method of enhancing opportunities for 
young people to participate in political processes by connecting them more directly to 
political agents (Schillemans and Bouverne-De Bie 2005).  
 
In  post-communist  Eastern  European  countries,  unlike  in  established  democracies, 
policies of administrative and political decentralisation have not evolved gradually over 
a period of time. Instead, these were initiated by the majority of governments in the area 
soon after the fall of communism, often on the advice of Western observers and in 
particular to prepare for European Union accession (Białasiewicz 2002).  This was a 49 
 
radical  approach  as  it  meant  the  complete  restructuring  of  the  existing  centralised 
decision-making structure.   
 
During Communism, administrative and political centralisation meant the countries of 
Eastern Europe were effectively run in a top-down manner with the central government 
taking all decisions. Even though on the surface it appeared there was a system of local 
government in fact this was a ‘democratic façade’ in which local electoral candidates 
were appointed by the central party (Bird et al. 1996, Swianiewicz 2003). This left a 
deep  distrust  of  local  decision-makers  amongst  citizens  as  they  often  saw  them  as 
simply ‘puppets’ for the centralised regime (Regulski 2003). In turn, this has meant that 
encouraging post-communist political participation at local level has also faced similar 
difficulties as at national level, namely overcoming a large degree of distrust in political 
agents and a lack of experience of participating in civil society (Vetter and Kersting 
2003,  Regulski  2003).  As  a  result,  although  structurally  decentralisation  has  been 
implemented to varying degrees across post-communist countries, citizen participation 
in  local  decision-making  remains  generally  limited  (Regulski  2003).  However,  the 
provision for decentralisation of political processes does also vary importantly between 
countries. For this reason, we could hypothesise that in those countries where there is 
greater  de  facto  decentralisation  the  potential  for  greater  levels  of  youth  political 
participation would be higher than in the countries which remain mainly centralised.  
 
Table 2.1: Units of Local Government in Poland and Romania  
 
Level  of  Local 
Government 
POLAND  ROMANIA 
1
st level  Voivodship (województwo) 
16 of these since 1999 
County (judeţ) 41 and Bucharest 
municipality 
2
nd level  County (powiat) 
308 rural and 65 urban counties 
Municipality  (urban)  or 
Commune (rural) circa. 2600 
3
rd level  Municipality  (urban)  or 
Commune (rural) (gmina) circa. 
2500 
 
(Source: Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS) and Romanian National Statistical Institute (INSSE)) 
 
Poland and Romania are examples of two post-communist countries which have had 
considerably  different  approaches  to  decentralisation.  Poland  rapidly  implemented 
radical administrative reform after 1989 whereas Romania remains a largely centralised, 50 
 
unitary  state  (Swianiewicz  2003).  This  contrast  can  be  seen  by  examining  the 
restructuring of local government in each country. In 1990 Poland reinstated local self 
government by creating over 2000 gminas (communes) which granted a large degree of 
autonomy  to  the  municipal  authorities.  In  1998  sixteen  voivods  (regions)  were  also 
created which have elected regional governments in order to streamline regional policy. 
This has resulted in a three tier system of local government (see Table 2.1). In contrast 
to  Poland’s  rapid  route  to  implementation  of  decentralisation  reform,  progress  in 
Romania has been considerably more protracted. In the early 1990s some reform was 
implemented concerning local finances and a two tier local government system was 
created (see Table 2.1). However, according to observers there is still no definite legal 
provision which states the functions and responsibilities of different actors at the county 
and municipal levels of government (Roper and Fesnic 2002, Nations in Transit 2006).  
 
Studies  in  Poland  have  suggested  that  decentralisation  has  meant  more  favourable 
opportunities for participation in local politics across the country and in particular for 
young people. For instance, the Nations in Transit Report (2007) on Poland stated,  
 
‘For  many  young  people,  self-government  has  been  a  means  to  learn  about  and 
participate in politics and governance’.  
 
The implication here is that the greater independence and power of local authorities has 
opened up opportunities for young people to become more involved at local level.  This 
suggestion  is  supported  by  evidence  given  by  Swianiewicz  (2002)  who  found  that 
councillors in Polish municipal governments tend to be much younger than those in 
national government.  
 
In Romania, the lack of clear political and administrative decentralisation has also had 
implications for youth policy and participation at local level. In particular, it means that 
provisions  for  encouraging  active  participation  are  frequently  disjointed  and  weakly 
supported by authorities at national or local level (Helsingius 2001).  A Council of 
Europe trial to improve local level participation in one Romanian town, which included 
the  implementation  of  a  local  youth  council,  was  however  successful  at  increasing 
levels  of  youth  political  involvement  (Greer  2006).  This  suggests  that  where 51 
 
opportunities are created for participation at local level, possibilities for youth political 
participation also increase.   
 
As such, given the comprehensive measures to decentralise political and administrative 
structures in Poland, it can be hypothesised (H2.1) that this has created a basis from 
which youth political participation at local level can potentially develop. The existence 
of  these  more  favourable  opportunities  could  be  expected  to  have  opened  up 
possibilities  for  young  people  to  participate  effectively.  In  Romania,  the  more 
fragmented  and incomplete approach to decentralisation means it could be expected 
(H2.2)  that  opportunities  for  youth  political  participation  at  local  level  are  less 
favourable than in Poland.  
 
b. Party systems 
 
A party system is a way of describing how parties compete in a given country, how they 
interact with government and how open the system is to new parties (Lewis 2006). It is 
therefore  generally  recognised  that  the  type  of  party  system  which  develops  in  a 
democracy can have an important influence on the quality of democracy to emerge in 
that  country  (Kitschelt  1995,  Mair  1997,  Kitschelt  et  al.  1999,  Lewis  2006).  In 
particular,  different  party  systems  can  offer  opportunities  for  citizens  to  engage  in 
politics or alternatively  create barriers to political involvement (Gamson and Meyer 
2006).  
 
In  established democracies, party systems are normally described as having varying 
degrees  of  institutionalisation  in  wider  society  (Mair  1997,  Mainwaring  and  Torcal 
2006). In many, the long term existence of a few main political parties, which have a 
recognisable  electoral  base  in  society,  is  seen  to  illustrate  the  stability  of  the  party 
system. Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) describe this stability as being crucial to how 
citizens view the legitimacy of political parties and in turn this can act to strengthen 
programmatic 
23or ideological links between parties and voters. Such linkages mean that 
parties have to appeal to supporters through promises of detailed policy or ideological 
commitments  (Kitschelt  et  al.  1999).    As  a  result  the  opportunities  for  political 
                                                           
23 A programmatic party is characterised by its focus on attracting electoral support through detailed 
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participation  in  a  mainly  programmatic  party  system  are  seen  as  generally  fair  and 
balanced, where each citizen is more or less equal in terms of possibilities to participate 
(Caciagli  2006).  This  helps  create  a  system  where  there  are  not  only  vertical  links 
between party and citizen, but it can also encourage horizontal links to form between 
citizens who work together to lobby and improve on the policy commitments offered by 
parties (Putnam 1993, Caciagli 2006).  
 
In  less  well-established  democracies,  as  in  the  post-communist  countries  of  Eastern 
Europe, the development of political parties, and therefore party systems, after 1990 
largely  constituted  a  reversal  of  the  historical  pattern  of  party  development  in 
established democracies (Van Biezen 2003, Lewis 2006). In many cases, this meant the 
creation  of  top-down,  elite  driven  parties  which  have  weak  membership  and 
organisational  structure.  Typically,  this  lack  of  social  embeddedness  and 
institutionalisation has meant that, from the start, parties could not depend on specific 
groups of voters for electoral support (Kopecký 1995, Innes 2002). As a result, during 
the  1990s,  in  many  post-communist  countries,  the  political  environment  was 
characterised by high levels of electoral volatility and low levels of party effectiveness 
and stability (Grzymała- Busse 2003, Van Biezen 2003, Lewis 2006). In general, this 
lack  of  institutionalisation  has  made  these  countries  particularly  vulnerable  to 
clientelistic
24 and populist
25 political practices.  
 
In contrast to programmatic linkages between party and citizen, clientelism is based on 
a system of short term exchange, where a citizen (the client) pledges electoral support in 
return for some type of selective benefit from the party (the patron) such as money, jobs 
or  power  (Kopecký  and  Scherlis  2008).  This  has  significant  implications  for 
opportunities for political participation. Instead of forcing parties to develop policy for 
the  long-term  and  therefore  improve  legitimacy  and  accountability,  clientelism  is 
premised on vertical links between citizen and party where some citizens have greater 
                                                           
24 The academic literature is often confused as to the difference between patronage and clientelism. In this 
study  I  follow  the  definition  given  by  Kopecký  and  Scherlis  (2008)  who  define  clientelism  as  an 
exchange between parties and clients whereby a range of goods are exchanged for electoral support.  
25 Here I employ the definition of populism given by Mudde (2004, p.543);  
‘an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic 
groups,  ‘the  pure  people’  versus  ‘the  corrupt  elite’,  and  which  argues  that  politics  should  be  an 
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’.  
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opportunities for participation than others (Stokes 2007). In addition, in such a system 
there  is  little  incentive  for  citizens  to  create  horizontal  linkages  which  can  help  to 
strengthen the quality of democracy offered by parties
26. Instead, clientelism often has 
the  effect  that  many  citizens,  who  are  not  interested  in  becoming  involved  in  such 
relationships, will withdraw from wider societal participation, in order to concentrate on 
private concerns (Caciagli 2006).  
 
However,  despite  the  general  lack  of  institutionalisation,  the  development  of  party 
systems in post-communist countries has been far from uniform and important contrasts 
which have significant implications for political participation have emerged (Kitschelt 
1995, Kitschelt et al. 1999, Innes 2002, Lewis 2006). Poland and Romania are examples 
of post-communist countries which have, over the relatively short period of transition 
from communism, developed quite different party systems. This is due to a combination 
of  historical  factors  such  as  the  type  of  communist  regime  and  the  nature  of  post-
communist political and economic restructuring (Kitschelt et al. 1999)
27.  
 
In Poland, the party system today is made up of a mixture of mainly programmatic 
parties, with a tendency towards populism in others (Grzymała-Busse 2002, Jasiewicz 
2008). Romania, in contrast, exhibits a party system which is dominated by charismatic 
and clientelistic parties (Gallagher 2005, Ioniţa 2005, Uslaner 2008)
28. This could be 
expected to have an important influence on youth political participation in each country.  
 
In Poland, although the first period of post-communism was characterised by a very 
large degree of party volatility and government instability (Millard 2008), there are now 
signs  that  the  party  system  has  begun  to  stabilise  (Szczerbiak  2007).  However,  this 
initial period of instability coupled with hard hitting economic and social reform has 
been  cited  as  a  reason  for  wide-spread  abstention  of  Polish  citizens  from  political 
participation (Rose and Munro 2003, Tworzecki 2003). Nonetheless, the emergence of 
                                                           
26 Putnam’s (1993) comparative study of social capital in northern and southern regions of Italy showed 
the  influence  that  differing  party  systems  can  have  on  civic  life.  He  illustrated  that  in  the  more 
economically  and  politically  progressive  north,  civic  life  and  societal  trust  were  significantly  more 
developed than in the south where clientelistic practices persist.  
27 In Poland, the post-communist period has seen a relatively comprehensive programme of economic and 
political restructuring (Millard 1999, Castle and Taras 2002, Rose-Ackermann 2005) while in Romania 
the  legacy  of  the  patrimonial  communist  regime  style  is  evident  in  the  gradual  and  inconsistent 
programme of economic and political post-communist reform (Tismăneanu 2004, Bacon 2004). 
28 I outline how individual political parties fit into this in Chapter Four, section 4.2.  54 
 
mainly programmatic parties does mean that citizens have generally equal opportunities 
for  political  participation  in  Poland.  This  is  because,  as  in  many  established 
democracies, parties are unable to offer individuals selective incentives in return for 
involvement.  Yet,  given  the  top-down  development  of  parties  in  Poland,  which 
generally lack a grass-roots support base, it could be expected that the opportunities for 
political involvement will be still less favourable than in established democracies where 
linkages between citizens and parties have developed over a far greater time period. 
This could be expected to be particularly relevant for young people in Poland who not 
only lack experience of political participation because of their position in the life-cycle, 
but also lack models of political participation in their parent’s generation. This means 
that they are unlikely to easily recognise the opportunities for political participation.  
 
In  Romania,  the  situation  contrasts  importantly  with  that  of  Poland.  Failures  to 
restructure the economy, reform political process and to decentralise power have left 
political  parties  with  the  ability  to  access  resources  which  then  they  can  offer  to 
members and supporters in return for electoral support (Gross and Tismăneanu 2005, 
Kitschelt 2007). This is particularly the case at local level where local politicians are 
often also in control of local media and business, meaning they have disproportionate 
access to local resources (Roper 2002). As many Romanian people remain marginalised 
and poor, they can be attracted by the short term incentives which politicians and parties 
can offer (Stokes 2007). This means that opportunities for political participation could 
be expected to be less equal than in Poland. However, some studies in Romania have 
also illustrated that the perception of corruption and clientelism in political life is likely 
to be as damaging to political participation as actual corruption (Bădescu 2007, Uslaner 
2008).  This is because it fosters very low levels of societal trust and means citizens are 
less likely to get involved in civic activities. In turn, for those who are not interested in 
participating  politically  to  gain  selective  incentives,  the  clientelistic  party  system  is 
likely to act as a barrier to political engagement (Stokes 2007). In Romania, where 
Bădescu  (2007)  reported  that  the  proportion  of  Romanian  people  who  felt  that 
corruption was the greatest problem which had faced the country in the past four years 
was considerably higher than that in other post-communist countries
29, the perceptions 
                                                           
29 He presented the results of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems for 2006/2007 which found 
that 38% of Romanian respondents felt corruption was the greatest problem to have faced society over 
four years compared to only 2% of Polish respondents.  55 
 
of  clientelism  could  be  expected  to  have  particularly  important  consequences  for 
political participation.  
 
This  is  especially  the  case  for  young  people  who  have  no  personal  experience  of 
political  participation  and  so  therefore  gain  their  understanding  and  perceptions  of 
politics from older generations. Where older generations perceive the party system to be 
corrupt, clientelistic and illegitimate, we could also expect that young people will lack 
trust and confidence in political processes. This could make them reluctant to become 
participative in political activities.  
 
This leads me to my third hypothesis. In Poland (H3.1) it is hypothesised that the more 
programmatic nature of the party system could be expected to mean that favourable and 
equal  opportunities  exist  for  youth political participation,  similarly  to  in  established 
democracies. However, it could also be expected that given the relative newness of 
party  system  stability  and  a  lack  of  experience  of  political  participation,  these 
opportunities may not be widely recognised by young people. In Romania, in contrast, it 
is hypothesised (H3.2) that the clientelistic party system could be expected to ‘block’ 
opportunities for fair and equal youth political participation. While the possibility of 
gaining  selective  incentives  could  be  expected  to  attract  some  young  people  to 
participate,  for  others  this  would  serve  to  effectively  exclude  them  from  political 
participation by intensifying feelings of alienation from political agents and creating 
real or perceived ‘blockages’ in participation channels. 
 
2.2d(ii) Socioeconomic Contexts 
 
Studies  of  various  forms  of  political  participation  have  often  shown  a  correlation 
between  socioeconomic  level  and  political  participation  (Verba  and  Nie  1972, 
McCarthy and Zald 1977, Barnes and Kaase 1979) where people with higher levels of 
income and education will be more likely to participate than people with lower levels.  
This is because these factors provide a person with resources (time, money and skills) to 
participate. It is now generally recognised that these socioeconomic resources can only 
partly  explain  the  reasons  behind  participation.  Indeed,  they  must  be  considered 
alongside  factors  such  as  political  opportunities  (Leighley  1995,  Tarrow  1998). 
Nonetheless, this does not diminish the important role that resources can play.  56 
 
Table 2.2: GDP and Unemployment in Poland and Romania 2006 
 
  POLAND  ROMANIA  EU27 average 
GDP  per  capita 
(PPS in Euro)  
12 400   8 800  23 500 
Unemployment 
Rate  (%  of  total 
labour force) 
13.8  8.2  7.3 
(Source: Eurostat Yearbook 2008. PPS: Purchasing Power Standards) 
 
Economic  reform  in  post-communist  countries  has  generally  had  to  address  the 
difficulties created by failing communist era industry and outdated infrastructure. This 
has led to higher levels of unemployment and economic insecurity. However, the nature 
of this has varied across the region. In Poland, a series of hard hitting economic policies 
known as ‘shock therapy’ were implemented in the early 1990s which aimed to stabilise 
the currency, attract foreign investment and limit budget deficits. Despite criticism at 
the  time,  these  have  since  been  credited  with  increasing  privatisation  deals  and 
encouraging  foreign  trade  (Castle  and  Taras  2002).  The  short  term  consequences, 
however, were severe. It meant closure for many loss-making sectors of heavy industry 
and  unemployment  increased  dramatically  as  a  result  (Orenstein  2001).  Although 
unemployment remains high (see Table 2.2), especially in rural areas, the restructuring 
of state owned industry has meant an effective depoliticisation of this sector and foreign 
investment has helped to ensure a fast growing economy throughout the 2000s.  
 
Economically,  Romania  has  fared  worse  than  Poland  since  the  fall  of  communism. 
Indeed Tismăneanu (2004, p. 30) describes the situation in Romania after the fall of 
Ceausescu as ‘catastrophic’. This was due not only to the problems inherited by all 
former communist countries such as the shortage economy, overemployment and low 
productivity but also because in the 1980s, unlike the other countries, Ceauşescu had 
actually strengthened centralisation of the economy in a bid to pay back Romania’s  
overwhelming  foreign  debt  (Bacon  2004).  During  the  1990s,  various  reforms  were 
initiated  but  none  were  fully  completed  and  as  a  result  many  loss  making  state 
industries continued to function and privatisation was slow (Stan 1997, Bacon 2004). 
Foreign investors were also deterred by the poor political image and lack of economic 
reform (Pridham 2001). Bacon (2004) notes an improvement in the economy and in 
attracting foreign investors since 2000 but economically Romania still lags behind some 57 
 
other post-communist states. The GDP per capita of Romania (see Table 2.2) remains 
one of the lowest in the European Union and although the unemployment figures appear 
low  in  comparison  to  Poland  and  the  EU27  average,  this  masks  the  continuing 
overemployment of people in loss making state run industry.  
 
Table 2.3: Youth Unemployment and Educational Attainment in Poland and Romania 
2007 
 
  POLAND  ROMANIA  EU 27 average 
Under 
25 years 
Over  25 
years 
Under 
25 years 
Over  25 
years 
Under 
25 years 
Over  25 
years 
Unemployment 
Rate  (%  of  labour 
force) 
29.8  11.7  21.4  5.7  17.2  7 
Educational 
Attainment (%) 
91.1  84.8  76  73.1  77.4  69.3 
(Sources: Eurostat News Release 2007 ‘Young Europeans through Statistics’ and Eurostat Yearbook 
2008.  Unemployment  rate  is  2006  and  is  measured  from  15  years  upwards.  Level  of  educational 
attainment refers to the percentage of people who have completed at least upper secondary school. It is 
measured from 20 years upwards). 
 
The economic and social problems facing post-communist countries have been seen to 
impact  youth particularly  severely (Machacek 2001). This is because  young people, 
having a lack of experience, are often the most vulnerable to changes in the labour 
force. The impact of this in creating a ‘generational gap’ between age groups in Poland 
and Romania can be seen by looking at figures on  youth unemployment. Table 2.3 
shows that the level of youth unemployment in both countries is considerably higher 
than that of older age groups, and this gap is more pronounced than for the European 
Union average. These labour problems facing the young have also led to significant 
temporary migration of young people abroad to find work (Baláz et al. 2004, Open 
Society Foundation Romania 2006). In both countries the combination of these factors 
could be expected to depress rates of youth political participation, as young people often 
lack economic and time resources. In turn, the severity of this problem could help to 
explain  lower  rates  of  youth  political  engagement  in  Poland  and  Romania  than  in 
established democracies.  
 
However, in comparison to the high levels of unemployment for young people in both 
Poland and Romania, the educational levels contrast importantly. Table 2.3 shows that 58 
 
the educational level in all countries is higher for the youngest age group than for older 
people. However, the rate of youth educational attainment is particularly striking for 
Poland which at over 90% is significantly higher than in Romania  and the average 
across  the  twenty-seven  members  of  the  European  Union.  This  suggests  that  young 
people in Poland may have greater potential resources in terms of skills to participate 
than their counterparts in Romania. This leads to the fourth hypothesis (H4). Although 
high  levels  of  youth  unemployment  could  be  expected  to  depress  youth  political 
participation in both countries, given the higher rate of educational attainment and GDP 
per  capita,  it  could be  expected  that  youth political participation patterns  in Poland 
(H4.1) would reflect this higher level of resources. In particular this could mean that it 
would be easier for young Poles to recognise political opportunities to participate in 
elections,  parties  and  informal  methods  of  participation.  In  Romania  (H4.2),  lower 
levels  of  resources,  both  economic  and  educational  would  be  expected  to  have  the 
opposite outcome.  
2.2e. Sub-National Control Comparisons  
In order to further contextualise the paired comparison between Poland and Romania 
and control for local variation, I chose to conduct my field research at the level of sub-
national units in Poland and Romania. Sub-national comparison has several significant 
advantages over national level comparisons. The first is that by taking the comparison 
down  to  sub-national  level,  it  is  possible  to  limit  the  ‘whole-nation  bias’  often 
associated with national level comparisons (Snyder 2001). Comparisons which are done 
at country level necessarily use national level and aggregate information, which, whilst 
useful for across country comparison can also distort results due to regional disparities 
in terms of socioeconomics, civic traditions and political make-up within each country. 
This problem of ‘many variables, small number of cases’ (Lijphart 1971, p. 685) is 
therefore  a  common  one  for  paired  country  comparisons  (Guy  Peters  1998).  By 
choosing to conduct research at sub-national level, the number of potential variables can 
be reduced. However, for this to be effective, the sub-national units chosen must exhibit 
contrasting political, economic and social features.  
A sub-national level comparison is particularly useful for this study of youth political 
participation in Poland and Romania. This is because, within both these countries, there 
exist a number of distinctly different geographical areas which contrast importantly in 59 
 
terms of socioeconomics and politics. Since the fall of Communism, the differences 
between  these  regions  have  again  become  evident  with  some  regions  ‘winning’  or 
‘losing’ from the transition to democracy. Some have become very attractive to outside 
investment and have successfully restructured existing industry whilst other areas have 
remained largely agricultural or have suffered devastating industrial decline. Added to 
this, pre-communist legacies of democratic experience, economic success and political 
culture have meant that in both countries some areas have proven better prepared for 
democratisation than others (Weltrowska 2002, Bădescu and Sum 2005). 
The importance of the sub-national context for research into youth has already been 
recognised by some studies in Poland and Romania (Roberts 1995, Bădescu and Sum 
2005)
30.  However,  as  these  have  largely  focused  on  issues  facing  young  people  in 
general rather than how they participate politically, they present limited analysis into 
this subject. Nonetheless, the findings they do offer show some important similarities 
and differences across the countries but suggest that the similarities across the countries 
may be more significant than the differences. For this reason sub-national comparison is 
used in this study as a control strategy. While significant difference between localities is 
not predicted, by also conducting research at sub-national level we can have greater 
confidence in our findings than would a study based on national level data alone. For 
these reasons, where I do not find significant difference between the national and local 
level  data,  the  data  used  throughout  the  thesis  is  national  level.  However,  in  the 
instances where  I find important sub-national contrasts,  I indicate this by  citing the 
relevant local level data.  
 
In this study, I have chosen three sub-national units in each country which contrast in 
terms  of  political,  economic  and  social  make  up.  As  Polish  and  Romanian 
administrative units differ as regards size and population, I do not attempt to directly 
compare the sub-national units across the two countries.  
 
                                                           
30  Roberts  (1995)  sociological  study  of  Polish  youth  employed  three  contrasting  sub-national  cases: 
Suwałki,  Katowice  and  Gdansk.  He  found  youth  in  Suwałki  faced  the  worst  prospects  in  terms  of 
employment  and  education  but  found  that  they  had  similar  levels  of  political  interest  to  youth  in 
Katowice. Bădescu and Sum (2005) studied social capital in Romania based on age and locality. Their 
study hypothesised greater levels of social capital would be found in Transylvania. This was found to be 
true for older people but they found little difference in levels of trust amongst youth across the country. 
See also the British Council 2004 report ‘Being Young in Romania’ which found a uniform low level of 
political participation and interest amongst youth across different Romanian localities.  60 
 
2.2e(i) Sub-National Units in Poland  
 
The units chosen for comparison in Poland are all at the Powiat (county) level of local 
government. Each of these is a part of a larger voivodship and each consists of a number 
of gmina (communes)
31. There exist both urban and rural counties and most towns are 
considered urban counties but each is also surrounded by a rural county. These units of 
local  government  were  reintroduced  in  Poland  in  1999  and  are  governed  by  a  city 
council (urban) or a county council (rural). City and County councils are responsible for 
employment, secondary education and civil protection. Local elections were first held in 
1990 and are now held every four years. Local representatives on county and municipal 
level councils are elected directly by citizens as are the mayors who head the municipal 
councils. County heads are elected indirectly by the county councils who as stated are 
elected directly. Provincial marshals head the voivodships and these are elected by the 
regional assemblies. 
 
Figure 2.1: Map of Poland with localities marked. 
 
 
(Source: Embassy of Poland in the UK) 
 
                                                           
31 Except Warsaw County which is divided into 18 boroughs known as dzielnica.  61 
 
The three localities considered in this study are all urban counties. They consist of the 
capital city, Warsaw, Bielsko-Biała, (marked 1 on Figure 2.1) a town in the South west 
of the country, and Chełm (marked 2 on Figure 2.1), a town in the East of Poland. 
 
Table 2.4: Polish Population and Labour Force Statistics by Locality 2007 
 
  Bielsko- 
Biała 
county 
Chełm 
county 
 
Warsaw 
county 
 
Poland 
Total 
Total 
Population  
175690  67782  1706624  38115641 
0-15 years %  15  15  12  17 
16-24 years %  13  16  17  14 
25-29 years %  9  8  9  8 
30-59 years %  43  44  39  42 
60 + years %  20  17  23  19 
Unemployment 
rate %  
5.2  17.5  2.9  12.8 
% employed in 
agriculture  
1  4  1  17 
% employed in 
industry  
45  25  18  28 
% employed in 
services 
54  71  81  55 
(Source: Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS) 2007) 
 
 
Table  2.4  shows  the  population  by  age  group  for  each  county  and  lists  the 
unemployment figures and percentages of workers employed in agriculture, industry 
and services. The age groups 16-24 and 25-29 are highlighted to illustrate the numbers 
of young people in each county. From the table we can see that the variation in this 
regard  between  counties  is  insignificant.  However  the  unemployment  rates  differ 
considerably with the highest level recorded in Chełm and the lowest in Warsaw. The 
following section details the individual localities.   
 
1.  Warsaw 
 
Political  complexion  of  County  Council:  Since  2006  the  Mayor  is  Hanna 
Gronkiewicz-Waltz (Civic Platform) – Council is majority Civic Platform (PO). 
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The city of Warsaw is the capital of Poland and the city with the largest population. In 
comparison with the rest of the country, Warsaw attracts greater amounts of foreign 
investment, has considerably lower unemployment rates (see Table 2.5) and is the seat 
of the national government and the headquarters of national political parties. It is the 
commercial and political centre of the country. It also has a large student population and 
many young people migrate from other areas of Poland to Warsaw in order to study or 
to find work (Dzierżanowski and Pleśniak 2005). Taken together, it would be expected 
that  the  high  level  of  social  and  economic  development,  proximity  to  the  national 
centres  of  political  power  and  a  large  number  of  students  would  mean  political 
participation amongst young people in Warsaw would be higher than in other areas of 
the country. This is because of the access to resources required to participate and also 
the greater number of potential political opportunities offered by living in the political 
and economic centre of the country.  
 
2.  Bielsko-Biała  
 
Political Complexion of County Council: Since 2002 the Mayor is Jacek Krywult 
(Independent). Council majority coalition Civic Platform (PO) and Independent.  
Main Industries: Automobile industry (Fiat Auto Poland), textile industry, chemical 
industry.  
Higher Education Institutes: University of Bielsko-Biala (circa. 10,000 students). 
 
Bielsko-Biała urban county lies in the Silesian voivodship and since the 19
th century it 
has been a highly industrialised town. Today Bielsko-Biała is considered to be part of a 
‘winning region’ in Poland in terms of socioeconomic development (Weltrowska 2002, 
p.50). It has been attractive to foreign capital and has a high level of development of 
higher  education.  The  unemployment  rate  is  significantly  lower  than  the  national 
average. Most of the workforce is employed in industry and services (see Table 2.4). 
This high level of socioeconomic development could be expected to mean that young 
people  would  have  greater  resources  to  participate  politically  than  in  other  less 
economically developed areas of the country.  
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3.  Chełm 
 
Political  Complexion  of  County  Council:  Since  2006  Mayor  is  Agata  Fisz  (Own 
election committee -member of Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)). Council is coalition 
of major parties and independent committees – no overall majority) 
Main  industries:  Cement  industry,  Furniture  makers  (Meblotap),  Dairy  industry 
(Biomelk) 
Higher  Education  Institutes:  Branch  of  the  Lublin  University  Medical  Faculty, 
Teacher Training College. 
 
Chełm is in the Lublin voivodship. Unemployment remains higher than the national 
average at 17.5% (see Table 2.4). Since 1989 eastern Poland has attracted little foreign 
investment and inefficient, over staffed industry and farming has left it with great social 
and economic problems. However, Chełm has links with the Ukraine and as a border 
town between the EU and the Ukraine has attracted a significant amount in EU funds. 
Nonetheless,  the  general  lack  of  socioeconomic  development  in  Chełm,  could  be 
expected to have a negative influence on youth political participation in this locality.  
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1.e (ii) Sub-National Units in Romania  
 
Figure 2.2: Map of Romania 
 
 
(Source: Embassy of Romania in UK) 
 
In Romania, the units of comparison are at municipality level and comprise the capital, 
Bucharest, Oradea (marked 1 on Figure 2.2) in the North West and Alexandria (marked 
2 on Figure 2.2) in the South.  However as figures are only available at county level, I 
use these to compare population and labour force statistics.  Each county has a mayor 
and  a  local  council.  The  mayor  is directly  elected.  However,  the  mayor  lacks clear 
constitutional  authority  and  is  at  risk  of  manipulation  by  the  party  dominated  local 
councils (Roper 2002, Nations in Transit 2006). In addition county prefects who are not 
elected but rather chosen by the central government are responsible for checking the 
decisions made by local government bodies. Yet, due to unclear legal provisions they 
lack accountability and can theoretically approve biased decisions without recourse. The 
prefect  also  has  the  right  to  appoint  local  council  secretaries  and  these  effectively 
constitute  a  direct  link  from  central  government  to  local  councils  meaning de facto 
subordination  of  local  decisions  to  the  central  government.  Local  elections  are held 
every four years.  65 
 
Table 2.5: Romanian Population and Labour Force Statistics by Locality 2006 
 
  Bihor 
County 
Teleorman 
County 
Bucharest 
Municipality 
Total 
Romania 
Total Population   59 4982  41 7183  19 31236  21584365 
0-14 years %  16  14  11  11 
15-24 years %  15  13  14  15 
25-34 years %  16  13  18  16 
35-54 years %  28  25  31  28 
55+ years %  25  35  26  30 
Unemployment 
rate % 
2.7  8.2  2.2  7.3 
% employed in 
agriculture 
2  9  1  30 
% employed in 
industry 
42  35  18  25 
% employed in 
services 
56  56  81  45 
(Source: Romanian National Statistical Institute (INSSE) 2006)  
 
 
Table 2.5 presents figures on population and labour force in each of the three localities. 
The age groups 15-24 and 25-34 are highlighted to illustrate the numbers of young 
people in each county. We can see that although variations are not pronounced, the 
population  in  Oradea  and  Bucharest  is  slightly  younger  than  in  Teleorman.  The 
unemployment rate differs significantly across localities, being highest in Teleorman 
and  lowest  in  Bucharest  and  Bihor.  The  following  section  details  the  individual 
localities.  
 
1.  Bucharest 
 
Political complexion: Since 2008 Mayor is Sorin Oprescu (Independent). Council run 
by  coalition  of  National  Liberal  Party  (PNL)  and  New  Generation  Party-  Christian 
Democratic (PNGCD).  
 
Bucharest is the capital of Romania, and is also the commercial and political centre of 
the country.  The unemployment rate is significantly lower than the Romanian average 
(see Table 2.7) and there is a large population of students. Similarly to Warsaw, this 
economic and social make up could be expected to mean youth political participation 
will be greater in Bucharest than in other areas of Romania.  66 
 
 
2.  Oradea 
 
Political Complexion of Town Council: Since 2008 Mayor is Ilie Bolojan (National 
Liberal Party (PNL)). Council is led by coalition between the National Liberal Party 
(PNL) and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR).  
Main Industries: Aluminum industry, mechanical industry, chemical industry, textile 
industry. 
Higher Education Institutes: University of Oradea (circa. 35,000 students). 
 
Oradea is situated in Transylvania and is a border town with Hungary. In comparison 
with  many  areas  in  Romania,  since  communism,  Bihor  county  has  profited  from 
industrial restructuring and significant foreign investment. The unemployment rate is 
significantly lower than the national average (see Table 2.5). Since 1989, the political 
complexion in Oradea has been characterised by support for reform oriented parties 
(Lăzăroiu 2000, Turnock 2000) and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania. 
This reflects the ethnic make up of the town which has a high population of ethnic 
Hungarians
32. This high level of economic and social resources, young population and 
ethnic diversity could be expected to mean young people in Oradea would be more 
likely to participate politically than in less economically developed areas of Romania.  
 
3.  Alexandria 
 
Political Complexion of Town Council: Since 2008 mayor is Victor Drăguşin (Social 
Democratic Party (PSD). Council majority run Social Democratic Party (PSD). 
Main  Industries:  Roll  bearing  industry,  mechanical  component  industry,  food  and 
beverages industry.  
Higher Education Institutes: Branch of the Bucharest based Spiru Haret University. 
 
Teleorman county is situated in the Southern region of Muntenia and is close to the 
Bulgarian border. The county is economically less developed than Bihor County and 
Bucharest. The unemployment rate is above the national average (see Table 2.5) and a 
                                                           
32 According to the 2002 census ethnic Hungarians make up around 28% of the population in Oradea.  67 
 
recent  report  by  the  Open  Society  Foundation  in  Romania  (2006)  suggests  that  the 
economic and social problems have meant that a significant number of the population, 
many young, have temporarily migrated abroad to seek work. The Social Democratic 
Party continues to have a stronghold in this area (Lăzăroiu 2000, Turnock 2000). These 
factors  could  be  expected  to  impact  on  the  level  of  youth  political  participation  in 
Alexandria, as young people would have fewer resources to participate than in other 
more economically developed areas of the country.  
 
2.3. A Multi-Method Analysis  
 
I chose to conduct this study into youth political participation in Poland and Romania 
by employing a multi-method approach. Thus, my research design is based mainly on 
qualitative methods but, when appropriate, combines these with quantitative methods.  I 
detail  the  particular  methods  chosen  in  Section  2.3b  below,  but  first  Section  2.3a 
outlines the benefits of such an approach and explains why it is especially relevant to 
the study of youth political participation.  
 
2.3a. The Strengths of a Multi-Method Approach 
 
Multi-method  analysis  aims  to  move  away  from  the  traditional  qualitative  versus 
quantitative methods paradigm and instead to recognise how these different methods 
can be combined to complement one another and to generate confident, well-rounded 
research findings (Cappoccia and Freeden 2006, Bergman 2008). Quantitative methods 
are invaluable in making sense of large data sets and therefore for comparison across 
many  different  situations.  However,  such  analysis  often  lacks  contextualisation  and 
therefore is unable to explain confidently divergence in results. Qualitative methods, on 
the other hand, are necessarily restricted to analysis of a small number of variables. 
However, this concentration on a small number of cases means that the researcher is 
able to suggest convincing reasons for particular findings based on context. 
 
Although  similar  studies  of  youth  political  participation  in  newer  democracies 
employing the multi-method approach are scarce, research undertaken in established 
democracies suggest that a multi-method research design is particularly appropriate for 
this topic.  68 
 
2.3a(i) Multi-Method Approaches Applied to Youth Political Participation 
 
Studies of youth political participation in established democracies have frequently noted 
that there is often a mismatch between how researchers and young people understand 
politics (Henn et al. 2002, O’Toole et al. 2003, Henn et al. 2005, Sloam 2007). They 
contend that young people in particular are likely to associate politics with politicians 
and parties, rather than wider political issues which may affect them. As young people 
tend  to  hold  negative  views  of  such  formal  political  agents,  closed-ended  survey 
questions which ask them about interest, participation and trust in politics are also liable 
to  be  answered  in  negative  terms  as  a  consequence.  This  in  turn  can  lead  to  a 
misrepresentation of how young people actually conceive of politics.  
 
Whereas  responses  to  direct  questions  may  lead  researchers  to  conclude  that  young 
people are apathetic towards and uninterested in politics, an approach which discusses 
politics  in  more  general  issue-based  terms  and  relates  this  to  young  people’s  own 
experiences  and  opinions  can  offer  significantly  different  results.  For  instance,  the 
results of Henn et al.’s (2002) mixed qualitative and quantitative study of British young 
people between 18 and 24 years showed that although survey responses indicated that 
the young people were overwhelmingly disenchanted with formal party politics, when 
asked  in  detail  in  focus  groups  about  issues  which  concerned  them,  they  were 
knowledgeable and opinionated about local political decisions concerning education and 
the environment.  
 
The merits of a multi-method approach to understanding youth political participation 
were  also  recognised  by  Sloam  (2007)  in  his  study  of  British  young  people.  He 
illustrated that qualitative methods such as focus groups and interviews allowed young 
people to speak about politics in their own language and to explain and discuss why so 
many young people answered survey questions on political interest and participation 
negatively.  In  this  way,  he  argued  a  multi-method  approach  allows  for  a  ‘three–
dimensional  analysis’  of  youth  political  engagement  which  is  lacking  in  a  purely 
qualitative or quantitative approach. For similar reasons, multi-method approaches have 
also been used in the study of participation in post-communist states, one successful 
example being Howard’s (2003) comparative study of civil society in post-communist 
East  Germany  and  Russia.  In  this  study  he  combined  quantitative  and  qualitative 69 
 
research  methods  in  order  to  illustrate  the  reasons  for  the  widespread  lack  of 
participation in civil society within these countries. He analysed large data sets to firstly 
build up a picture of how the participation habits of people in post-communist Europe 
compared to those in established democracies. He then contextualised these findings 
through a series of interviews with people in East Germany and Russia.  
 
2.3b Research Design 
 
The research design I chose for the present study was governed by the logic of the 
research questions posed in chapter one. I considered the characteristics of each type of 
political  participation  to  be  studied  (electoral  participation,  party  activism  and 
involvement in informal forms) separately. For instance, as electoral participation is the 
most  widespread  type  of  participation,  findings  based  on  interviews  with  a  small 
number of voters or non-voters would likely fail to generate general theories for the 
wider population. Instead, a multi-method approach which employs standardised large 
‘N’ surveys combined with focus group discussion at local level would allow a more 
detailed and representative picture of voters and non-voters in a particular country.  
 
In contrast, party membership and engagement in informal forms of participation are 
more nuanced types of political involvement which constitute a far smaller number of 
people. Individual participation in these activities will likely differ in terms of frequency 
and degree of involvement. This means that it is particularly important in these cases to 
understand  how  young  people  conceive  of  the  political,  their  experiences  of 
involvement and how they perceive the opportunities available to them. In this case, by 
concentrating on the findings of large scale surveys we may be misled by the negative 
responses given by young people concerning political interest and trust into thinking 
that  they  are  more  disengaged  from  politics  than  is  actually  the  case.  Instead, 
interpretive  methods  such  as  focus  groups  and  interviews  with  young  activists  are 
necessary  to  add  depth  and  context  to  existing  quantitative  findings.  The  following 
sections outline the data, research techniques and fieldwork undertaken in this study.  
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2.3b(i) Focus-Groups with Non – or Less- Politically Active Young People  
 
To gain in-depth data on how young people in Poland and Romania conceive of politics 
and political participation I opted to undertake a series of focus groups
33 with non- or 
less-  politically  active  young  people.    The  choice  of  focus  groups  as  opposed  to 
interviews  was  made  on  the  basis  of  the  explorative  power  of  such  a  method. 
Particularly, the discussion produced by the interaction between respondents in focus 
groups  has  been  recognised  as  an  effective  way  to  produce  data  which  can  elicit 
important insights into complex topics (Nagy Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2006). As existing 
studies  in  established  democracies  have  found  that  young  people  often  conceive  of 
politics in a unique manner, my objective was to discover whether this was also the case 
for  Polish  and  Romanian  young  people.  Interviews  of  individual  non-active  young 
people would therefore, have lacked the possibility for discussion and argumentation 
between peers. This interaction between respondents can also, however, be the greatest 
weakness in this method as it can generate discussion which misrepresents individual 
respondent’s true feelings (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). One way to reduce the possibility 
of this occurring is to carefully select respondents based on a set of pre-determined 
criteria.  
 
In total, I conducted 10 focus groups (5 in Poland and 5 in Romania). Each of these 
consisted of 5-8 respondents and lasted between 1 and 2 hours. They were conducted in 
English, with the exception of one in Alexandria, Romania which was conducted mostly 
in Romanian.  
 
I selected focus group respondents on the basis of age and location. In each location, I 
aimed to set up two focus groups
34. One for school age respondents (16-19) and another 
for older respondents (20-25). This was based on the reasoning that people are more 
likely to feel comfortable discussing matters with people of similar age and experience 
(Ritchie and Lewis 2003). The school-aged groups were selected by contacting local 
groups which had links with schools in the area. In practice, this mostly meant that I 
was put in contact with a teacher in the school who was willing to help select suitable 
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students for the discussion. The discussion would then take place within school time, in 
the school library, or some other vacant room.  
 
For the older groups, I again contacted organisations with links to young people and 
also colleges and universities. In most cases, an individual within these organisations 
would then help me to select the respondents. This meant that the discussions took place 
in a variety of settings, in college classrooms, large quiet cafes or in town halls.  
 
This method of sampling necessarily meant that the respondents were generally biased 
towards  having  higher  levels  of  education.  However,  this  bias  was  mitigated  by 
analysing the discussions produced in the focus groups in combination with secondary 
sources such as survey results and media reports. I use the data generated by the focus 
group  discussions  throughout  the  thesis  and  particularly  to  analyse  the  reasons  for 
abstention from elections in chapter three and non-participation in informal forms of 
political involvement in chapter five.  
 
2.3b(ii) Semi-Structured Interviews  
 
I also conducted 30 semi-structured interviews
35 with activists in Poland and Romania 
(12 in Poland and 18 in Romania). I defined activists as youth party members or leaders 
and young people involved in informal forms of participation such as social movements 
or voluntary groups. In addition, I also carried out six semi-structured interviews (2 in 
Poland and 4 in Romania) with academics and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) 
workers interested in the issues surrounding youth participation.   
 
These interviews were conducted face–to-face or in some instances by email exchange. 
Face-to-face interviews lasted from 45 minutes to 2 and a half hours. Email exchanges 
took the forms of written answers to a set of open-ended questions. Interviews were 
mainly  conducted  in  English,  as  most  of  my  interviewees  were  proficient  and 
comfortable speaking in English. However, if they preferred they answered questions in 
their own language as my knowledge of Polish and Romanian meant  I was able to 
                                                           
35 Details of these can be found in Appendix B. 72 
 
understand  the  responses  and  check  my  comprehension  through  further  questions. 
Immediately, after each interview, I wrote a detailed set of field notes.  
 
Although these interviews were conducted within a broad framework of questions on 
influences and experiences of youth activism, they were designed in order to allow the 
interviewee to expand on and explain matters which were of interest to them. This was 
particularly important given that their experiences could not necessarily be predicted 
from existing research (Nagy Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2006).  
 
Interviewees were picked on the basis of purposive sampling (Patton 2002, Ritchie and 
Lewis  2003)  which  means  that  they  were  selected  according  to  a  set  of  specific 
demographic, political and geographical criteria. Thus, my sample included only those 
political activists, volunteers or protestors who were under the age of 30 years
36, were 
active politically and were based in one of the sub-national localities chosen.  
 
I accessed these interviewees through a range of techniques which included contacting 
headquarters  of  political  parties  and  specific  youth  members  by  email,  phone  or 
personal visit. I then used a snowballing technique in order to contact more members of 
parties.  Interviewees  involved  in  volunteer  groups  were  mostly  accessed  through 
contacting national and locally based NGOs.  
 
As for the focus groups, the way in which this sample was collected evidently means 
that  the  sample  was probably biased  towards  those  young people  who  have  greater 
resources to participate, and who are most active. In line with much qualitative research, 
it also means that more general inferences cannot necessarily be made from the findings 
of such a small number of interviews. However, as the objective of these interviews was 
to explore the motivations and experiences of young activists in Poland and Romania, 
this method of sampling did not detract from these findings. In addition, to counteract 
this  bias,  these  findings  are  triangulated  with  reference  to  a  selection  of  secondary 
resources such as party documentation and press reports on young activists. This data is 
primarily employed to assess the logics behind political party membership in chapter 
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four. I also use this data in chapter five to analyse youth participation in informal forms 
of political engagement.  
 
2.3b(iii) Quantitative Methods  
 
Throughout the thesis I employ the results of the European Social Survey (ESS) 2006 to 
produce descriptive statistics relevant to comparative youth political participation. The 
ESS 2006 is also the basis for logistical regression analysis to determine the relative 
strength  of  various  independent  variables  which  may  influence  youth  electoral 
participation  in  Poland  and  Romania.  The  European  Social  Survey  is  a  large  scale 
European-wide survey which tests political, social and cultural attitudes of citizens from 
the age of 15 in European countries. The 2006 round is the third round of the survey and 
is the first round in which Romania has been included. The results of the ESS are freely 
available  from  the  internet.  As  the  ESS  is  a  standardised  set  of  data  with  a  high 
percentage of response, its results can be reasonably used to  generate  more general 
predictions for the wider population. However, following existing studies in established 
democracies  which  have  found  large  ‘N’  studies  to  sometimes  give  misleading 
information on  young people’s attitudes towards politics (See section 2.3a(i)),  I use 
qualitative findings from focus groups to put the ESS results into context and to help 
explain any deviations which occur across countries.  
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has outlined and explained the major methodological choices made in this 
study. The first part detailed the comparative approach taken, particularly with reference 
to  the  advantages  of  a  paired  country  comparison  which  uses  sub-national  units  to 
contextualise national level findings. The factors which make Poland and Romania an 
especially  valid  choice  for  such  research  were  explained.  As  these  countries  differ 
significantly within the newer democracies of Eastern Europe in terms of communist 
experience  and  post-communist  political  and  socioeconomic  contexts,  a  comparison 
between them aims to show how youth political participation patterns in each country 
compare to other each other and to existing findings in established democracies.  
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The second part of the chapter concentrated on the multi-method approach taken to the 
research  design.  It  explained  that  although  the  study  is  biased  towards  qualitative 
methods, it also uses quantitative methods where appropriate to deepen and complement 
the qualitative findings. Using existing studies in established democracies as examples, 
I showed how this approach was particularly relevant for a study of  youth political 
participation as young people generally conceive of the political in a different way from 
older people. By triangulating these research findings, the objective is to build up a 
convincing and detailed picture of youth political participation in Poland and Romania 
and how this compares to the situation in established democracies.  
 
In the following chapters, I apply this methodology to present and analyse data on three 
forms of youth political participation in Poland and Romania, voting, political party 
membership and informal forms of political involvement.  
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CHAPTER THREE – ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The central aim of this chapter is to explore the individual level determinants of youth 
voter turnout in Poland and Romania in order to build up an understanding of why some 
young people choose to vote and others to abstain and how this compares with findings 
of  studies  in  established  democracies.  As  discussed  in  chapter  one,  electoral 
participation  remains  the  most  widespread  form  of  traditional  democratic  political 
participation. However, it is also a form of political involvement which is necessarily 
episodic, as elections occur generally only every few years. This means that it demands 
less in terms of resources such as time and money to participate than other forms. As 
such it is a low-intensity form of political participation which is likely to engage far 
greater numbers of people than other more costly activities such as party membership. 
Building up an understanding of who votes and who abstains in a given country is 
therefore vital in addressing the broader question of youth political participation. 
 
Studies of electoral turnout in established democracies have often shown that a range of 
different factors are important in determining who votes and who abstains at an election. 
These factors include individual, institutional and election-specific determinants (Gray 
and Caul 2000, Fox Piven and Cloward 2000, Franklin 2004, Fieldhouse et al. 2007). 
Although  institutional  and  election-specific  factors  have  proven  important  in 
determining aggregate turnout numbers, my focus in this chapter is on the logics behind 
the choice to vote or to abstain. Therefore I limit my research to understanding the 
relative strength of individual level determinants
37.  
 
Age  has  traditionally been  found  to be  a persuasive  individual  level determinant in 
explaining voter turnout, where young people have often been associated with lower 
levels of turnout which was traditionally explained as being due to their place in the 
                                                           
37 Poland and Romania have similar electoral systems which mean differences between them are minimal. 
After the fall of communism, the electoral systems adopted by Poland and Romania were, as in most 
Central and East European countries, chosen in order to foster high voter turnout. Thus, in both countries 
the electoral systems have elements of proportional representation and voting takes place on a Sunday 
(Rose and Munro 2003, Birch 2003).  76 
 
life-cycle  (Kimberlee  2002,  Denver  2006,  Quintelier  2007)
38.  However,  in  recent 
decades, research in established democracies has pointed to an increasing decline in 
youth voter turnout for which life-cycle explanations alone cannot account (Wattenberg 
2002,  Electoral  Commission  2002,  O’Toole  et  al.  2003,  Quintelier  2007).  Although 
traditional determinants such as socioeconomic level and involvement in organisations 
which act to mobilise people to vote, such as churches and trade unions, also continue to 
be linked to a higher propensity for a young person to vote, the most persuasive reasons 
for the recent increases in youth abstention in established democracies are based on 
young people’s political  interest  and  attitudes  towards political  agents  (International 
IDEA 1999, O’Toole et al. 2003, Kimberlee 2002, Edwards 2007, Quintelier 2007). 
This argument contends that changes in political culture have meant that young people 
feel increasingly alienated and distant from the political system and unrepresented by 
politicians and political parties. A result of this is that they choose to ‘exit’ traditional 
forms of political participation such as voting.  
 
In newer democracies, studies have generally shown particularly high levels of voter 
abstention across all age groups in elections since the early period of post-communism 
(Tworzecki 2003, Rose and Munro 2003, Millard 2004), although some have also noted 
the particularly high levels of young abstainers (Tworzecki 2003, Sum and Bădescu 
2005).  However,  these  studies  have  generally  been  concerned  with  understanding 
institutional determinants rather than individual level factors
39. Equally, a concentration 
on explaining trends within the whole voting public rather than that of different age 
groups means that there is little specific information on why young people choose to 
vote or to abstain at elections (Kostadinova 2003, Millard 2004, Rotariu and Comşa 
2004, Cześnik 2007). This is an important omission as awareness of these individual 
level choices and how they compare to those of older age groups and those of young 
people in established democracies is critical to building up an understanding of how 
young people in newer democracies participate politically.  
 
In this chapter I employ a multi-method comparative approach to analyse the individual 
determinants of young voters and non-voters in Poland and Romania. As the aim of my 
                                                           
38 For a discussion of life-cycle explanations see chapter one, section 1.4a.  
39 Although a recent study by Bernhagen and Marsh (2007) found that the individual level determinants 
of electoral turnout in newer democracies were similar to those in established democracies.  77 
 
analysis is to build up a detailed picture of the determinants of voting and non-voting 
amongst young people, analysis of quantitative data alone cannot allow for the ‘thick’ 
description  required.  Instead  I  first  employ  qualitative  data  from  focus  groups  to 
identify and assess how different individual level variables are likely to influence youth 
electoral  participation  and  non-participation.  Having  built  up  this  model  of  youth 
electoral participation and non-participation, I then use logistic regression analysis on 
the European Social Survey (ESS) 2006 data for Poland and Romania to help identify 
and unpack the various reasons behind the choice to vote or abstain for different age 
groups. By conducting such analysis on a large and representative population sample as 
offered by the ESS, I am able to test the relative strength of the hypotheses generated 
from my analysis of qualitative data.  
 
The  general comparative hypotheses set out in chapter two  which are tested in this 
chapter are H2, H3 and H4: 
 
H2: Differing levels of decentralisation in Poland and Romania could be expected to 
mean that in Poland (H2.1) young people would be more interested in and participate 
more in local elections than in Romania (H2.2) where decision-making remains largely 
centralised.  
 
H3.  In  Poland  (H3.1)  the  more  programmatic  nature  of  the  party  system  could  be 
expected  to  mean  that  the  reasons  behind  youth  electoral  participation  and  non-
participation  would  more  closely  resemble  those  in  established  democracies  than  in 
Romania. In Romania (H3.2) the clientelistic party system could be expected to mean 
that while selective incentives could mobilise some  young people to participate, for 
others  this  would  serve  to  effectively  exclude  them  from  political  participation  by 
intensifying feelings of alienation from political agents and creating real or perceived 
‘blockages’ in participation channels. 
 
H4. In Poland (H4.1) higher levels of socioeconomic resources would be expected to 
heighten participation of young people in elections. In Romania (H4.2) low levels of 
socioeconomic  resources  would  be  expected  to  depress  levels  of  youth  electoral 
participation.   
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The first section of the chapter sets out the electoral context in Poland and Romania, 
detailing  actual  and  reported  turnout  figures  to  estimate  the  extent  to  which  young 
people in both countries vote or abstain at elections. Section two employs the findings 
from my qualitative research to build up a model for explaining the individual level 
determinants  which could be  expected  to  impact  on  youth  voting  and  abstention  in 
Poland and Romania. Subsequently, section three employs logistic regression analysis 
of European Social Survey (ESS) 2006 data to test this model.  
  
3.2 The Electoral Context 
 
3.2a. Actual Turnout in Poland and Romania 
 
Table 3.1: Elections in Poland 2000-2007 
 
 
Date  Type of Election   Turnout (%) of 
Electorate 
2000  Presidential  61.1 
2001  Parliamentary  46.2 
2002  Local  44.2 
2004  European Parliamentary  20.4 
2005  Presidential  51 
2005  Parliamentary  40.6 
2006  Local   46 
2007  Parliamentary  53.9 
(Source: Polish National Electoral Commission (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza))  
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Table 3.2: Elections in Romania 2000-2007 
 
 
Date  Type of Election  Turnout (%) of 
Electorate 
2000  Presidential   56.6 
2000  Parliamentary  65.3 
2000  Local   50 
2004  Presidential  54.8 
2004  Parliamentary  58.5 
2004  Local  54 
2007  European Parliamentary  29.5 
2008  Parliamentary  39.3 
(Source: Romanian Central Electoral Bureau (Biroul Electoral Central)) 
 
 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present the actual turnout figures for parliamentary, presidential, 
European and local elections in Poland and Romania since 2000.  In each the turnout is 
calculated  as  a  percentage  of  the  total  electorate  rather  than  of  the  voting  age 
population.  From  these  figures  it  is  possible  to  identify  certain  features.  In  both 
countries there appears to be a downward trend in turnout for parliamentary elections 
apart from in the Polish parliamentary election of 2007 which had a turnout of 53.9% 
and is therefore notably higher than in 2001 and 2005. Second, in both countries the 
turnout  for  the  European  parliamentary  election  is  very  low  (20.4%  in  Poland  and 
29.5% in Romania). This follows the trend across Europe for European elections which 
are  generally regarded  as ‘second-rate’  elections by  voter turnout  analysts (Franklin 
2004, Schmitt 2005). The third point worth noting is that although turnout for national 
elections  appears  to  show  a  generally  downward  trend,  turnout  actually  increased 
slightly in the time period for local elections (from 44.2 % to 46% in Poland and from 
50% to 54% in Romania).  
 
3.2b Turnout by Locality in Poland and Romania 
 
In both Poland and Romania, turnout has been found to vary depending on region. In 
Poland studies have shown that turnout is generally higher in urban areas and in the 
more economically developed regions in the West of the country (Millard 1999). In 
Romania, the situation is rather more complicated. Some studies (Rotariu and Comşa 
2004) have suggested that turnout is greater in rural areas than urban but this is also 80 
 
believed to be partly linked to support for the Social Democratic Party (PSD) which  
derives mainly from rural and less economically developed areas. The developed nature 
of the local level organisational structure of the Social Democrats in these areas is such 
that they are thought to be able to mobilise people to turn out and vote (Kostadinova 
2003)
40. Indeed, the PSD has also been accused of vote-buying tactics such as offering 
benefits to people in economically deprived areas in return for votes (Downs and Miller 
2006).    
 
3.2b(i) Poland 
 
Table 3.3: Turnout in the Polish Sub-National Case Study Localities 
 
Election  Turnout % 
Warsaw  Bielsko-Biała  Chełm  Polish Average 
2005 
Parliamentary 
56.1  44.4  38.4  40.6 
2007 
Parliamentary 
74  58.8  46.2  53.9 
(Source: Polish National Electoral Commission (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza))  
 
 
Table 3.3 presents the actual turnout figures for the three Polish sub-national case study 
localities, Warsaw, Bielsko-Biała and Chełm. It shows that turnout in both the 2005 and 
2007  parliamentary  elections  was  highest  in  Warsaw  and  lowest  in  Chełm.  This 
corresponds with existing study and suggests that the higher level of socioeconomic 
resources in Warsaw and Bielsko-Biała may be one factor influencing voter turnout.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
40 The reasons for the local level penetration of this political party and the consequences for youth 
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3.2b(ii) Romania 
 
 
Table 3.4: Turnout in the Romanian Sub-National Case Study Localities 
 
Election  Turnout% 
Bucharest  Bihor County 
(Oradea) 
Teleorman 
County 
(Alexandria) 
Romanian 
Average 
2004 
Parliamentary 
51.3  54.5  66.3  57.1 
2008 
Parliamentary 
30.4  44  52.7  39.3 
(Note: The results for both elections represent the turnout at 21.00 on the Election Day.  
Source: Romanian Central Electoral Bureau (Biroul Electoral Central)) 
 
 
Table 3.4 presents the turnout figures for the 2004 and 2008 parliamentary elections in 
the three case study localities in Romania. We can see that the lowest rate of turnout in 
both elections was recorded in Bucharest and that the highest was in Teleorman county 
where Alexandria is situated. These findings appear to contradict the hypothesis that 
areas with higher levels of socioeconomic resources  will also have higher levels of 
turnout. This is a very interesting finding and suggests that other factors such as the 
attraction of selective incentives to voters in poorer areas may be a factor in predicting 
turnout. It is also significant that Teleorman remains a Social Democratic Party (PSD) 
stronghold (See chapter two) and this may have an impact on the mobilisation of voters 
in the region.  
 
3.2c Voting by Age Group  
 
To understand the differences between age groups and voting in Poland and Romania it 
is  necessary  to  separate  turnout  figures  into  age  groups.  However,  this  is  not 
straightforward as actual turnout figures are only available for the electorate as a whole. 
Therefore to assess the differences between age groups we must turn to reported voting 
figures as given in large scale surveys. As the figures given by such surveys are liable to 
be higher than actual voting figures they must be interpreted with caution (McDonald 
and  Popkin  2001).  In  the  case  of  Poland,  I  employ  data  from  the  Polish  National 
Election Studies of 2001 and 2005 and in Romania I use the European Social Survey 82 
 
2006 results coupled with Rotariu and Comşa’s (2004) findings for the 2004 elections to 
give a comparative overview of turnout for different age groups. 
 
3.2c(i) Poland  
 
Figure 3.1: Reported Turnout (%) by Age Group in Two Polish Elections  
                   (2001, 2005) 
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(Source: Polish National Election Surveys 2001 (N= 1783) and 2005 (N= 1197)).  
 
Figure 3.1 presents the reported turnout data by age group for the 2001 and 2005 Polish 
parliamentary  elections.  As  expected  the  reported  turnout  is  higher  than  the  actual 
figures for each election. However as the degree of error between the two sets of figures 
(11.4 points difference for 2001 and 13.4 points difference for 2005) is relatively low 
the trends shown in Figure 3.1 can be taken to accurately reflect the differences between 
age categories.  
 
The reported turnout by age group shows that in both elections the two youngest age 
groups (18-25 years and 26-35 years) had the lowest turnout by a considerable margin. 
For each election, turnout peaks in mid-age (between 46 and 65 years) and then falls 
again for the over 66 years age bracket. These findings are both consistent with studies 
on voter participation in established democracies and studies on post-communist turnout 83 
 
(Lijphart  1997,  Kimberlee  2002,  Geys  2006,  Birch  2003,  Fieldhouse  et  al.2007
41). 
However,  the  latest  election  in  Poland  may  contradict  this  trend  as  although  the 
Electoral Survey for the 2007 elections has not yet been published, estimates put turnout 
for  the  youngest  age  group  at  this  election  over  50%  which  is  strikingly  high  in 
comparison to previous elections and would place  youth turnout at similar levels to 
older age groups
42. This suggests a significant change in the voting behaviour of young 
people. However this could be overstated as the nature of the 2007 election as a close 
contest between two contrasting main parties (the Law and Justice Party (PiS) and Civic 
Platform (PO)) is likely to have had a positive effect on voter turnout (Franklin 2004).  
 
3.2c(ii) Romania 
 
Figure 3.2: Reported Turnout (%) by Age Group in the 2004 Romanian Parliamentary 
Election 
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41 In their analysis of the European Social Survey 2002-2003, Fieldhouse et al. (2007) found that whereas 
average turnout across 22 European countries for elections between 1999 and 2002 was 70%, this fell to 
51% for the 18-24 years age group.  
42 A report by Interia.pl/Fakty (22/10/07) based on exit polls gave the turnout figures as follows: 18-24 
52.4%, 25-39 51.5%, 40-59 56.6%, over 60 years 45.1%. 84 
 
Figure 3.3: Reported Turnout (%) by Age Group in 2004 Romanian Parliamentary 
Election (ESS 2006) 
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                         (Source: European Social Survey 2006 Romania (N=1844)) 
 
As  there  are  no  systematic  national  electoral  surveys  published  in  Romania,  the 
information in Figure 3.2 for turnout by age group is based on the analysis of an exit 
poll of the 2004 elections conducted by Rotariu and Comşa (2004) and published in 
their book. This shows the same trends as observed in Poland. Namely, the age groups 
with the least turnout are the youngest (18-34) and the oldest (over 65). However, as 
this data uses larger age groups than in the present study,  Figure 3.3  illustrates the 
reported turnout by age group for the 2004 elections as given by respondents in the 
European  Social  Survey  (ESS)  in  2006.  Although  caution  must  be  exerted  in 
interpreting these results as a considerable time lapse of two years exists between the 
elections  and  the  survey  (Norris  2002,  Fieldhouse  et  al.  2007)
43,  a  similar  trend  in 
voting turnout by age can again be observed.  
 
This  section  has  shown  that  in  both  Poland  and  Romania,  young  people  generally 
abstain from voting in greater numbers than older age groups. As general turnout levels 
across  the  population  are  commonly  lower  in  these  newer  democracies  than  in 
established ones, this means that voter turnout for the youngest age group may be even 
lower than that found in established democracies. Based on the estimations given by 
                                                           
43 It has been suggested that respondents are more likely to forget or exaggerate their participation in 
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reported voting turnout, it appears that as many as 50-70% of young people in Poland 
and Romania are choosing to abstain at elections
44.   
 
3.3 Building a Model for Youth Electoral Participation and Non-Participation in 
Poland and Romania  
 
To  understand  the  reasons  behind  this  large-scale  youth  abstention  in  Poland  and 
Romania  and  to  assess  how  these  compare  to  existing  studies  on  young  people  in 
established democracies, it is necessary to unpack various individual level factors which 
may  help  determine  why  some  young  people  vote  and  why  some  abstain.  In  the 
following section, I consider three interrelated groups of individual level factors which 
could be expected to have an influence on the propensity of young people in Poland and 
Romania to vote or to  abstain at elections. The choice of these factors is based on 
findings  of  the  large  existing  literature  on  voter  turnout  and  abstention  in  both 
established and newer democracies and from my own qualitative research in Poland and 
Romania. The factors considered are socioeconomic factors, especially education level, 
political interest and trust and existing involvement in social and political activities.  
 
3.3a Socioeconomic Factors 
 
The  access  to  resources  such  as  money,  time  and  skills  has  often  been  found  to 
positively predict voter turnout in established democracies (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 
1980, Lipset 1981, Jackman 1987, Blais and Dobryznska 1998, Norris 2002). We could 
therefore hypothesise that the lower levels of socioeconomic resources of young people 
in Poland and Romania in comparison to established democracies would impact on their 
likelihood of voting. However, this could also vary depending on country and locality. 
As such, higher levels of national economic development and educational attainment of 
young people in Poland than in Romania
45 could be expected to mean that young people 
in Poland would have greater resources with which to vote. Equally, a similar finding 
could be expected of different localities within each country. It should be noted however 
that the turnout figures in Romania appear to contradict this trend, as turnout is often 
greater in those areas which are less economically developed such as Alexandria (see 
                                                           
44 This is calculated based on the error between reported voting figures and actual voting figures.  
45 See chapter two section 2.2d(ii). 86 
 
section 3.2b(ii)). This suggests that socioeconomic factors may have a less important 
role in explaining turnout and abstention in Romania than in Poland.  
 
3.3a(i) The Importance of Educational Level in Predicting Youth Turnout  
 
In established democracies the strength of education level as a predictor of voting has 
been found to vary from country to country
46. One apparent paradox of education and 
voter  turnout  is  that  as  education  levels  have  been  seen  to  rise  across  established 
democracies, turnout has fallen. This is particularly puzzling in the case of the youngest 
cohort as education is now largely more accessible for them than it was for older age 
groups.  However  within  this,  studies  have  also  suggested  that  education  level  has 
strengthened as a predictor of voter turnout for young people in comparison with older 
cohorts (Lyons and Alexander 2000, Blais et al. 2004). This suggests that voting is 
increasingly becoming a pastime for an educated elite of young people, meaning that 
more marginalised young people are becoming even more unlikely to participate. In 
addition, some studies suggest that the type of education available may also play an 
important role in encouraging young people to vote. Particularly, it has been proposed 
that specific civic education classes may increase a person’s awareness of civic duty and 
political issues thus making them more likely to vote (Campbell 2006). However, this 
remains an area of controversy and studies have been unable to show a consistently 
direct relationship between access to civic education and the likelihood of turning out to 
vote (Stoker 2006, Shea and Green 2006).   
 
There is no  general consensus on whether education level is  an important factor in 
determining turnout in post-communist countries.  Some studies of turnout have found 
that education level is relatively important (Norris 2002, Markowski and Tucker 2005, 
Rotariu  and  Comşa  2004
47)  whereas  others  stress  that  socioeconomic  characteristics 
cannot  effectively  explain  turnout  (Millard  1999).  However,  as  in  established 
democracies  access  amongst  young  people  to  education  has  increased  over  recent 
                                                           
46 Studies in the USA have consistently found that this is an important factor (Verba and Nie 1972, 
Powell 1986, Fox Piven and Cloward 2000) but studies have found that education tends to have less 
influence in European countries (Powell 1986, Topf 1995, Norris 2002, Wattenberg 2002). 
47 They found that for the MMT/INSOMAR exit poll on the Romanian elections of 2004 there was a 10% 
difference between reported turnout of respondents who had a very low level of education and those who 
had attained a level of higher education.   87 
 
decades
48.In  addition,  it  has  also been  argued  that  young people  in post-communist 
countries  contrast  importantly  with  youth  in  established  democracies  in  regard  to 
learning about civic duty and democratic political participation (Youniss et al. 2002). 
This  is  based  on  the  contention  that  the  lack  of  experience  in  democratic  political 
participation of older cohorts means that young people do not benefit from the political 
socialisation  of  their  parents  and  teachers  in  the  same  way  as  in  established 
democracies
49. In turn, this could mean that school based learning about voting may 
hold  more  importance  in  newer  democracies  in  encouraging  young  people  to  vote 
(Torney-Purta  2002).  However,  studies  have  shown  that  access  to  education  which 
stresses  civic  duty  and  knowledge  also  varies  across  countries  and  localities  within 
these countries (Torney-Purta 2002). Particularly, unbalanced educational reform and 
unequal distribution of educational resources has meant poorer, rural young people are 
particularly disadvantaged in terms of educational provision (Polyzoi et al. 2003).  
 
An international study of civic education during the 1990s and early 21
st century found 
significant  differences  between  the  level  of  civic  knowledge  and  teaching  of  civic 
education in general in Poland and Romania (Torney-Purta 2002). In particular, it found 
that 14 year olds in Poland had civic knowledge which was above the international 
average and that teachers in Poland were committed to integrating civic education as 
part  of  the  general  curriculum.  In  contrast,  in  Romania,  young  people  had  civic 
knowledge  which  was  lower  than  the  international  average  and  there  was  little 
commitment to integrated teaching of civic education in the curriculum. Response from 
my focus groups in both countries partly supported these findings. In Poland, although 
respondents generally felt that there could be more discussion of political issues and 
civic duties in schools,  they  expressed the belief that formal education was vital in 
encouraging young people to vote. This view was summed up by one respondent,  
                                                           
48  As  a  result  the  percentage  of  young  people  in  both  countries  completing  at  least  secondary  level 
education is higher amongst 20-24 year olds than older age groups. In Poland 91% of 20-24 year olds 
compared to 85% of 25 years and above. In Romania 76% of 20-24 year olds compared to 73% of over 
25 years (Eurostat News Release 44/2007). 
49Youniss et al (2002, p.123) explain this in the following way, ‘In the former socialist bloc nations, the 
switch to democracy has put the older generation on par with the younger generation as learners of a 
new system’.  
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‘Education  is  the  most  important  in  making  people  vote  here  because  there  is  no 
tradition of voting so people don’t have the example of their family voting and so they 
have to learn about it at school’ (m, 18, Warsaw) 
 
In Romania, respondents generally felt that there was a complete lack of civic education 
in schools and that they were positively discouraged from discussion of politics and 
democracy. For example, one stated,  
 
The problem is that older teachers don’t want us to discuss politics’ (f, 17 Oradea) 
 
Another explained,  
 
‘All we hear about the communist regime is what we hear in school and naturally in a 
democratic country what they teach us is that ok communism was bad, they couldn’t do 
this,  they  couldn’t  do  this  and  during  communism  they  used  to  teach  kids  that 
democracy was bad because they can’t do this, they can’t do this and communism, is 
good. We don’t discuss why things are good or bad’ (f, 18 Alexandria) 
 
On the basis of these findings, it is hypothesised that education level would have a 
greater significance in Poland than Romania in determining youth voter turnout, where 
the lack of teaching about democracy and civic duty in schools may mean that even 
those with higher levels of education have less access to the resources associated with 
political participation.  
 
3.3b Political Interest and Trust:  Alienation and/or Apathy?  
 
The  second  set  of  factors  which  constitute  various  attitudes  towards  politics  is 
particularly relevant to assessing the reasons behind youth electoral participation and 
abstention  in  Poland  and  Romania.  In  established  democracies  the  degree  to  which 
someone states their political interest and trust has been correlated with the likelihood of 
them turning out to vote (Almond and Verba 1963, Parry et al. 1992, Norris 2002, 89 
 
Kimberlee  2002)
50.  However,  studies  have  also  shown  that  these  concepts  may  be 
interpreted differently by young people meaning that the reasons behind increasing rates 
of youth abstention at elections are often misread as political apathy rather than political 
alienation (O’Toole et al. 2003, Henn et al. 2005). This view of a politically apathetic 
youth  has  also  been  supported  by  media  reports  on  young  people  in  established 
democracies  whose  abstention  at  elections  is  often  framed  as  a  product  of  a  youth 
culture  which  encourages  political  and  social  apathy  and  consumerism  (Wattenberg 
2002, Kimberlee 2002)
51. However, qualitative studies of youth political participation 
have  found  that  this  image  of  young  people  as  uninterested  in  and  uncaring  about 
politics is due to their interpretation of politics as referring to political agents, such as 
politicians and parties, rather than to wider political and social issues. Indeed, young 
people have often been found to have a high degree of interest in wider political issues 
and to be supportive of democracy and elections (Electoral Commission 2002, Henn et 
al. 2005, Phelps 2005, Vaizey 2005).  Their feelings of alienation from political agents 
however, tend to be deep-rooted and have a detrimental influence on their belief that by 
voting they can influence change in policy.  
 
In newer democracies, the way in which young people conceive of politics is likely also 
to be framed by the way in which political agents are viewed particularly negatively 
across all age groups. High level corruption scandals, economic hardship and unfulfilled 
promises  are  often  cited  as  reasons  for  the  low  level  of  confidence  many  post-
communist citizens have in politicians and parties and are seen as a persuasive reason 
for high levels of electoral abstention (Mischler and Rose 2001, Rose and Munro 2003). 
This means that it is very difficult to determine whether the reasons for young people in 
newer democracies choosing to abstain at elections is due to specific post-communist 
factors  or  reflects  a  more  general  trend  amongst  youth  as  found  in  established 
democracies.  
 
To address this, in this section, I combine survey data on political attitudes of Polish and 
Romanian young people with qualitative data to assess how their conception of politics 
                                                           
50 Although studies have found levels of trust to be positively linked to the likelihood of voting, different 
studies have found that the strength of this relationship varies (Parry et. al. 1992, Putnam 1993, 2000, 
Norris 2002) 
51 Kimberlee (2002, p.87) explains that youth culture is often seen by the media as ‘problematic, inferior 
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compares  to  that  of  young  people  in  established  democracies.  Building  an 
understanding  of  whether  young  people  in  these  countries  are  also  alienated  from 
political  agents  but  interested  in  wider  political  issues  is  vital  to  understanding  the 
reasons  behind  the  choice  to  vote  or  to  abstain  at  elections.  However,  it  could  be 
expected that the political attitudes of young people in Poland and Romania could also 
differ from one another as a result of contrasting party systems and decentralisation (See 
chapter two). As such, we could expect that young people in Romania may exhibit a 
greater degree of separation from political agents and processes than their counterparts 
in Poland.  
 
3.3b(i) How do Polish and Romanian Young People Conceive of Politics?  
 
To test how young people in Poland and Romania conceive of politics, I first asked 
focus groups respondents to describe what they understood by the term ‘politics’. Their 
answers in both countries revealed that they invariably associated politics with political 
agents rather than wider political issues which affected their daily lives. The answers 
they  gave  were  generally  scathing  of political  agents  and particularly politicians. A 
typical example of how this question was interpreted was given by the answers of focus 
group respondents in a high school in Oradea, Romania where they said that politics 
meant, ‘thieves’, ‘corrupt people’ and ‘scandals’. The majority of respondents in both 
countries stated that they were uninterested in politics.  
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Figure 3.4: Interest in Politics by Country and Age Group 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
%
18-25 26-35 36-55 56+ Average
Age Groups
UK Germany Poland Romania
 
(Source: European Social Survey 2006: UK (N= 2386), Germany (N=2915), Poland (N=1720), Romania 
(N=2139) where % represents number of respondents saying they are quite or very interested in politics)  
 
 
This lack of stated political interest is supported by the European Social Survey (ESS) 
2006  data  which  appears  to  show  that  young  people  in  Poland  and  Romania  are 
particularly  uninterested  in  politics  (see  Figure  3.4).  Indeed,  according  to  this  data, 
Polish  and  Romanian  young  people  are  even  less  interested  in  politics  than  young 
people in the UK and Germany. However, it should be noted that the gap between the 
youngest  age  group  and  older  age  group  of  those  who  say  they  are  quite  or  very 
interested in politics is narrower (around 20%) in the newer democracies than in the 
established democracies (around 30%). This suggests that the lack of interest in politics 
amongst young people in Poland and Romania may also be a product of a more general 
separation between society and political agents in post-communist countries (Howard 
2003,  Dilema  Veche  2003
52)  rather  than  a  reflection  of  the  way  young  people 
specifically  conceive  of  politics  as  has  been  found  in  established  democracies. 
Nonetheless, this finding of very low levels of interest in politics amongst young people 
also supports findings of national level studies in Poland and Romania
53 and as such it is 
important to assess whether this is due to negative views of political agents or whether it 
                                                           
52 This special report in Dilema Veche nr.553 (2003) (Divorţul de Politică) encompasses a number of 
articles on the separation between politics and citizens in Romania.  
53 See for example the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) (2003) Report on Polish Youth and the 
British Council/Gallup (2004) Report: Being Young in Romania.  92 
 
also reflects a wider apathy about political and social issues and a low confidence in 
democratic institutions. To address this we should first evaluate the degree to which 
young people in Poland and Romania are distrusting of political agents before assessing 
how  this  compares  with  their  views  on  wider  political  issues  and  democratic 
institutions.   
 
 
Figure 3.5: Trust in Politicians by Country and Age Group 
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(Source:  European  Social  Survey  2006:    UK  (N=  2386),  Germany  (N=  2915),  Poland  (N=  1548), 
Romania (N= 1844) where % represents the number of respondents who have a moderate to high level of 
trust in politicians)  
 
 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the levels of trust in politicians by age group and country. Again, 
we can see that the levels are consistently lower in Poland and Romania for all age 
groups than in the UK and Germany
54. In particular, the level of trust for politicians in 
the lowest age group in Poland and Romania is strikingly low in comparison to that in 
established democracies and again suggests that post-communist factors may also play a 
significant role in how young people relate to politics. The reasons given by focus group 
respondents for their low levels of trust and confidence in politicians, however, were 
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similar to findings of studies in established democracies and mainly focus on the self-
interest of politicians. In Poland, one respondent stated,  
 
‘politicians cannot be trusted because they are not interested in people, they are only 
interested in themselves’ (f,18 Chełm) 
 
Similarly another explained,  
 
‘I don’t know of anyone who has gone into politics to help the Polish society, they are 
all in it for their own gain, for ways to make money and get rich’  
(m, 25 Bielsko-Biała) 
 
These views support the findings of the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) study 
on  Youth  in  Poland  (2003)  which  found  that  80%  of  respondents  felt  that political 
parties  existed  for  the  personal  benefit  of  politicians  and  that  only  5%  felt  that 
politicians represented the interests of their electorate.  
 
In the Romanian focus groups, the views expressed about politicians also centred on the 
self-interest of politicians. For example, one respondent said, 
 
‘The politicians think only for themselves and not for the rest of the country and that is 
why this country has financial problems’ (f, 17, Alexandria) 
 
Again, this supports the findings of existing studies in Romania. For instance, a survey 
carried out by a sociologist
55 at the University in Oradea on 523 school pupils between 
the ages of 15 and 19 found that 63% of respondents felt that political leaders care little 
about the opinions of ordinary people and 89% felt that politicians rapidly forget about 
the needs of the people who elected them.  
 
However, these very low levels of confidence and trust in politicians varied slightly 
with respect to local level politicians. In Poland, the views on whether national or local 
                                                           
55 This survey was carried out by Dr. Adrian Hatos in Oradea in June 2006. Dr. Hatos kindly sent me the 
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level  politicians  were  more  trustworthy  were  mixed.  In  Chełm,  respondents  were 
generally more positive about local politicians. One stated,  
 
‘Local is better because they understand what happens in Chełm, they can do something 
for us here. Those people in Warsaw only care about big cities and they don’t know the 
problems in Chełm’ (m, 18 Chełm) 
 
However  in  Warsaw  and  Bielsko-Biała  the  views  were  less  positive.  In  Warsaw, 
respondents generally said that they had a similar level of trust in local as in national 
politicians and in Bielsko–Biala some respondents felt that local politicians were even 
more self-interested than national ones. For instance, one respondent explained,  
 
‘I don’t see local politics as any better than national – perhaps even worse. In the local 
council they all say that they are in different parties but it makes no difference. Behind 
closed doors they are friends who help one another and drink vodka at each other’s 
houses. They get advantages, they are always the first to know when something will be 
sold or some kind of opportunity comes up and they buy buildings before they are on the 
market under a someone else’s name and they get it much cheaper’ (m, 25 Bielsko-
Biała) 
 
These mixed views give little support to the hypothesis that decentralisation in Poland 
has made young people feel any more involved in or trustworthy of politics at local 
level. Indeed, the response from Romanian focus group participants suggested similarly 
mixed views on the relative trustworthiness of local politicians as compared to national. 
In most cases, respondents were equally negative about local politicians and national, 
however some showed a greater level of confidence in local politicians.  
 
For instance, one explained,  
 
‘Local politicians can represent our interests better than national. The mayor as the 
head of the town is better than the president for us because he knows the town better’ 
(f,18 Oradea) 
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Overall however, the views of young people in both countries show a very low level of 
trust and confidence in political agents. This suggests that this may also influence how 
much  they  feel  interested  in politics.  To  analyse  this  further  it  is  now necessary to 
question whether this low level of interest and confidence also extends to wider political 
and social issues and democratic institutions.  
 
3.3b(ii) Interest in Wider Political and Social Issues  
 
In Poland and Romania, as in established democracies (Wattenberg 2002) young people 
are often framed by the media as being apathetic about and uninterested in political and 
social issues and instead motivated by consumerism and self-interest
56. However, in 
established democracies this image of young people has been found to be flawed. To 
test whether this could also be valid for young people in Poland and Romania I asked 
focus group participants to state what they felt were important issues for young people 
in their countries. This generally provoked an informed and passionate discussion on a 
broad range of wider political and social issues. In Poland, the main issues raised were 
with regard to youth unemployment, low wages, and temporary migration abroad to 
find work. In Romania, the main topics were similar but also focused on the mismatch 
between state education and skills required for finding a job as well as the issue of 
corruption in universities and colleges. To understand the relationship between these 
issues and how they conceive of politicians I asked them how they felt politicians dealt 
with these problems. The answers suggested that they generally felt politicians were 
uninterested in the problems of young people. In Poland one respondent stated,  
 
‘They (politicians) just don’t care about these things – they do nothing about trying to 
get young people to come back to Poland for example’ (m, 24 Bielsko-Biała) 
 
In Romania, response was even more negative. For instance, one respondent answered,  
                                                           
56 Examples include a Polish newspaper article (Karoń and Kowalczyk 2007) which stated that ‘young 
people  do  not  show  the  slightest  interest  in  the  state  of  the  social  institutions  which  are  part  of  a 
democracy’ and then continued on to argue that young people felt voting was not for them but rather for a 
‘weird group of political party supporters, disgruntled older relatives, old men and the popularised old 
grandmother (babcia) who goes to vote to protect her pension’. Also in Romania, a similar image is often 
promoted by the media. An article in the daily newspaper, Adevărul (Marin 2007) states, ‘It is easy to 
identify the new members of the electorate who were born in 1989. You can find them in the park with a 
beer in their hand, on roller skates or in fast food restaurants’.  96 
 
 
‘There are still a lot of really old people in politics with old ideas from the communist 
era. They don’t want to do anything to change things for young people – they want it to 
stay how it is because it is good for them’ (f, 18 Oradea) 
 
These views contrast importantly with the image of an apathetic and uninterested youth. 
Indeed,  they  illustrate  similar  findings  to  that  of  studies  in  established  democracies 
which find young people to feel unrepresented and misunderstood by political agents 
(O’Toole  et  al.  2003,  Henn  et  al.  2005).  As  such,  this  provides  support  for  the 
hypothesis that young people in Poland and Romania are largely alienated from political 
agents rather than apathetic about wider political and social issues.  
 
3.3b(iii) Support for Democratic Institutions  
 
In  established  democracies,  studies  have  found  that  although  young  people  are 
distrustful of political agents, they have more confidence in the democratic process and 
institutions. This is seen to add important support to the argument that young people are 
largely  alienated  from  political  agents  rather  than  politically  apathetic  (Henn  et  al. 
2005). However, in newer democracies, studies have found that all age groups are likely 
to have higher levels of distrust in democratic institutions such as parliaments than in 
established  democracies  (Linz  and  Stepan  1996,  Mischler  and  Rose  2001).  Similar 
findings have been found with regard to satisfaction in democracy (Rose-Ackermann 
2005). This has been explained by a disappointment with post-communist democratic 
reform and economic hardship (Howard 2003, Barnes 2004). 
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Figure 3.6: Trust in Country’s Parliament by Country and Age Group 
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(Source:  European  Social  Survey  2006:    UK  (N=  2386),  Germany  (N=  2915),  Poland  (N=  1548), 
Romania (N= 1844) where % represents the number of respondents who said they had a moderate to high 
level of trust in the country’s parliament)  
 
The figures on levels of trust in the country’s parliament shown in Figure 3.6 appear to 
support  these  earlier  findings.  Although  the  parliament  is  an  enduring  democratic 
institution,  according  to  these  survey  results,  the  levels  of  trust  in  the  newer 
democracies,  particularly  Poland,  for  all  age  groups  are  lower  than  in  the  UK  and 
Germany.  Also,  unlike  in  the  established  democracies  the  youngest  age  groups  in 
Poland and Romania seem to have significantly lower levels of trust than the older age 
groups. When compared to the level of trust of young people in Poland and Romania in 
politicians (see Figure 3.5) they do appear to have slightly higher levels of trust in the 
parliament. However, the difference is not significant. Given their lack of experience of 
communism,  the  youngest  age  group  are  unlikely  to  feel  the  same  degree  of 
disappointment with the transformation to democracy as older age groups. However 
their socialisation in a time of great political, economic and social change could also 
help to explain the contrast between them and young people in established democracies. 
Despite  these  survey-based  findings  on  trust  in  democratic  institutions,  many 
respondents in focus groups in both Poland and Romania appeared more supportive of 
democratic processes. For instance, in Poland, one focus group respondent stated,  98 
 
 
‘Democracy is much better than anything else but the problem is the politicians’ (m, 23, 
Bielsko-Biała) 
 
In  Romania  also  respondents  made  this  separation  between  political  agents  and 
democracy as a system. For instance, one explained,  
 
‘Democracy is good, politicians in Romania are not’ (f, 17, Alexandria) 
 
Although, this only represents the views of a small sample, it does suggest that there are 
groups of young people in both countries who feel that although political agents are 
untrustworthy and self-interested, this does not negate the worth of democracy as a 
system.  Coupled  with  the  finding  that  young  people  do  not  appear  apathetic  about 
political and social issues, this suggests that the conception of politics amongst young 
Poles  and  Romanians  may  be  closer  to  that  of  their  counterparts  in  established 
democracies than at first appears.  
 
3.3b(iv) Implications for Electoral Participation and Non-Participation 
 
If  young  people  in  Poland  and  Romania  are  indeed  largely  alienated  from  political 
agents  rather  than  apathetic  about  wider political  issues  and  democratic  institutions, 
then what is the likely effect of this on their decision of whether to vote or abstain at an 
election?  Studies  in  established  democracies  have  suggested  that  alienation  from 
political agents has made young people likely to choose to ‘exit’ from traditional forms 
of political involvement such as voting as they feel that their participation would make 
no difference (Kimberlee 2002, Henn et al. 2005, Sloam 2007). However, the support 
for the democratic process also suggests that there is potential for young people who are 
alienated  from  political  agents  to  recognise  the  worth  in  turning  out  to  vote.  My 
qualitative research found that in Poland and Romania there is support for both of these 
possibilities.  
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3.3b(v) The Alienated Abstainers 
 
In focus groups in both countries two common reasons were given for not voting at 
elections. These were the belief that one vote could make no difference to the outcome 
of an election and that there was no valid choice between candidates.  
 
a.  My Vote Makes no Difference  
 
In focus groups in both countries, examples of typical statements made by non-voters 
were as follows:  
 
‘Even if I vote it doesn’t count – it can’t change anything’ (f, 17 Chełm) 
 
‘One vote makes no difference to anything’ (f, 18, Oradea) 
 
Evidently, taken by themselves, these opinions appear to correspond with the so-called 
paradox  of  voting,  where  it  is  argued  that  a  rational  being,  understanding  that  the 
individual benefits of voting are outweighed by the costs incurred, would choose to 
abstain (Downs 1957, Geys 2006). However, it is important to understand why these 
young non-voters feel this way. When questioned further, these respondents showed 
that non-voting was a component of a more general feeling that they lacked influence in 
decisions made by politicians and institutions. For instance, in Poland the respondent 
quoted above (f, 17 Chełm) continued on to say,  
 
‘politicians say one thing to get people to vote for them but when they are in power they 
don’t need to stick to these promises and no one can do anything’  
 
Similarly, the Romanian respondent (f, 18 Oradea) argued,  
 
‘some people- like my parents- think it is important to vote because they feel like they 
are  doing something  to  change  the  country  but I  don’t feel so personally  involved, 
nothing I do can make all that much difference’  
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These  feelings  of  lack  of  personal  political  efficacy  are  also  supported  by  survey 
evidence in both  countries.  In Poland, the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) 
(2003) study on youth asked young people if they agreed with the statement ‘During 
elections voters can influence the outcome of the election’ and only 29% of respondents 
said they definitely agreed. In Romania, a National Youth Authority Survey (2007)
57 
asked the degree to which respondents felt they had influence over decisions made by 
political institutions and 72 % said they had little influence.  
 
In established democracies it has also been argued that young people express feelings of 
low political efficacy and that this can manifest as voluntary abstention at elections 
(Henn  et  al.  2005).  However,  it  appears  that  the  basis  for  these  feelings  may  vary 
importantly from established democracies to newer post-communist ones. Particularly, 
the response of young people in Poland and Romania also corresponds to the feelings of 
separation from politics which have been also found consistently in older age groups in 
these countries (Rose and Munro 2003). Although the  youngest age groups in post-
communist countries have little or no personal experience of communism, the perceived 
split between citizens and the state which has endured throughout the first decades of 
post-communism  has  undoubtedly  had  an  influence  on  the  degree  to  which  young 
people believe in their  ability to influence public decision-making. However, recent 
studies in Poland suggest that although very many young people do not feel that they 
can influence what happens in the country, the numbers are less than those for older age 
groups. A Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) survey
58 in 2008 found that 60% of 
18-24 year olds and 54% of 25-34 year olds felt that they had no personal influence 
compared to 69% of 35-54 year olds and 82% of 55-64 year olds. It may be that this 
change indicates a slight move within the Polish young generation from the influence 
that communism has had on the relationship between older age groups and political 
institutions, nonetheless it is too soon to suggest that will lead to much greater belief in 
political efficacy amongst young people in the future.  
 
Therefore, it appears that the finding of very low levels of political efficacy amongst 
young  non-voters  in  Poland  and  Romania  may  stem  from  a  combination  of  two 
                                                           
57 This survey had 3072 respondents between the ages of 14 and 35 years.  
58 Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej January 2008 – ‘Czy Obywatele mają Wpływ na Sprawy 
Publiczne?’ (Do citizens have influence over public matters?). 101 
 
differing influences. Firstly, their socialisation during post-communism and secondly a 
wider phenomenon of low levels of political efficacy which are also found amongst 
youth in established democracies.  
 
b.  There is no Choice between Candidates 
 
The second common factor in the views expressed by young non-voters in both Poland 
and  Romania  was  that  they  felt  there  was  a  lack  of  ‘good’  candidates  standing  in 
elections. For instance, in Poland, one respondent said,  
 
‘There is really no choice of people to vote for- they are all the same’ (m, 18, Chełm) 
 
In  Romania,  respondents  were  even  more  adamant  about  this  lack  of  choice.  In 
Alexandria one stated,  
 
‘It’s easy to vote but it’s impossible to choose between the candidates. They are all bad’ 
(m, 24 Alexandria) 
 
These sentiments were also reiterated by respondents in Oradea. One explained,  
 
‘There is not much point in voting for anyone really and certainly not for small parties. 
None of our parties are really trustworthy. If you do vote it is like choosing the lesser 
evil’ (f, 17 Oradea) 
 
Another added,  
 
‘If we are going to vote we need options and I don’t know, I don’t want to give any of 
them my vote’ (m, 18 Oradea) 
 
This  perceived  lack  of  worthy  candidates  in  elections  appears  to  correspond  to  the 
feeling that political agents do not represent the needs of young people (see section 
3.3bi) and again corresponds to similar views expressed by young people in established 
democracies (O’Toole et al. 2003).  
 102 
 
3.3b(vi) The Alienated Voters 
 
Another group of young people in my focus groups in Poland and Romania who also 
appeared alienated from political agents did not see this as a reason to ‘exit’ from voting 
altogether. Indeed, their support of elections and democracy was such that it appeared to 
override their feelings of alienation. For instance, one respondent in Poland said,  
 
‘I will always vote, it doesn’t matter how bad the politicians get. The only way to have a 
say in a democracy is by voting even if the politicians are corrupt and stealing from the 
people’ (m, 19 Warsaw) 
 
Similarly, in Romania one respondent stated,  
 
‘I will vote even if there are only bad choices, I can’t complain otherwise and you must 
do it if you live in a democracy’  (f, 18 Oradea) 
 
Although  this  seems  to  be  a  positive  indication  that  some  young  people  will  vote 
regardless  of  their  mistrust  of  and  low  levels  of  confidence  in  political  agents,  the 
strength of this can be overstated. As has been found in established democracies, it is 
possible that this confidence in the underlying democratic value of elections is linked 
with higher levels of education and socioeconomic resources (Henn et al. 2005). Indeed, 
this is supported by survey results in Poland where the Public Opinion Research Center 
(CBOS)  (2003)  study  of  youth  found  that  support  for  democracy  was  considerably 
greater amongst those young people who had a higher level of education and came from 
a wealthier family. As such, this group of ‘alienated voters’ may only represent a very 
small minority of youth in each country. Equally, although these young people may 
initially express such support for elections, there is no guarantee that this will endure if 
they continue to feel unrepresented by and alienated from political agents.  
 
These findings suggest that the relationship between young people’s levels of political 
interest and trust and the likelihood of voting is more problematic than at first appears. 
Indeed, it seems that young Poles and Romanians, like their counterparts in established 
democracies, conceive of politics as relating to political agents whom they often regard 
negatively. Unlike in established democracies, it appears that this conception of politics 103 
 
is  also  strongly  related  to  a  more  general  post-communist  set  of  attitudes  towards 
politics. Nonetheless, this does not mean that young people in Poland and Romania are 
necessarily  uninterested  in  wider  political  and  social  issues  and  unsupportive  of 
democratic process. Indeed, similar to findings in established democracies, it appears 
that  many  young people  in both  countries  feel  alienated  from political  agents. This 
alienation often manifests as abstention at elections as they feel low levels of political 
efficacy and that political agents are uninterested in and unrepresentative of their needs. 
However, my qualitative research also suggests that there is another group of young 
people who despite feelings of alienation, choose to vote on the basis of their support 
for democracy and elections. As such, we could expect that although young people who 
profess greater interest in politics and trust in political agents may be more likely to 
vote, such a finding does not necessarily indicate that the choice to abstain at an election 
can be explained by political apathy.  
 
3.3c Existing Social and Political Involvement 
 
The final set of variables relates to existing involvement in political or social activities. 
Studies have shown that people who are already involved in social or political networks 
are also more likely to vote (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, Norris 2002, Wattenberg 
2002, Denver 2006). This is based on the contention that these people are more able to 
recognise political opportunities which exist and therefore feel that their vote matters. In 
this  study  I  look  at  the  role  of  different  types  of  existing  social  and  political 
participation which are particularly relevant for the study of young people and electoral 
involvement in Poland and Romania. These are the possible trade-offs between informal 
modes of political involvement and electoral participation and the link between church 
attendance and turning out to vote. 
 
3.3c(i) Involvement in Informal Modes of Political Participation.  
 
As discussed in chapter one, the general decrease in electoral turnout in established 
democracies has promoted debate on whether people are ‘exiting’ traditional forms of 
participation  in  favour  of  more  direct,  informal  forms  such  as  volunteering  in  non-
governmental  organisations  and  engaging  in  more  spontaneous  protest  actions 
(Inglehart 1997, Norris 2002). This question has been seen to be particularly relevant to 104 
 
young people who appear to be the age group most likely to feel both alienated from 
formal  political  processes  and  agents  and  to  be  interested  in  informal  forms  of 
participation  (Galston  2001,  Kimberlee  2002,  Shea  and  Green  2006,  Sloam  2007). 
However, the nature of the relationship between informal participation and voting is still 
uncertain. It is only recently that studies have begun to explore in detail the possible 
trade-offs between volunteering, protest and voting (Ball 2005, Van der Meer and Van 
Ingen 2009)
59.  
 
The role that informal youth participation plays in acting as an alternative or an addition 
to voting is even less explored in newer democracies. As discussed in chapter one, 
involvement in informal modes of political participation has been found to be generally 
at a very low level in post-communist countries (Ekiert and Kubik 1998, Mudde 2003, 
Howard 2003, Vanhuysse 2004).  However, studies in Poland and Romania have found 
differing results in relation to participation of young people. In Poland, although general 
rates  of  volunteering  in  non-governmental  organisations  are  generally  considerably 
lower than those in established democracies, the youngest age group has been found to 
be slightly more participative than older age groups (Gumkowska and Herbst 2006). In 
contrast, in Romania studies suggest young people are no more participative in these 
forms of participation than older age groups (British Council/Gallup 2004). The reasons 
behind  these  low  levels  of  youth  involvement  in  informal  forms  of  participation  in 
Poland and Romania, and the potentially changing nature of this in Poland are the focus 
of chapter five. In this chapter however, the question is whether those young people 
who do participate in these activities are more or less likely to turn out and vote.  
 
In my qualitative research in Poland and Romania I found mixed views on whether 
activity in informal forms of political and civic participation encouraged or discouraged 
young people to turn out and vote. In Poland, one interviewee (m, 18, Bielsko-Biała) 
who had taken part in demonstrations and petitions against the appointment of the right-
wing  education  minister,  Roman  Giertych,  in  2006,  explained  that  this  activity  had 
made him more informed about politics and had made him more determined to exercise 
                                                           
59 Studies have suggested that the type of informal participation may be important in determining the 
relationship  with  voting.  For  instance,  Van  Der  Meer  and  Van  Ingen  (2009)  argue  that  where  civic 
volunteering may act as an alternative to traditional forms of political participation, volunteering in a 
cause-oriented organisation may have a positive relationship with voting. For more discussion of this see 
chapter five, section 5.2.  105 
 
his  right  to  vote  as  a  result
60.  However  another  respondent  in  Chełm  (f,  18)  who 
volunteered  in  hospitals  and  raised  money  through  organisations  for  poor  children 
suggested that this participation had made her more unlikely to turn out and vote. She 
explained that she volunteered because,  
 
‘politicians don’t care about these people, they only care about themselves’ 
 
She  added  that  her  voluntary  work  had  made  her  angrier  about  the  way  in  which 
politicians behaved and that as she saw all politicians as uncaring, voting at an election 
would make little difference. This view suggests that, as some studies in established 
democracies  have  also  found  (Ball  2005,  Van  der  Meer  and  Van  Ingen  2009), 
involvement in civic volunteering may act as an alternative to electoral participation.   
 
In Romania, views expressed by  young people who had participated in a variety of 
different  informal  modes  of  participation  suggested  that,  as  in  Poland,  the  type  of 
participation mattered for the relationship with voting. Again, civic participation, such 
as charitable or leisure based volunteering, appeared to be undertaken as an alternative 
to voting and traditional participation. However the views expressed by young people 
involved  in  cause-oriented  volunteering  suggested  that  their  involvement  had  made 
them more likely to vote. For example one respondent (f, 18 Oradea) who volunteered 
for an environmental organisation said that she would definitely vote as she felt she now 
knew  what  should  happen  locally  and  by  voting  there  would  be  a  possibility  of 
changing something. This was also the view of a volunteer (f, 22 Bucharest) for the Pro-
Democracy  Association.  She  explained  that  her  participation  in  activities  which 
promoted transparency and accountability in politics in Romania had made her very 
sure of the necessity to vote and that now even if she did not support any of the parties, 
she believed that voting could make a difference.  
 
The views in both countries suggest that, as has been found in established democracies, 
different  types  of  informal  participation  may  have  varying  relationships  with  the 
likelihood of voting. This means that activity which has a political or policy changing 
purpose such as protest or involvement in cause-oriented organisations may indeed have 
                                                           
60 See chapter five, section 5.3d for a discussion of these protests.  106 
 
a positive link with wider political interest and voting. In contrast, civic volunteering 
appears  to  act  as  an  alternative  to  electoral  participation.  It  can  therefore  be 
hypothesised  that  involvement  in  protest  activities  and  volunteering  in  interest  and 
activist organisations would be positively related to voting in both countries, whereas 
civic volunteering would be negatively linked to voting.  
 
3.3c(ii) Religious Attendance 
 
Traditionally, church attendance was seen as strongly and positively linked to electoral 
participation in established democracies (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993,  Verba et al. 
1995, Norris 2002). This was because it meant access to social networks which could 
encourage voting and also it has been linked to increasing feelings of civic duty. In 
many established democracies, though, a rise in secularisation and ageing in church 
congregations over recent decades is said to have resulted in a fall in the strength of 
church attendance as predicting likelihood to vote (Fox Piven and Cloward 2000, Norris 
2002). In many cases, the decrease in religious attendance has been strongest amongst 
young people and it follows that the strength of the church to mobilise young voters 
would be even less than for older groups (Norris 2002). 
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Figure 3.7: Frequent Religious Attendance (%) by Age Group and Country 
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(Source: European Social Survey 2006: UK (N=2386), Germany (N=2915), Poland (N=1720), Romania 
(N=2139) where frequent religious attendance ranges from at least once a month to once a day)  
 
 
In Poland and Romania, there is reason to suggest that church attendance may have a 
greater  role  in  predicting  youth  electoral  participation  and  non-participation  than  in 
established democracies. As Figure 3.7 shows, the religious attendance levels for all age 
groups in both countries, including the youngest are considerably higher than in the UK 
and Germany. Indeed, this is particularly the case for Poland, where over 70% of 18-24 
year olds proclaim to attend church at least once a month. However, it could also be 
expected that church attendance may have a contrasting influence in mobilising people 
to vote in Poland and Romania. This is because the Catholic Church in Poland and the 
Romanian Orthodox Church play quite different roles within the respective societies.  
 
In Poland the Catholic Church has played a large role in shaping the post-communist 
political situation of the country (Millard 1999). Partly this is due to the role of the 
church  in  the  overthrow  of  communism  and  the  fact  that  Polish  national  identity 
continues  to  be  very  closely  associated  with  Catholicism.  The  Catholic  Church  in 
Poland  is  also  supported  by  a  vast  network  of  national  and  local  level  catholic 
organisations which often, in the absence of other non-governmental organisations, play 
a  significant  role  in  community based  activities  (Magner  2005).   There  is therefore 
frequently  an  important  connection  between  church  attendance  and  involvement  in 108 
 
wider church-based social networks. Existing studies on voter turnout in Poland have 
found that church attendance is an important predictor of voting
61. However, there is an 
absence of study on whether this varies across age groups.  
 
The considerable recent debate in Poland surrounding whether the relationship between 
young people and the church is changing
62 suggests that linkages between voting and 
religious attendance should also be scrutinised carefully. Particularly, the very visible 
outpouring of grief by the youngest generation after the death of the Polish pope, John 
Paul II in 2005, gave rise to intense discussion as to whether these young people could 
be said to have formed a specific cohort known as ‘Generation JP2’. Although it has 
been questioned whether this cohort actually exists or whether it is merely a media 
construct, the intense debate has meant that the religious beliefs and behaviour of young 
Poles has come under  considerable scrutiny. Whereas before the death of the pope, 
falling  church  attendance  amongst  young  people  was  thought  to  indicate  increasing 
secularisation, the emergence of the so-called JP2 generation has forced observers to 
rethink (Sowa 2007, Podgorska 2008). Indeed one of the common explanations is that 
young Poles are not becoming less religious but that they are choosing to manifest this 
in less formal and less networked ways. Therefore, even if young people continue to 
attend church, this is often in a more ad hoc manner than older generations and they 
may  not  be  as  involved  in  the  social  networks  and  organisations  which  were 
traditionally connected with high levels of church attendance
63. Amongst focus group 
respondents there was support for the argument that involvement in social networks 
fostered by the church had weakened for some young people. In particular, it was said 
that those young people who had left the countryside to find work in larger cities, were 
less  likely  to  attend  church  regularly  and  to  get  involved  in  church-based  social 
networks. One respondent explained,  
 
                                                           
61 Cześnik (2007) found that people who practised religion were more likely to vote in both the 2001 and 
2005 elections in Poland.   
62 For instance see the report in Polityka (Podgorska 2008) which cites a number of studies conducted in 
various parts of Poland which have found that the religious habits and beliefs of some young Poles are 
changing.  
63 Sowa (2007) reported that the numbers of people involved in catholic movements and organisations 
was falling and this was particularly the case amongst young people. He stated that young people did not 
relate to the traditional and formal style of these organisations, which were mostly made up of activists 
over the age of 50 years. See also the Public Opinion Research Centre (2003) report on Polish youth 
which found that only 3% of young respondents were involved in catholic organisations of any kind.  109 
 
‘Young people who come to a city often go to church less because they have other 
things to do and in a big city, unlike in the village, the priest doesn’t know if you come 
to church or not’ (m, 19 Warsaw) 
 
Another  respondent  in  Bielsko-Biała  (m,  25)  argued  that  he  did  not  choose  to  get 
involved in church organisations and activities because he felt that that he could be 
religious without such participation. If indeed, as the literature and these views suggest, 
some young poles are separating church attendance and religious expression from the 
more  formal  social  networks  and  organisations  surrounding  the  Catholic  Church  it 
seems reasonable to expect that the social pressures to vote engendered by these social 
networks  will  also  weaken.  Nonetheless  as  shown  by  the  figures  in  Figure  3.7  the 
number  of  young  Poles  still  attending  church  frequently  remains  very  high  in 
comparison  to  established  democracies  and  as  such  religious  involvement  could  be 
expected to have a continuing role in mobilising young people to vote.  
 
Similar to the Polish Catholic Church, the Romanian Orthodox church is also closely 
linked  to  national  identity.  In  contrast  though,  its  role  throughout  communism  was 
tainted with submission and conformism to the communist party (Ramet 2004). Despite 
this,  however,  it  has  also  had  some  involvement  in  post-communist  politics  and  it 
continues to claim a relatively large number of followers (Stan and Turcescu 2007). Due 
to this more problematic position in Romanian society, the church’s role as a mobilising 
agent for electoral turnout remains unclear.  Unlike Poland, it does not retain a support 
mechanism  of  national  and  local  organisations  which  could  be  expected  to  be 
instrumental in encouraging people to participate in elections. However, as Figure 3.7 
illustrates,  the  number  of  young  people  in  Romania  who  attend  church  frequently 
appears  still  considerably  higher  than  that  in  the  UK  and  Germany.  As  such,  it  is 
important  to  consider  the potential  role  of  religious  attendance  in  mobilising  young 
Romanians to vote.  
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3.4 Testing the Model of Youth Electoral Participation in Poland and Romania 
 
Having set out in Section 3.3 the individual level variables which could be expected to 
have an influence on predicting whether a young person in Poland and Romania will 
choose to vote or abstain at an election, this section will now test this model using 
logistic regression analysis. As explained in the introduction to this chapter, logistic 
regression  analysis  can  help  to  identify  and  unpack  the  various  reasons  behind  the 
choice of whether to vote or abstain. Particularly, it allows us to assess the relative 
strength of individual variables to predict the likelihood of voting and therefore to test 
various  hypotheses.  Whereas  qualitative  data  can  contextualise  and  enrich 
understanding of electoral participation and non-participation, the analysis is necessarily 
limited to a small population sample. Logistic regression analysis, on the other hand, 
can  offer  a  higher  degree  of  validity  as  it  based  on  a  much  larger  and  more 
representative data set.  
 
The  data  set  used  here  is  the  European  Social  Survey  (ESS)  2006  for  Poland  and 
Romania. As the survey samples populations from the age of 15 upwards I adjusted the 
sample accordingly to represent only those who were 18 and thus eligible to vote at the 
time of the last election in each country. Furthermore, as there was a gap between the 
time of the last election (1 year in Poland and 2 years in Romania) and the survey, I also 
adjusted  the  age  groups  to  reflect  this.  Thus,  in  Poland,  the  18  year  olds  actually 
represent those respondents who were 19 at the time of the survey and in Romania those 
who were 20 at the time of the survey. To test for differences between the countries and 
also between the different age groups in each country, I conducted one analysis on the 
whole population sample in each country and then separate analyses on four different 
age categories which are 18-25 years, 26-35 years, 36-55 years and 56 years and above. 
This means that the N varies across the groups and is smallest for the youngest age 
group. As a result, this must be taken into account in analysing and comparing the 
results. 
 
I employ logistic regression instead of linear regression as the dependent variable (voted 
in the last election) is dichotomous (Foster et al. 2006). The dependent variable for each 
analysis is voting at the last election and this is measured on a two point scale where 
No=0 and Yes=1. The independent variables are categorical or continuous and have 111 
 
been tested for multicollinearity where none of the correlation coefficients were found 
to  be  above  medium  strength  (Pallant  2007)
64.    A  table  of  the  descriptives  of  the 
independent  variables  and  tables  for  Pearson’s  r  bivariate  correlations  of  the 
independent variables for both countries can be found in Appendices  C and D. 
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3.4a Comparison between Poland and Romania 
 
Figure 3.8: Logistic Regression Analysis for Whole Population Sample in Poland and 
Romania 
 
  POLAND  ROMANIA 
Variables  All  Warsaw  Silesia  Lubelskie  All  Bucharest  North-
West 
Muntenia 
Male  .14 
(.12)
* 
.14 
(.12) 
* 
.14 
(.12) 
* 
.14 
(.12) 
* 
.25 
(.14) 
* 
.24 
(.14) 
* 
.26 
(.14) 
* 
.24 
(.14) 
* 
High School 
Education
65 
.31 
(.13) 
** 
.30 
(.13) 
** 
.31 
(.13) 
** 
.31 
(.13) 
** 
.30 
(.16) 
* 
.29 
(.16) 
* 
.34 
(.16) 
** 
.30 
(.16) 
* 
High  level  of 
household 
income 
.14 
(.10) 
* 
.14 
(.10) 
* 
.15 
(.10) 
* 
.14 
(.10) 
* 
.06 
(.08) 
* 
.03 
(.08) 
 
.06 
(.08) 
* 
.06 
(.08) 
* 
Volunteer  in 
NGO 
.03 
(.08) 
.03 
(.08) 
.03 
(.08) 
.03 
(.08) 
.02 
(.07) 
.03 
(.07) 
.02 
(.07) 
.02 
(.07) 
Actively 
Religious 
.36 
(.05) 
*** 
.37 
(.05) 
*** 
.037 
(.05) 
*** 
.036 
(.05) 
*** 
.07 
(.05) 
* 
.07 
(.05) 
* 
.09 
(.05) 
* 
.08 
(.05) 
* 
Signed 
Petition  in 
last 12 mths 
.30 
(.30) 
* 
.29 
(.30) 
* 
.29 
(.30) 
* 
.30 
(.30) 
* 
.37 
(.39) 
* 
.37 
(.40) 
* 
.34 
(.40) 
* 
.35 
(.40) 
* 
Trusts 
Politicians 
.06 
(.03) 
** 
.06 
(.03) 
** 
.06 
(.03) 
** 
.06 
(.03) 
** 
.09 
(.03) 
*** 
.09 
(.03) 
*** 
.08 
(.03) 
** 
.09 
(.03) 
*** 
Interested 
In Politics 
.51 
(.08) 
*** 
.51 
(.08) 
*** 
.51 
(.08) 
*** 
.51 
(.08) 
*** 
.40 
(.09) 
*** 
.41 
(.09) 
*** 
.39 
(.09) 
*** 
.39 
(.09) 
*** 
Feels  close  to 
a  Political 
Party 
.81 
(.16) 
*** 
.81 
(.16) 
*** 
.82 
(.16) 
*** 
.81 
(.16) 
*** 
1.71 
(.22) 
*** 
1.70 
(.22) 
*** 
1.73 
(.22) 
*** 
1.72 
(.22) 
*** 
Lives  in 
Capital 
  _  .28 
(.18) 
* 
    _      _    _  -.68 
(.20) 
*** 
   _      _ 
Lives  in  Area 
1 
  _     _  .21 
(.17) 
* 
    _    _      _  -.64 
(.19) 
*** 
    _ 
Lives  in  Area 
2 
  _     _      _  -.03 
(.25) 
  _      _     _  .33 
(.20) 
* 
Constant   1.09 
(.33) 
*** 
1.14 
(.34) 
*** 
1.04 
(.34) 
*** 
1.09 
(.33) 
*** 
.33 
(.36) 
* 
.45 
(.36) 
* 
.41 
(.36) 
* 
.26 
(.36) 
* 
Nagelkerke 
R² 
0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.15  0.16  0.16  0.15 
N  1550  1550  1550  1550  1844  1844  1844  1844 
(Note: The table lists unstandardised logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in parenthesis, 
with voted at the last national election as the dependent variable. *p<0.5, **p<0.05, ***p<0.005 
Source: European Social Survey 2006 for Poland and Romania).  
 
                                                           
65 High School education includes anyone who is attending or has completed high school. This is to make 
sure the youngest age group are included. 113 
 
Figure  3.8  presents  the  results  of  the  logistic  regression  analysis  for  the  whole 
population samples of Poland and Romania. In each, I entered three sets of independent 
variables  based  on  socioeconomics,  existing  social  and  political  participation  and 
political attitudes and values. In addition, to test the strength of locality, I also ran the 
analyses with dummy variables based on whether or not someone lived in the three 
different localities studied in each country
66. The R² value is relatively low in each 
country meaning that the model explains less than 20% of the variance in each case. 
However, as the model tests only individual level and not election-specific variables this 
low level of variance could be expected and reflects similar findings in existing studies 
conducted in Poland and Romania
67.  
 
It is evident from the analysis that the most significant predictors of the likelihood to 
vote in each country are based on attitudes towards politics and political agents, namely 
trust in politicians, interest in politics and feeling close to a particular political party. 
The main contrasts between the countries are based on religious attendance and locality. 
In Poland, as hypothesised in section 3.3c(ii), the frequency of religious attendance is a 
strong predictor of turnout suggesting that the social networks and links between society 
and church continue to have a significant influence on turnout behaviour. In addition, 
living in Warsaw or Silesia has a positive, albeit weak, influence on turnout, whereas 
living  in  the  less  economically  developed  Lubelskie  (in  the  East)  has  a  negative 
relationship with turnout. However this is also very weak. In each locality, educational 
level and household income level have a similar influence on turnout, suggesting that 
individual level socioeconomic resources may be more important for determining the 
decision to vote regardless of locality. In Romania, as turnout figures suggested would 
be the case (see section 3.2b(ii)), locality appears to have an opposite effect on turnout 
decisions. Living in Bucharest or the North West has a negative influence on turnout, 
                                                           
66 In each case, the localities represented are regions and the capital city. In Poland Bielsko-Biała is in the 
larger region of Silesia and Chełm is in the larger region of Lubelskie. In Romania, Oradea is in the 
North-West Region and Alexandria in the region of Muntenia. These are the units employed in the ESS 
2006 and could not be broken down further. In the analyses of different age groups, I use only the dummy 
variable of living in the capital.  
67 In Cześnik‘s (2007, p. 136) study of the 2001 and 2005 Polish elections, he found that socioeconomic 
variables (including religiosity) only explained 14% of the variance in each election. A study of this for 
all countries in post-communist Europe reduced this variance to 10%. In Romania, Rotariu and Comşa’s 
(2004,  p.92)  study  of  the  2004  Romanian  elections  found  that  a  logistic  regression  model  based  on 
individual level variables explained 27% of the variance. The strength of this could be explained by the 
more specific election-specific nature of the variables used, which were not included in the ESS 2006 
survey.  114 
 
whereas living in Muntenia is positively related to turnout
68. In comparison to Poland, 
education  level  appears  to  have  less  of  a  positive  relationship  with  the  decision  of 
whether to vote. This suggests that other factors such as the strength of party networks 
at local level may also have an influence on mobilising people to vote in Romania.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
68 This supports the findings in Rotariu and Comşa’s (2004, p. 92) study which found living in Muntenia 
to have a positive relationship with turnout.  115 
 
3.4b. Comparison of Age Groups in Poland 
 
Figure 3.9: Logistic Regression Analysis for Different Age Groups in Poland 
 
Variables  18-25 years  26-35 years  36-55 years  56 and above 
Male  .10  
(.31) 
 
.63 
(.30) 
** 
.09 
(.21) 
.04 
(.25) 
High School 
Education 
1.14 
(.31) 
*** 
.25 
(.30) 
* 
.13 
(.22) 
* 
.21 
(.18) 
* 
High  level  of 
household 
income 
.04 
(.25) 
.30 
(.27) 
* 
.29 
(.17) 
* 
.21 
(.18) 
* 
Volunteer  in 
NGO 
.01 
(.18) 
.34 
(.23) 
* 
.06 
(.14) 
.03 
(.18) 
Actively 
Religious 
.29 
(.13) 
** 
.48 
(.13) 
*** 
.39 
(.09) 
*** 
.34 
(.10) 
*** 
Signed  Petition 
in last 12 mths. 
.56 
(.55) 
* 
.94 
(.68) 
* 
.51 
(.54) 
* 
.21 
(.93) 
 
Trusts Politicians  .05 
(.08) 
* 
.01 
(.08) 
 
.19 
(.06) 
*** 
.03 
(.06) 
Interested  in 
Politics 
.66 
(.22) 
*** 
.54 
(.20) 
** 
.28 
(.15) 
** 
.61 
(.15) 
*** 
Feels  close  to  a  
political party 
1.09 
(.43) 
** 
.73 
(.39) 
** 
.57 
(.26) 
** 
.89 
(.30) 
*** 
Lives in Warsaw  1.05 
(0.51) 
** 
0.40 
(0.40) 
* 
.17 
(.31) 
 
.07 
(.32) 
Constant  1.95 
(.81) 
** 
1.35 
(.89) 
* 
.43 
(.58) 
* 
.88 
(.65) 
* 
Nagelkerke R²  0.25  0.22  0.15  0.21 
N  265  267  578  440 
(Note: The table lists unstandardised logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in parenthesis, 
with voted at the last national election as the dependent variable. *p<0.5, **p<0.05, ***p<0.005 
Source: European Social Survey 2006 for Poland). 
 
Although according to the logistic regression analyses of different age groups in Poland 
the differences across age groups are not pronounced (Figure 3.9), a number of points 116 
 
about the youngest age group should be noted. Namely that education level and living in 
Warsaw are more significant as predictors of turnout for this age group than for older 
cohorts and that religious attendance appears as a less strong predictor of turnout than 
for other age groups. That living in Warsaw and education level are more significant for 
the youngest age group could mean that the gap between those who vote (urbanised, 
educated)  and  those  who  abstain  (less educated,  rural)  in  Poland  may  be becoming 
wider  for  the  younger  generation.  If  this  indicates  an  increasing elitism  in  electoral 
participation  in  Poland,  this  could  have  very  important  consequences  for  the  future 
representativeness  of  elected  officials.  However,  the  finding  that  education  has  a 
stronger significance for the youngest age group could also support the hypothesis that 
the type of education is important in mobilising young people to vote. As such, the 
significance of education could be a product of advancements in the teaching about 
democratic political participation in schools (see section 3.3a(i)). The lower significance 
of religious attendance for the youngest age group supports the hypothesis that although 
the involvement in church networks continues to have a strong influence on the decision 
to vote in Poland, this may be weaker for younger people who are more mobile and less 
attached to a parish church and religious group (see section 3.3c(ii)).  
 
As hypothesised in section 3.3c(i), involvement in cause-oriented informal participation 
such as petitioning has a positive, if weak, relationship with the likelihood of voting. 
However, this does not vary across age groups. Volunteering has no relationship with 
the likelihood of voting for any age group. This may be because the interpretation of 
volunteering varies significantly depending on the question and the respondent. It could 
also be a reflection of the low levels of informal participation in Poland across all age 
groups. The role of volunteering in youth political participation is assessed further in 
chapter five.  
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3.4c. Comparison of Age Groups in Romania 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Logistic Regression Analysis for different Age Groups in Romania 
 
Variables  18-25 years  26-35 years  36-55 years  56 and above 
Male  .35 
(.34) 
* 
.73 
(.31) 
** 
.28 
(.25) 
* 
.28 
(.30) 
* 
High School 
Education 
.31 
(.51) 
* 
.23 
(.47) 
 
.07 
(.31) 
.31 
(.30) 
* 
High  Level  of 
Household 
Income 
.33 
(.20) 
* 
.18 
(.17) 
* 
.11 
(.14) 
* 
.07 
(.18) 
 
Volunteer  in 
NGO 
.03 
(.21) 
.06 
(.16) 
.05 
(.13) 
.19 
(.11) 
* 
Actively 
Religious 
.01 
(.12) 
.24 
(.12) 
* 
.14 
(.09) 
* 
.09 
(.09) 
* 
Signed  Petition 
in last 12 mths. 
.26 
(.85) 
.62 
(1.17) 
        _  .98 
(.56) 
* 
Trusts Politicians  .07 
(.08) 
* 
.04 
(.07) 
* 
.10 
(.06) 
* 
.14 
(.06) 
* 
Interested  in 
Politics 
.17 
(.22) 
* 
.39 
(.22) 
* 
.44 
(.15) 
*** 
.46 
(.17) 
** 
Feels  close  to  a 
political party 
2.35 
(.78) 
*** 
2.14 
(.55) 
*** 
1.42 
(.33) 
*** 
1.42 
(.41) 
*** 
Lives  in 
Bucharest 
-.46 
(.45) 
* 
-.96 
(.50) 
** 
-.47 
(.36) 
* 
-.80 
(.42) 
** 
Constant  1.12 
(.98) 
* 
.04 
(.81) 
 
.32 
(.64) 
1.27 
(.80) 
* 
Nagelkerke R²  0.17  0.22  0.18  0.16 
N  213  338  661  632 
Note: The table lists unstandardised logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in parenthesis, 
with voted at the last national election as the dependent variable. *p<0.5, **p<0.05, ***p<0.005 
Source: European Social Survey 2006 for Romania.  
 
Figure 3.10 presents the results of the logistic regression analyses for the different age 
groups in Romania.  In comparison to Poland, the model appears less able to explain the 
variance for all age groups. Indeed, there are also few differences across the age groups, 
with only closeness to a political party proving a strongly significant predictor for all 
ages. The results for the youngest age group suggest that education level may be more 
significant in predicting turnout than for other age groups, yet this is weak and is also 
the case for the oldest  group. This may support the qualitative data which suggests 118 
 
education in many schools in Romania does not teach young people about politics in a 
wider sense and the importance of voting (see section 3.3a(i)). The particularly weak 
significance of interest in politics for the youngest age group suggests that even for the 
small minority of Romanian young people who state they are interested in politics, this 
may not be enough to mobilise them to vote.  If this were the case, it would suggest that, 
as hypothesised, the alienation amongst young people from political agents in Romania 
may even be more intense than in Poland. However, to establish this, in-depth research 
of youth electoral participation over a series of elections would be required.  
 
As  in  Poland,  the  analysis  tells  us  little  about  the  relationship  between  informal 
participation and likelihood of voting. Indeed, in the Romanian case, both petitioning 
and volunteering appear to have no relationship with the propensity to turnout.  
 
3.5 Conclusions  
 
The main aim of this chapter was to explore the individual level determinants of youth 
electoral  participation  and  non-participation  in  Poland  and  Romania,  to  reach  an 
understanding of the reasons behind these choices and how these compare to findings of 
studies in established democracies. The first part of the chapter employed actual and 
reported  electoral  turnout  figures  for  Poland  and  Romania  and  showed  that  youth 
abstention in both countries is a serious problem of a scale apparently greater than that 
in established democracies. In the following section I employed descriptive statistics 
and qualitative data to build up a model of the individual level determinants of youth 
electoral participation and non-participation in Poland and Romania. The strength of 
these determinants in assessing the reasons behind the choice of young people to vote or 
to abstain at elections was then tested by using logical regression analysis models for 
different  age  groups  in  Poland  and  Romania.  The  chapter  made  a  number  of  key 
findings.  
 
First, both qualitative and quantitative findings suggest that there are important general 
similarities  between  the  individual  determinants  of  youth  electoral  participation  and 
non-participation in newer and established democracies. In particular, young people in 
both situations appear to have similar conceptions of politics, where despite deep-rooted 
distrust and alienation from political agents, they are often interested in wider political 119 
 
issues and have a strong support for democracy. This alienation from political agents 
often manifests in a choice to ‘exit’ from electoral participation. However, my findings 
also suggest that in the newer democracies there is also a group of young people who in 
spite  of  this  alienation,  will  vote  as  a  result  of  their  support  for  elections  and  the 
democratic process. 
 
Yet,  despite  these  general  similarities,  there  appears  a  less  pronounced  difference 
between the individual determinants of electoral turnout between age groups in newer 
democracies. Indeed the degree of separation and alienation from political agents and 
the  electoral  process  seems  to  be  considerably  greater  for  all  ages  in  the  newer 
democracies  than  found  in  the  established  democracies.  This  suggests  that  post-
communist  factors  such  as  rapid  political  and  socioeconomic  change  continue  to 
influence the choice of young people in Poland and Romania to vote or to abstain at 
elections.  
 
This study also highlighted some important differences between Poland and Romania.  
First, as hypothesised, socioeconomic factors do appear to matter more in Poland than 
in Romania. However, the findings of my analysis suggest that this may not be in the 
same  way  as  first  predicted.  Indeed,  it  appears  that  instead  of  generally  increasing 
numbers  of  young  voters  in  Poland,  higher  levels  of  individual  resources  may  be 
creating a widening gap between a select elite of educated, urbanised young people who 
participate and those with lower levels of resources who opt to abstain. The quantitative 
findings suggest that this gap may be wider for the young cohort than for older. In 
Romania,  the  findings  suggest  that  socioeconomic  resources  have  a  less  direct 
relationship with youth voter turnout and abstention than in Poland. Instead of a positive 
relationship with youth voter turnout as hypothesised, living in the capital city or the 
economically  developed  North  West  of  Romania  is  negatively  correlated  with  the 
decision to turn out and vote. In turn, this suggests that other factors such as local level 
penetration and organisation of political parties may also be influential in determining 
youth political participation. This is analysed further in chapter four.  
 
Second, my findings supported the continued role of the social networks behind the 
Catholic  Church  in  Poland  in  determining  individual  voter  turnout.    Although  the 
significance  of  this  appears  to  have  diminished  slightly  in  respect  of  the  youngest 120 
 
cohort, it retains a very important role in the mobilisation of young people to vote. This 
underlines a need for greater systematic analysis of the interactions between church 
attendance and youth political participation in Poland which is beyond the possibilities 
of the present study.  
 
Finally,  my  findings  present  little  evidence  of  a  relationship  between  informal 
participation and voting for young people in the newer democracies. Indeed, it remains 
unclear as to whether informal participation represents an alternative form of political 
involvement for young people who are alienated from political agents or whether the 
people who participate in these forms are also those most likely to vote. These questions 
are explored in greater detail in chapter five.  
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CHAPTER FOUR – YOUTH POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter considers the role of political parties in Poland and Romania in the broader 
question  of  youth  political  participation  and  elaborates  and  tests  comparative 
hypotheses outlined in chapter two. Unlike electoral participation, due to the greater 
demands  placed  on  resources  of  members,  party  membership  is  an  activity  which 
generally involves only a small number of people in a given country (Mair and Van 
Biezen 2001, Whiteley and Seyd 2002, Seyd and Whiteley 2004, Heider 2006). Within 
this  small  group  of  participants,  it  is  probable  that  the  degree  of  effort  and  time 
members will dedicate to party activities will vary, however a significant group of these 
will likely be high-intensity participants who spend a considerable amount of time and 
energy on party involvement (Whiteley and Seyd 2002). As such, it could be expected 
that the motivations to become involved in a party may differ importantly from those of 
voters.  This  chapter  outlines  the  political  opportunity  structures  for  youth  party 
membership  in  Poland  and  Romania,  how  parties  are  organised  and  explores  the 
motivations of the young people who choose this mode of political participation. By 
doing this I aim to highlight important similarities and differences between Poland and 
Romania and between newer and established democracies.  
 
Young people have been organised by political parties in established democracies into 
youth organisations or youth wings from around the start of the 20
th century (Russell 
2005, Poguntke 2006). In the 1960s and 1970s, when parties acted more like ‘mass 
parties’,  youth wings could offer their members access to benefits such as jobs and 
social  activities,  whilst  the  involvement  of  young  people  was  seen  as  essential  to 
ensuring party longevity (Abrams and Little 1965, Hooghe et al. 2004, Russell 2005, 
Cross and Young 2008). However, as the structure and nature of parties has changed, 
youth wings have also experienced significant alterations. Reports show that youth wing 
membership  numbers  in  some  established  democracies  have  fallen,  sometimes 
dramatically, over recent decades (Hooghe et al. 2004, Russell 2005, Cross and Young 122 
 
2008)
69.  Studies  have  shown  this  to  be  a  consequence  of  not  only  organisational 
changes  in  parties  themselves  but  also  a  product  of  social  trends  leading  to  the 
increasing  disillusionment  with  political  agents  amongst  young  people  (Henn  et  al. 
2005, Sloam 2007).   
 
As highlighted in previous chapters, the overwhelmingly critical views of many young 
people in Poland and Romania towards formal political agents resemble those found in 
studies in established democracies (International IDEA 1999, Kimberlee 2002, O’Toole 
et al. 2003, Edwards 2007, Quintelier 2007). Particularly, both survey results and focus 
group response have found a significant proportion of youth in these countries to feel 
that politicians are self-serving and uninterested in their electorates
70 and that political 
parties are unrepresentative of their needs and concerns
71.  
 
Despite shrinking membership and related changes in the nature of activities of many 
party  youth  wings  across  established  democracies  coupled  with  increased  societal 
distrust towards parties, most European political parties continue to support ancillary 
youth organisations. This is because they retain a number of important functions for the 
party. These include acting as a recruitment source for future politicians (Recchi 1999, 
Hooghe et al. 2004), offering legitimacy for the party and providing a labour force for 
party activities (Scarrow 1996). Young members therefore are still seen as providing a 
vital link between the party and wider society.  
 
Equally in newer democracies, the majority of political parties which emerged after the 
fall  of  communism  also  developed  affiliated  youth  wings  as  part  of  their  structure. 
However,  unlike  in  established  democracies  where  ancillary  organisations  originally 
emerged to fulfil needs of particular groups in society, post-communist youth wings 
were immediately faced with questions about their purpose and function (Lewis 2000, 
Szczerbiak  2001).  Nonetheless,  in  spite  of  electoral  volatility  and  party  instability, 
                                                           
69 Hooghe et al. (2004) found that Belgian youth wings have typically lost at least half their members 
since the 1980s. Similar decreases have been found in Canada (Cross and Young 2008) and in the UK 
(Russell 2005). 
70See chapter three, section 3.3b for a discussion of how young people in Poland and Romania conceive 
of politics and how this compares to findings of studies in established democracies.  
71 In Poland a Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) (2003) survey found that only 5% of respondents 
felt political parties represent the interests of the electorate and in Romania a National Youth Authority 
(ANT) (2007) survey found that 64% of respondents felt that no party represented their needs at present.  123 
 
youth wings in post-communist countries have largely persevered. Despite this, there is 
a notable lack of study of youth organisations and youth party membership in newer 
democracies. Very little is known about the size of these organisations, their structure, 
the  motivations  of  their  members  and  significantly  the  type  of  participation 
opportunities they can offer to young people.  This represents an important gap in our 
knowledge of youth political participation in newer democracies. 
 
Studies in established democracies have shown that youth party activism is still the 
main route into formal politics for many people (Recchi 1999, Hooghe et al. 2004, 
Russell 2005, Cross and Young 2008). This means that, arguably, current youth party 
membership can be seen to represent the future face of formal politics in a particular 
country  (Hooghe  et  al.  2004).  This  information  is  especially  valuable  in  newer 
democracies where the communist experience has led to markedly weak links between 
parties and society. Given that improvement in the quality of democracy partly depends 
on strengthening such links (Randall and Svâsand 2002, Innes 2002), understanding 
how young people are involved in formal party politics is vital. 
 
4.1a Contrasting Party Systems and Hypotheses 
 
As discussed in chapter two, section 2.2d(i)b, since the fall of communism Poland and 
Romania have developed quite different party systems. Due to radical economic and 
social reform and effective administrative decentralisation, the prevailing Polish party 
system,  although  still  relatively  volatile,  is  generally  programmatic.  In  contrast, 
continued  state  interference  in  the  economy  together  with  a  lack  of  administrative 
decentralisation reform has left the Romanian party system particularly susceptible to 
clientelistic practices especially at local level where business, media and politics are 
often  linked  through  a  series  of  clientelistic  relationships.  In  chapter  two,  section 
2.2d(i),  I  presented  two  hypotheses  generated  from  the  different  post-communist 
political  contexts  in  Poland  and  Romania  which  are  tested  in  this  chapter.  First,  I 
hypothesised  (H.2)  that  different  degrees  of  decentralisation  reform  would  have  a 
contrasting impact on youth political participation. In Poland, (H2.1) it is hypothesised 
that more radical decentralisation and more effective depoliticisation of local politics 
would mean that the interest and involvement of young people in local politics may be 
more intense than in national level parties as they could feel that their involvement 124 
 
would  have  more  of  an  impact  on  local  decision  making.  In  Romania  (H2.2)  it  is 
hypothesised  that  continued  centralisation  of  administration  would  mean  that  young 
people have similar levels of interest and engagement in local as in national level party 
participation.  
 
In  addition,  a  related  hypothesis  (H3)  expected  that  the  contrasting  post-communist 
party  systems  which  have  developed  in  each  country  would  mean  that  the  reasons 
behind youth participation in political parties in Poland and Romania would differ. It is 
hypothesised that the mainly programmatic party system in Poland (H3.1) would mean 
that opportunities to participate in parties were generally fair and equal. However, it 
could be expected that youth party membership would have little to offer young people 
who  were  not  sufficiently  ideologically motivated or policy-seeking  to join  a party. 
Those who do get involved could therefore be expected to have similar motivations to 
young  people  in  established  democracies,  namely  pursuing  a  political  career  or 
satisfying ideological or policy- seeking needs. In Romania (H3.2), in contrast, it is 
hypothesised  that  the  clientelistic  party  system  could  attract  young  people  to  party 
membership by offering members selective incentives such as jobs or social benefits. 
However, it could also repel those young people who are ideologically motivated or 
policy-seeking  by  ‘blocking’  political  opportunities  to  participate.  This  is  because 
opportunities  to  participate  are  unequal  and  based  on  short-term  exchange  between 
party and individual. In turn, this serves to alienate many people who perceive political 
agents to be illegitimate and unaccountable.  
 
This  chapter  is  made  up  of  five  main  sections.  The  first  gives  an  overview  of  the 
policies and background to the main political parties in Poland and Romania. Sections 
two to four then provide information on membership levels, organisational structures, 
and  main  activities  of  members  in  youth  wings  in  Poland  and  Romania.  The  final 
section employs qualitative data to assess the individual motivations behind joining a 
political  party  and  analyses  the  power  of  youth  sections  within  parties.  It  focuses 
specifically  on  incentives  for  building  a  political  career,  social  and  other  selective 
benefits and opportunities to satisfy policy-seeking and ideological motivations.  
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4.2 Overview of Party Developments in Poland and Romania 
 
4.2a The Polish Political Context 
   
During the 1990s, the Polish party system was one of the most volatile of the new 
Eastern European democracies and was characterised by a large number of competing 
parties and short-lived governments
72. However, by 2000, this had started to stabilise
73, 
allowing for the emergence of clearer party families. In 2001, the left-wing communist 
successor party, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) won a substantial majority in the 
parliamentary elections. They were in power until 2005, when after a number of high 
profile corruption scandals and a fall in popularity, they were heavily defeated in the 
parliamentary elections by the two main centre-right parties, Law and Justice (PiS) and 
Civic Platform (PO). Failing to form a coalition with PO, PiS then went on to govern in 
coalition with two smaller parties, the populist agrarian based, Self-Defence and the 
radical,  nationalist,  League  of  Polish  Families  (LPR).  Faced  with  increasing  public 
criticism and political opposition together with a loss of majority in parliament, PiS 
called snap parliamentary elections in 2007. This signalled the defeat of PiS, in favour 
of a PO led government which now governs in coalition with the Polish People’s Party 
(PSL) under the premiership of Donald Tusk. 
 
Below, to explain how the six main parties which have featured most prominently in 
Polish politics since 2000 compare in terms of policy and characteristics, I have divided 
them into three main party family groupings.  
 
4.2a(i) Regime Successor Parties  
 
Two current parties in Poland have roots in the former communist party. These are the 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and The Polish People’s Party (PSL). The SLD first 
held office in 1993 in alliance with PSL and again in 2001 as a single, unitary party in 
coalition with the smaller Labour Union (UP). Although it was believed at first that 
                                                           
72 By 1998 there had been three presidents and nine prime ministers in office in Poland (Millard, 1999 
p.14). 
73 This stabilisation, although gradual, has been noted by various studies. For instance, Zielinski et al 
(2005, p. 377) report that in 1991, the parliamentary elections were contested by 48 parties, of which 46 
were new. In 1997 of 25 contesting parties, 5 were new. By 2001, the number of contesting parties had 
fallen to 14, of which 4 were new.  126 
 
Communist  successor  parties  in  post-communist  democracies  would  have  to  gain 
support  through  populism  or  rely  on  communist-era  nostalgia,  the  Polish  SLD  has 
surprised  observers  by  exhibiting  characteristics  which  are  more  programmatic  than 
populist (Grzymała-Busse 2002, Jasiewicz 2008).  To some, the electoral success of this 
party was seen as proof that SLD had managed to break connections with its past and to 
draw up a more moderate and credible centre-left programme responding to economic 
and social difficulties of the time (Grzymała-Busse 2002). However in 2005, after the 
heavy electoral defeat by Civic Platform (PO) and Law and Justice (PiS) the party was 
forced to reform once more. This time the old leadership was replaced with young, 
European  oriented  politicians
74  and  an  electoral  coalition  was  formed  in  2006  with 
several  other  left–wing  and  centrist  parties.    Nonetheless  in  the  2007  elections,  the 
coalition only gained 13% of the vote and was later dissolved.  
 
The Polish People’s Party (PSL) acted as a satellite party during communism in Poland 
when it was known as The United Peasant Party (ZSL). After the fall of communism it 
retained its rural, agrarian identity and continues to gain the majority of its support from 
the countryside (Szczerbiak 2001b). It governed in coalition with the Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD) from 2001 until 2003 and since 2007 is again in government in coalition 
with Civic Platform (PO). Again, like the SLD, it has largely avoided populism and 
instead  focused  on  developing  policies  for  regional,  agricultural  and  economic 
development (Jasiewicz 2008).  
 
4.2a (ii) Centre-Right Post-Solidarity Parties  
 
In  the  most  recent  period  of  Polish  post-communism  the  two  main  parties  on  the 
political  scene  have  been  the  liberal  Civic  Platform  (PO)  and  the  conservative-
nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) founded by the Kaczyński twin brothers, who shortly 
after the 2005 elections took both the presidential and prime ministerial posts. Both of 
these originate in the Solidarity movement, which won the first partially-free elections 
after  the  Round  Table  agreements  in  1989  and  derive  more  directly from  the post-
Solidarity coalition, Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS). AWS formed as a coalition of 
                                                           
74  In  2005,  Wojciech  Olejniczak  was  elected  the  leader  of  SLD.  He  was  succeeded  by  Grzegorz 
Napieralski in 2008. Both men were born in 1974 and Olejniczak was the first leader of SLD to have not 
been a former member of the Polish United Worker’s Party.  127 
 
more than thirty parties in 1996 and held office from 1997 until 2001 (Grzybowski and 
Mikuli 2004). By 2000, AWS had started to break up and by 2001 Civic Platform (PO) 
and Law and Justice (PiS) had formed as separate parties. 
 
Civic Platform (PO), currently the main governing party after election victory in 2007 is 
characterised by its support for economic liberalism and European integration. Civic 
Platform (PO), more than any other party in Poland, appears to fit most comfortably 
under the heading of a programmatic or technocratic party, which has detailed policy 
and largely avoids populism (Innes 2002, Jasiewicz 2008).  
 
From 2005 until 2007, Law and Justice (PiS) governed in coalition with the smaller, 
radical parties, Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families (LPR). Their policies 
were largely focused on elimination of corruption, which they saw as a product of the 
communist past, and promotion of the values of Catholicism. To achieve these goals, 
PiS chose a number of highly controversial tactics. These included the rooting out of 
communist informers from public life and collaboration with Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, 
the leader of the radical catholic radio station, Radio Maryja (Puhl 2006). The way in 
which  PiS  separated  ‘the  pure  people’  from  the  ‘corrupt  elite’  during  their  time  in 
government, corresponds well with the definition of populism (Jasiewicz 2008)
75.  
 
4.2a (iii) Radical Parties 
  
Two small, radical parties have played a significant role in the Polish political scene 
since 2000. However since the 2007 elections, when they both failed to gain the 5% 
threshold required to enter parliament, they have declined in popularity. The first of 
these is the agrarian based Self-Defence which first entered parliament after the 2001 
elections. Although it formed part of the governing coalition with Law and Justice (PiS) 
after  2005,  in  the  2007  elections  Self-Defence  failed  to  gain  the  5%  threshold  for 
representation  in  parliament  and  its  popularity  has  since  declined.  The  party  is 
dominated by the personality cult of its leader, Andrzej Lepper (Wysocka 2007, Millard 
                                                           
75 As stated in chapter two, populism can be defined in the following way,  
‘an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic 
groups,  ‘the  pure  people’  versus  ‘the  corrupt  elite  ,  and  which  argues  that  politics  should  be  an 
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde (2004, p.543)). 128 
 
2006).  His  main  stance  is  populist,  eurosceptical,  economically  conservative  and 
focuses on the purging of corruption from public life (Krok-Paszkowska 2003).  
 
The League of Polish Families (LPR) is also a radical party which uses populism as a 
method of gaining support. However, it is also highly nationalistic and in particular 
strongly emphasises the role of the Catholic Church in Polish national identity (Repa 
2006, Kość 2006). The party’s main stance is that the values of the Polish Nation are 
under attack by the state and by European integration. Like Self-Defence it first entered 
parliament in 2001 and also joined the governing coalition with Law and Justice (PiS) 
from 2005 to 2007. In the 2007 elections it failed to gain any seats, gaining less than the 
5% threshold. 
 
4.2b. The Romanian Political Context 
 
In contrast to Poland, the Romanian post-communist political system was much more 
stable during the 1990s with a lower rate of new party emergence. However, the early 
period was largely dominated by the Social Democratic Party (PSD)
76. This situation 
was arguably only seriously challenged after the 2004 parliamentary elections when the 
Justice and Truth Alliance (DA), made up of the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the 
Democratic Party (PD), replaced the PSD in office (Gross and Tismăneanu 2005). This 
allowed  for  a  partial  opening  of  the  political  system  and  the  emergence  of  more 
balanced competition between party blocs of left and right. However, the government 
formed in 2004 between the DA, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania 
(UDMR) and the small Humanist Party (PUR) faced continuous instability. In 2006, the 
PUR which had since become the Conservative Party (PC) left the government and in 
2007 due to escalating tensions between the Democratic Party (PD) and the National 
Liberal Party (PNL), the Justice and Truth Alliance (DA) collapsed. This meant the 
National Liberal Party (PNL) formed a government with Hungarian minority party the 
UDMR, forcing the other half of the DA, the Democratic Party (PD) from office. PD 
                                                           
76 The PSD has had its current name since 2001. Its post-communist origin is in the hard line break off 
faction of the National Salvation Front (FSN) which formed the Democratic National Salvation Front 
(FDSN) under the leadership of Iliescu in 1992. For an overview see Gallagher (2005). 129 
 
then merged with the splinter party the Liberal Democratic Party (PLD) to form the 
Democratic Liberal Party (PD-L) in 2007
77.  
 
The 2008 parliamentary elections were won by PD-L by a very narrow margin
78 over 
the alliance made up of the Social Democrats (PSD) and the Conservative Party (PC), 
although no party won a majority in parliament. The greatest loser in the elections was 
the radical, nationalist Greater Romania Party (PRM) which, for the first time since the 
1992 parliamentary elections, failed to gain any parliamentary seats.  
 
The six main parties in Romania can be roughly divided into four loose party families. 
These I explain below.  
 
4.2b(i) Regime Successor Party
79 
 
After the defeat of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) in the 2004 elections the party, 
like the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) in Poland, sought to reform itself in order to 
try and break away from its communist roots and a corrupt image. Similarly to its Polish 
equivalent in the same period, PSD appeared to do this through replacement of the old 
leadership by younger, more reform oriented leaders
80. However, this transformation 
was partial and PSD has continued to be split between factions, some which call for 
modernisation  of  the  party  and  others  which  continue  to  resist  change  (Gross  and 
Tismăneanu 2005, Gussi 2008)
81. These divisions over the direction which the Social 
Democratic Party (PSD) should take have often meant that the party lacks a coherent 
programme. In addition, although changes have been implemented since the early phase 
of post-communism, unlike the Polish SLD, PSD continues to be accused of clientelistic 
                                                           
77 This new party was sponsored by the president, Traian Băsescu, whose public battles with the leader of 
PNL and then Prime-Minister Călin Popescu Tăriceanu were instrumental in the collapse of the Justice 
and Truth Alliance in 2007. Following an unsuccessful attempt by the PNL and PSD to impeach the 
president in 2007, Basescu’s supporters in the PNL formed the break away party, the Liberal Democratic 
Party (PLD) which joined the Democratic Party (PD) in December 2007 to form the Democratic Liberal 
Party (PD-L) For a full discussion see Maxfield (2008). 
78 PD-L won one more seat in the Chamber of Deputies and two more seats in the Senate than the PSD 
and PC alliance, however the alliance won 33.09% of the vote compared to 32.36% won by PD-L (Biroul 
Electoral Central). 
79 This is a very loose term in the Romanian context as several other parties including the centre-right 
Democratic Party (PD) were also formed from the remnants of the National Salvation Front (FSN). 
80 In 2005 Mircea Geoană was elected leader of PSD.  He was 47 years old and replaced Ion Iliescu as 
leader. This election of a reformist, younger leader was seen by many as a turning point for the PSD 
(Gussi 2008).  
81 Gussi (2008) describes the internal problems of PSD from the time of the election of Geoană as leader.  130 
 
practices  especially in local government where  so-called PSD local ‘barons’ control 
local politics, business and media (Ioniţa 2005).  
 
4.2b(ii) Centre-Right Parties 
 
Three  parties  on  the  current  Romanian  political  scene  can  be  grouped  together  as 
loosely constituting the Romanian centre-right. This is a loose term as the ideological 
basis of many Romanian parties remains unsure and changeable (Gross and Tismăneanu 
2004, Gallagher 2005, Maxfield 2008). Nonetheless, the Liberal Democratic Party (PD-
L), the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Conservative party (PC) all self-identify as 
parties of the centre-right
82 and share some common features such as a pro-democratic 
discourse which is opposed to the left and especially to communism (Szczerbiak and 
Hanley  2006,  Maxfield  2008).    Although  political  rivals,  the  two  main  centre-right 
parties, PD-L and PNL appear to converge on broad policy issues defining the right 
including  anti-communism,  economic  liberalism  and  further  European  integration. 
However, the programmes of both parties have been overshadowed by the emphasis 
their  leaders  placed  on  populist  appeals  and  personality  clashes  between  the  prime 
minister  (2004-2008)  and  president  of  PNL,  Călin  Popescu-  Tăriceanu  and  the 
Romanian president, Traian Băsescu (Ruse 2007).  
 
Arguably the party with the most changeable programme in Romanian politics is the 
Conservative Party (PC). It is a party which is dominated by the personality and power 
of its leader, Dan Voiculescu
83. Once seen as a left-wing party under the title Humanist 
party (Stan 2005), it now professes to support conservative ideals.  
 
4.2b(iii) Radical Party 
 
Since the fall of communism, radical nationalist political discourse aimed mainly at the 
Hungarian  minority,  Roma  and  Jews  has  helped  maintain  extremist  political  parties 
such as the Greater Romania Party (PRM) in Romania (Gallagher 2005, Mudde 2005). 
                                                           
82 From the party websites. PD-L states it is a ‘strong Centre-right political force’. PNL states it is ‘the 
only authentic party of the Right and the only party to represent liberalism in Romania’.  
83 Voiculescu has a vast personal wealth built up as a result of his media empire in Romania which is now 
owned  by  his  daughter.  He  has  also  faced  accusations  of  large  scale  corruption  and  has  admitted 
collaborating with the Romanian Communist Secret Service, the Securitate (Gallagher 2005). 131 
 
The PRM is characterised by its controversial and outspoken leader, Corneliu Vadim 
Tudor. Although PRM enjoyed moderate electoral success in the 1990s, its popularity 
peaked in the 2000 elections when it gained sufficient parliamentary seats to make it the 
second largest party. In the first round of the 2000 Presidential elections, Tudor won 
over 28% of the votes, placing him in second place
84. However, since this success, the 
popularity of PRM has weakened and the party has faced problems of infighting and 
identity. In the 2008 parliamentary elections, for the first time since the early 1990s it 
failed to gain the 5% threshold required to enter parliament.  
 
4.2b (iv) Hungarian Alliance 
 
The sizeable Hungarian minority
85 in Romania is politically represented by an alliance 
of parties and organisations which are collectively known as the Democratic Union of 
Hungarians in Romania (UDMR). This alliance first entered the Romanian parliament 
after the 1996 elections as a coalition partner of the Romanian Democratic Convention 
(CDR). Between 2004 and 2008 it governed once more in coalition with the Democratic 
Alliance (DA). Since the 2008 elections it has been in opposition. The Union has been 
active in ensuring greater representation of the ethnic Hungarian minority in the fields 
of  education,  self-government  and  use  of  the  Hungarian  language  (Brusis  2003, 
Karnoouh 2004).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
84 He then lost to Ion Iliescu in the Second Round.  
85 The Hungarian minority makes up approximately 20% of the population in the western Romanian 
region of Transylvania and is concentrated in the counties of Harghita, Mureş and Arad amongst others 
(Brusis 2003).  132 
 
4.3. Youth Party Membership in Poland and Romania 
 
4.3a. How Many Young Party Members in Poland and Romania? 
 
4.3a(i) Problems of Measurement and Contrast with Established Democracies  
 
One way of measuring the extent to which young people participate in political parties 
is to compare membership numbers across countries and parties
86. However, this can be 
problematic as accurate party membership numbers are often difficult to obtain and 
trust. This is because of poor record taking, exaggeration by party spokespeople or the 
provision  of  contradictory  figures  (Mair  and  Van  Biezen  2001,  Seyd  and  Whiteley 
2004, Heider 2006). Studies in established democracies have found that in the case of 
youth wings, these problems of data collection are often compounded (Hooghe et al. 
2004, Cross and Young 2008). This is partly because of the higher rates of membership 
turnover.  By the time  members reach the upper  age limit of the  youth wing, many 
members will either have progressed to the main party or left the party (Hooghe et al. 
2004).  Nonetheless,  in  the  absence  of  alternative  sources  of  data,  these  crude 
membership numbers can provide a useful estimate of party strength.  
 
To date, Mair and Van Biezen’s (2001) study of party membership in twenty European 
countries  over  two  decades  (1980-2000)  remains  the  most  comprehensive  study  of 
aggregate party membership (Seyd and Whiteley 2004). By calculating the percentage 
of the electorate who are party members in each country, they were able to compare and 
contrast  membership  levels  across  countries  and  to  track  a  general  European  wide 
decline  in  party  activism.  Such  comprehensive  comparative  study  of  youth  wing 
membership across countries has not been conducted and information available is often 
patchy and restricted to one country (Hooghe et al. 2004, Cross and Young 2008).  
 
                                                           
86 A member is usually someone who has signed a declaration to agree with the party aims and rules and 
has paid a subscription. The age conditions of youth wing membership in Poland and Romania vary 
slightly  from  party  to  party  but  formal  membership  generally  starts  at  18  (although  in  some  parties 
younger members are accepted as long as they are approved by the organisation) and ends at 30. This is 
the same in both countries. 
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In  the  absence  of  actual  party  data  for  youth  membership  from  across  European 
countries, the European Social Survey (ESS) 2006 can be used to give an overview of 
how Poland and Romania compare with the established democracies. 
 
Table 4.1: Political Party Membership by Percentage and Age group in Four Countries  
 
MEMBER OF A 
POLITICAL 
PARTY  
(% by age group) 
Under 
25 years 
26-35 
years 
36 -55 
years 
Over 56 
years 
Total 
UK  1.3  1.2  2  4.3  2.6 
GERMANY  1.9  1.7  4  6  4.2 
POLAND  0.5  1.5  1.2  1.2  1.1 
ROMANIA  2.8  6.2  9.1  4.3  5.9 
(Source: European Social Survey Round 3 (2006) UK (N=2386), Germany (N=2892), Poland (N= 1710), 
Romania (N=2099)) 
 
Table  4.1  shows  party  membership  by  age  group  and  country.  Several  important 
observations  can  be  made.  First,  notwithstanding  the  possibility  of  respondent 
exaggeration towards political activity in the survey (Brehm 1993), the findings indicate 
that Polish party membership for all age groups is consistently less than in the other 
three countries. This corresponds with the findings of Mair and Van Biezen’s (2001) 
study which found Poland to have the least membership as a percentage of the electorate 
of the twenty European countries studied. However, according to the European Social 
Survey 2006 data the total party membership in Romania is actually larger than that 
found in the two established democracies. Romania was not one of the twenty countries 
studied by Mair and Van Biezen (2001) but a total of 5.9% membership would place 
Romania very high in their late 1990s rankings
87.   
 
Second, from the table the two youngest age groups (under 25 years and 26-35 years) in 
both Germany and the UK appear markedly less likely to join a political party than 
older age groups. This corresponds with the patterns in party membership found in other 
studies of established democracies (Whiteley and Seyd 2002, Seyd and Whiteley 2004, 
Hooghe et al 2004, Russell 2005). The findings for Poland and Romania, however, are 
less clear. In both these countries the figures suggest that the difference between the 
younger and older age groups is less pronounced, with the 26-35 year group in Poland 
                                                           
87 This would place Romania roughly at seventh place, between Switzerland and Sweden. This is higher 
than all other newer democracies (Mair and Van Biezen 2001, p. 9). 134 
 
actually  participating  marginally  more  than  other  age  groups.  This  suggests  that 
generational differences in the post-communist countries may not be as pronounced as 
in established democracies. These two observations deserve greater analysis.  
 
4.3a(ii) Party Membership Levels in Poland and Romania 
 
To further examine these observations made from the European Social Survey 2006 
data, I now present party membership data for main parties and youth wings in Poland 
and Romania collected during my fieldwork in 2006/2007. As the aim of this study is 
not to identify trends in youth party membership over time but rather to build up a 
picture of youth membership in Poland and Romania in 2006/2007, the data collected 
represents, as closely as possible, the state of youth membership at this time.   
 
I  collected  data  on  membership  figures  for  parties  and  youth  wings  in  Poland  and 
Romania through a combination of different methods including interviews with party 
members, by visiting party headquarters and asking officials and from party documents 
either handed to me or found on the internet. Evidently, the way in which the data was 
collected coupled with inconsistencies
88 and poor record taking by some parties means 
that the findings must be interpreted with some caution. Nonetheless, they do provide an 
empirically  based  estimate  of  the  levels  of  youth  party  membership  in  Poland  and 
Romania.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
88  For example I was told that there were 200 members of The Greater Romania Youth Organisation in 
Sector 5 Bucharest whereas the party documentation states there are 41 members. 135 
 
Table 4.2: Party and Youth Organisation Membership in Absolute and Relative Terms: 
Poland and Romania 
 
  Total  party 
membership 
Members  as 
%  of  total 
electorate  
Youth  Wing 
membership 
Youth  wing 
members  as 
%  of  total 
population 15-
34 years 
POLAND  Circa. 218820  0.7  Circa. 28000  0.2 
ROMANIA  Circa. 1403420  7.6  Circa. 115000  1.6 
(Poland:  Total  electorate  2007:  30615471  (Polish  Election  Bureau),  total  population  15-34  years: 
12042831  (Rocznik  Demograficzny  2007  (Polish  Demographic  Year  Book  2007)).  Romania:  Total 
electorate 2004: 18449676 (Romanian Election Bureau), total population 15-34 years: 6810192 (Anurarul 
statistic al Romaniei 2005 (Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2005)) 
 
Table  4.2  shows  total  party  membership  numbers  for  the  six  main  parties  in  each 
country and totals for the youth organisations of these parties. The main party figures 
are then shown as an estimated ratio to the whole electorate. In the case of youth wings, 
the ratio is youth membership to the total population between the ages of 15-34 years
89. 
The total population figures are used here because many youth wings accept members 
from the age of 16 whilst the voting age is 18 and so figures based on the electorate 
would necessarily exclude the youngest of these.  
 
The figures in Table 4.2 correspond to the general pattern observed in the ESS 2006 
(Table 4.1). That is a very low total party membership to electorate ratio for Poland 
(0.7%) and a notably higher ratio for Romania (7.6%)
90. Here too the same general 
pattern  is  confirmed,  namely  remarkably  low  youth  membership  in  Poland  (0.2%) 
compared with a considerably higher level in Romania (1.6%). Given that the ESS 2006 
figures for Germany and the UK are also likely to be overestimated, this means that the 
youth rate of membership at 1.6% in Romania would still appear to at least equal the 
rates in these established democracies. If this is indeed the case, it poses a number of 
important questions about the type of participation opportunities political parties offer 
young people in Poland and Romania. Particularly, what is it about youth parties in 
Romania which makes them more attractive to young people?  
                                                           
89 In both the Polish and Romanian National statistics, age groups for population are broken down into 
groups which start 15- 17 years so starting from 16 would prove impossible.  
90 That the actual figures given in Table 4.2 are lower than those calculated from the ESS 2006 data could 
be explained by respondent exaggeration as is often found in large scale surveys (Brehm 1993).  136 
 
4.3b.Youth Wings in Poland and Romania – Structure and Membership 
 
To  address  the  questions  posed  above,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  size  and 
organisational structure of the youth wings in Poland and Romania. As in established 
European democracies, the majority of the main political parties in Poland and Romania 
support ancillary youth organisations.  
 
4.3b(i) Structure 
 
Table 4.3: Political Parties and Youth Wings in Poland 
 
Name of Main Party  Youth Wing 
Platforma  Obywatelska  (PO)  –  Civic 
Platform 
Stowarzyszenie  ‘Młodzi  Demokraci’ 
(‘S’MD) – Young Democrats 
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) – Law and 
Justice 
Forum  Młodych  PiS  (FMPiS)  –  PiS 
Youth Forum 
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD) – 
Democratic Left Alliance 
Federacja  Młodych  Socjaldemokratów 
(FMS)-  Federation  of  Young  Social 
Democrats 
Polskie  Stronnictwo  Ludowe  (PSL)  – 
Polish People’s Party 
Forum  Młodych  Ludowców  (FML)  – 
People’s Party Youth Forum  
Samoobrona – Self-Defence  Ogólnopolska  Młodzieżowa  Organizacja 
Samoobrony  (OMOS)-  Youth 
Organisation of Self-Defence 
Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) – League of 
Polish Families  
Młodzież  Wszechpolska  (MW)  –  All-
Polish Youth
91  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
91The link between LPR and MW is not straightforward. MW was (re)created in 1989 by the former 
leader of LPR, Roman Giertych as an organisation to promote nationalism and Catholicism amongst 
youth.  However  in  the  last  couple  of  years  Giertych  distanced  LPR  from  MW  as  MW  became 
increasingly associated with neo-Nazism. This led to a ‘velvet divorce’ between the two in December 
2006 (Szacki 2006) and in October 2007 a pledge by the new leadership of LPR to disband MW (Gazeta 
Wyborcza 26/10/07). 137 
 
Table 4.4:  Political Parties and Youth Wings in Romania 
 
Name of Main Party  Youth Wing 
Partidul  Naţional  Liberal  (PNL)  – 
National Liberal Party 
Tineretul  Naţional  Liberal  (TNL)- 
National Liberal Youth  
Partidul  Democrat  (PD)  –  Democratic 
Party
92 
Partidul  Democrat-  Organizaţia  de 
Tineret  (PD-OT)-  Democratic  Party 
Youth Organisation 
Partidul Social Democrat (PSD) – Social 
Democratic Party  
Tineretul Social Democrat (TSD)- Social 
Democratic Youth 
Partidul Conservator (PC) – Conservative 
Party  
Ofensiva Tinerilor
93 - Youth Offensive  
Partidul România Mare (PRM) – Greater 
Romania Party 
Organizaţia  de  Tineret  România  Mare 
(OTRM)-  Greater  Romania  Youth 
Organisation  
Uniunea  Democrată  Maghiară  din 
România (UDMR) – Democratic  Union 
of Hungarians in Romania
94 
Federation  of  Hungarian  Youth 
organisations in Romania 
 
The names of the main parties in Poland and Romania and the youth wings they support 
are set out in tables 4.3 and 4.4.  In both countries  youth wings mirror the national 
structure of main parties. In Poland, therefore, all the youth wings allow for several tiers 
of organisation where the national level organisation based in Warsaw
95 is supported by 
either two or three tiers of local level organisation
96. To set up a local level organisation, 
each party demands a certain number of initial members. This varies slightly from party 
to party but in each is fairly low
97. The statutes for youth wings in Romania also set out 
a hierarchical structure of national level organisation based in Bucharest
98 and then two 
or three lower levels
99.   
                                                           
92 Although the Democratic Party (PD) is now part of the Democratic Liberal Party (PD-L), as this 
merger happened after my fieldwork in 2006/2007, in this study I refer to the Democratic Party (PD) and 
its youth wing (OTPD).  
93 This is not an actual youth wing – PC is the only major party in Romania without a youth wing.  
94 UDMR is not actually a political party in the strict sense but an alliance of several different parties. Its 
various youth organisations are organised under the main Federation of Hungarian Youth Organisations 
in Romania.  
95 Warsaw is also divided into 18 different districts which theoretically can also host local level youth 
wings 
96 ‘S’MD, FMS, FMPiS and MW have three levels of organisation (national, voivodship and province 
(powiat)). FML and OMOS have four levels (national, voivoidship, province (powiat) and commune 
(gmina)). 
97 For example FMS and FML require 5 members to set up a province (powiat) level organisation and 
MW requires 10 members.   
98Bucharest  is  treated  separately  as  each  of  its  six  sectors  behaves  as  a  local  level  organisation  and 
Bucharest municipality as a county (judeţ).  
99 OT-PD, TNL, PSD and PC all have three levels of organisation (local, county (judeţ), national). OTRM 
has four levels (basic, territorial, judete and national). UDMR does not have a stated structure for its 
youth organisations.  138 
 
4.3b(ii) Membership 
Table 4.5:  Party Membership 2006/2007 (Total and Youth) in Poland by Party  
 
POLITICAL 
PARTY 
Membership of 
total party 
Membership of 
youth wing 
Estimated % of 
youth members in 
party total  
Civic Platform 
(PO):Young 
Democrats 
(‘S’MD) 
Circa. 33920  Circa. 8000  Around 24% 
Law and Justice 
(PiS):Youth Forum  
(FMPiS) 
Circa. 16900  Circa. 2500  Around 15% 
Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD): 
Federation of 
Young Social 
Democrats 
Circa. 72000  2000-6000  3%-8% 
Polish People’s 
Party (PSL): 
People’s Party 
Youth Forum 
(FML) 
Circa. 60000  10000-12000  17%-20% 
Self-Defence: 
Youth Organisation 
of Self-Defence 
(OMOS) 
Circa. 30000
100  Unknown  Unknown 
League of Polish 
Families (LPR): 
All-Polish Youth 
(MW) 
Circa. 6000  Circa. 3000
101  N/A 
(Sources: party materials, interviews with party representatives, National media) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
100  This  is  a  very  large  estimate  given  the  membership  rates  for  other  parties  and  the  limited  local 
implementation  of  Samoobrona  across  Poland  (Szczerbiak  2001a).  As  such  this  estimate  should  be 
interpreted with caution. 
101 From the magazine Polityka (Rybak (2005)). 139 
 
Table 4.6:  Party Membership 2006/2007 (Total and Youth) in Romania by Party  
 
POLITICAL 
PARTY 
Membership  of 
total party 
Membership  of 
youth wing 
Estimated  %  of 
youth members in 
party total 
Social Democratic 
Party(PSD): 
Social Democratic 
Youth (TSD) 
309714   75000  Around 12%  
Democratic 
Party(PD): 
Democratic Party 
Youth Organisation 
(PD-OT) 
165000
102  Circa. 10000  Around 6% 
National Liberal 
Party(PNL): 
National Liberal 
Youth (TNL) 
250000  Circa. 10000  Around 12% 
Greater Romania 
Party(PRM): 
Greater Romania 
Youth Organisation 
(OTRM) 
83392  Circa. 20000  Around 23% 
Conservative 
Party(PC) 
95314  N/A  N/A 
Democratic Union 
of Hungarians in 
Romania(UDMR)  
Circa. 500000  N/A  Up to 25%
103 
(Sources: party interviews, party materials, internet resources, Soare (2004)) 
 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the membership figures collected for each of the six main 
parties and youth wings in both countries. They also give an estimate of the percentage 
of youth members which make up the total party membership. Although these figures 
cannot represent more than a rough estimate of the state of youth party membership in 
Poland and Romania, some important points should be noted.  
 
 
 
 
                                                           
102 When the Democratic Party (PD) merged with the Liberal Democrats (PLD) in December 2007 to 
form the Democratic Liberal Party (PD-L) the membership of the party increased significantly, probably 
by around 60,000 (see for example, Maxfield (2008) who reports that the Liberal Democrats (PLD) had 
66,872 members in March 2007).  
103 According to Ardelean (2005) in a Report on Youth and Media in Romania. I do not have any figures 
of actual membership to verify this.  140 
 
4.3b (iii) Comparisons with Established Democracies 
 
In both countries the percentage of youth members in each party appears rather high in 
comparison to findings of studies in established democracies. For example, Hooghe et 
al. (2004) found that although youth membership had peaked at up to 18% for three 
Flemish parties’ youth wings in Belgium in the 1970s, it had since fallen into single 
figures
104.  Similarly,  in  their  studies  of  British  political  parties,  Seyd  and  Whiteley 
(1992) and Whiteley et al. (1994, 2006) found youth membership to be 12% in the 
Labour Party but only 5% in the Conservatives and 7% in the Liberal Democrats.  This 
corresponds to the ESS 2006 results (see Table 4.1) which showed there to be a less 
clear  generational  divide  in  party  membership  between  the  younger  and  older  age 
cohorts  in  the  newer  democracies  than  in  the  established  ones.  That  the  difference 
between cohorts is less pronounced could be explained by a combination of communist 
legacies and post-communist political volatility which have been found to mean older 
people  in  newer  democracies  are  less  partisan  and  inclined  to  join  political  parties 
compared to their counterparts in established democracies
105. Yet the higher percentages 
of  party  membership  amongst  young  people,  even  in  the  context  of  markedly  low 
overall party membership (as in Poland), also indicate that the logics behind youth party 
membership in newer democracies may contrast importantly with that in established 
democracies. It can be hypothesised from this that youth wings in newer democracies 
may  offer  a  different  set  of  incentives  and  opportunities  to  young  people  than  in 
established democracies. This is explored further in section 4.5 of this chapter.  
 
4.3b (iv) Comparisons across Party Families 
 
The second point to note from Tables 4.5 and 4.6 regards common findings across the 
families of parties (see Section 4.2) in each country. Generally, in both countries, the 
membership  numbers  of  the  regime  successor  parties  are  greater  than  those  of  the 
centre-right parties. In Romania this is also reflected in the size of the youth wing of 
Social Democratic Party (TSD) which claims a significantly larger membership base 
than the other youth wings. That the regime successor parties are larger and denser in 
                                                           
104 Hooghe et al. (2004) found that in 2003, the Flemish parties they studied had 4.9%, 2.8% and 1.2% of 
youth as members of the main party.  
105 See chapter one, section 1.4c. 141 
 
terms  of  membership  can  be  explained  though  the  more  developed  nature  of  their 
regional  and  party  organisational  infrastructure  inherited  from  communist  times 
(Szczerbiak  2001a,  Soos  et  al.  2002,  Linek  and  Pecháček  2007).  Even  now  this  is 
reflected in the number of local level branches (Szczerbiak 2001a).  
 
In  the  Polish  case,  the  extent  of  this  local  penetration  of  the  main  party  is  more 
prominently reflected in the membership of the youth wing of the Polish People’s Party 
(PSL,  FML)  than  that  of  the  Democratic  Left  Alliance  (SLD,  FMS).  This  can  be 
explained by a number of factors. First, as mentioned in Section 4.2, SLD necessarily 
had to undergo an intensive renewal of its policies and structures in the early post-
communist period. This restructuring led to breakages in links between the party and 
local level organisations and between the main party and its ancillary organisations. The 
result was a move away from dense local level organisation and a shift in membership 
to a mainly urban base (Grzymała-Busse 2002). This is also reflected in the membership 
of the youth wing which is concentrated in Warsaw and in the cities of the North and 
West such as Szczecin, Gdansk and Wrocław. The Polish People’s Party (PSL, FML) 
on the other hand, has been able to maintain its extensive local networks in rural areas 
of  Poland  and  supports  branches  of  PSL  and  FML  both  at  regional  (powiat)  and 
commune (gmina) level
106 (Szczerbiak 2001a, Grzymała-Busse 2002). This is partly 
due to the party’s continuing strong roots in rural communities where it is still seen as a 
party  which  protects  the  interests  of  farmers  and  those  in  the  countryside.  This  is 
reflected in the membership of FML, where a 2007 survey of young party members 
found that one of the five main reasons for joining the youth wing was because they 
were ‘from the countryside or involved in agriculture’
107.  
 
In Romania, the regime successor party, the Social Democratic Party (PSD, TSD) has 
not experienced the same degree of restructuring at local level as the Democratic Left 
Alliance  (SLD)  in  Poland  (Grzymała-Busse  2002).    As  a  result,  PSD  still  has  an 
extensive network of local offices across the country and is particularly strong in the 
South and East. (Soos et al. 2002, Soare 2004). In comparison to its Polish equivalent, 
                                                           
106 The local organisation of FML is concentrated in the Central and Eastern regions of Poland and 
although  organisations  exist  on  paper  in  the  Western  regions,  they  have  far  fewer  members  (from 
interview with FML representative). 
107 This survey was carried out by FML in 2007.  142 
 
the youth wing of PSD remains an integral and important part of the main party
108 and 
as such local level branches are mainly also found where the main party is organised. As 
PSD  inherited  many  of  the  former  communist party  offices  across  the  country,  this 
means that the youth wing also often benefits from centrally located, well equipped 
offices and meeting rooms.  
 
The  parties  in  both  countries  which  either  originated  in  the  early  post-communist 
coalitions (Civic Platform (PO,’S’MD) and Law and Justice (PiS, FMPiS) in Poland 
and the Democratic Party (PD, PD-OT) in Romania) or were historic parties reactivated 
after 1989 (National Liberal Party (PNL, TNL) in Romania
109) are generally organised 
in a less dense fashion across the countries. The development of these parties from 
urban  based  elites  meant  that  the  costly  building  up  of  local  level  membership 
organisations was not generally seen as a priority (Lewis 2000).  This is particularly 
visible in the case of Law and Justice (PiS, FMPiS) in Poland where the small number 
of  young members are  heavily  concentrated in  the large cities. Civic Platform (PO, 
‘S’MD) is also urban based but in addition has a denser local organisation in the North 
and West of Poland. In Romania, the Democratic Party (PD, PD-OT) and the National 
Liberal Party (PNL, TNL) are both more developed on a local basis than the Polish 
parties but generally their local penetration is less widespread than that of the Social 
Democratic Party (PSD, TSD).  
 
The  radical  parties  in  both  Poland  and  Romania  have  relatively  small  membership 
numbers, however it is notable that the youth wings associated with League of Polish 
Families  (LPR,  MW)  in  Poland  and  the  Greater  Romania  Party  (PRM,  OTRM)  in 
Romania  claim  a  proportionally  larger  membership  compared  to  other  parties  (see 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6). Although the often closed nature of these parties makes it more 
difficult  to  obtain  information  on  their  de  facto  organisation,  anecdotal  evidence 
suggests that the local level organisation is actually relatively weak and urban based.  
 
 
 
                                                           
108 The different relationships of the youth wings with main parties is discussed in greater detail in section 
4.5b. 
109 For a discussion of these historic parties see Siani-Davies (2005). 143 
 
4.3c Sub-National Representation of Youth Wings  
 
In the absence of comparable nationwide data on youth wing local level organisation in 
Poland and Romania, case studies of how individual youth wings operate in the six 
different localities studied adds support to anecdotal evidence presented above. This 
information  was  gathered  through  interviews  with  young  local  party  activists  and, 
where applicable, visits to the local party offices.  
 
4.3c(i) Poland  
 
Table 4.7:  Youth Wings in Three Polish Case Study Localities 
 
YOUTH WING  WARSAW  BIELSKO-
BIAŁA 
CHEŁM 
Young  Democrats 
(‘S’MD) 
Exists  at  district 
level  but  meets 
regularly  as  one 
group  at  central 
office.  
Small  group  (15 
members),  share 
office  with 
parliamentarian. 
No  organisation. 
Closest is in Lublin 
Youth Forum 
Law and Justice 
(FMPiS) 
No  district  level 
organisation,  meets 
weekly  as  one 
group  in  the 
parliament. 
Small  organisation 
not  separate  from 
main party.  
No organisation 
Federation of 
Young Social 
Democrats (FMS) 
143  members  on 
the  books,  district 
organisations  exist 
but  are  very  small 
(5 to 30 members). 
Meet as one group 
in central Warsaw.  
Small  group  (20-
30)  which  meets 
regularly.  
No organisation 
People’s Party 
Youth Forum 
(FML) 
Around  500 
members  including 
suburban  districts. 
Small  groups  meet 
weekly,  meet  as 
one group yearly 
Small organisation  Small organisation  
Youth 
Organisation of 
Self-Defence 
(OMOS) 
Meet  in  central 
Warsaw 
No organisation   No organisation 
All-Polish Youth 
(MW) 
Warsaw  level 
group  meet  at 
central offices. 
Voivodship level in 
Katowice 
Small  branch  in 
Chełm  established 
in 2005 
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Table  4.7  shows  the  extent  of  local  organisation  of  youth  wings  across  the  three 
localities  in  Poland.  It  confirms  that  most  youth  wings  have  a  weak  level  of  local 
penetration. This is particularly evident in the case of Chełm where there are only small 
branches of the far right, nationalist All-Polish Youth (MW) and The People’s Party 
Youth Forum (FML). According to anecdotal evidence the branch of MW has since 
stopped functioning. Young people who wish to become politically active in Chełm 
must otherwise either travel to Lublin (one hour away) for the youth wing or join the 
main party. In Bielsko-Biała, the organisation and membership of youth wings is also 
very  limited.  If  they  do  exist,  they  are  generally  based  at  the  local  offices  of 
parliamentarians and have no permanent staff. It is not therefore generally obvious to 
outsiders that the local party and youth wing are also based there. Even in Warsaw, due 
to small membership numbers, youth wings tend not to operate at district level, instead 
meeting as one group. This can prove exclusionary, as in the case of the Law and Justice 
Youth Forum (FMPiS) which meets inside the parliament. Effectively, this means that 
most young people in Warsaw who wish to join FMPiS have to join the local branch of 
the main party instead.   
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4.3c. (ii) Romania 
 
Table 4.8: Youth Wings in Three Romanian Case Study Localities 
 
YOUTH WING  BUCHAREST  ORADEA  ALEXANDRIA 
Democratic Party 
Youth 
Organisation 
(OTPD) 
Branches in all 6 
sectors. Has own 
central office. 
Moderate 
membership (circa. 
150), meets 
regularly 
Membership of 
around 500, has 
regular meetings 
National  Liberal 
Youth (TNL) 
Branches  in  all  6 
sectors.  
Moderate 
membership,  meets 
regularly 
Membership  of 
around  15,  has 
regular meetings 
Social Democratic 
Youth (TSD) 
Branches in all 6 
sectors. Has own 
central office.  
Significant 
membership in 
Bihor county 
(circa.1500), meets 
regularly  
Significant 
membership (at 
least several 
hundred), has 
regular meetings 
Conservative 
Party (PC) 
Part of Main party  Part of main party  Part of main party 
Democratic Union 
of Hungarians in 
Romania (UDMR) 
  Several  youth 
organisations exist 
N/A 
Greater Romania 
Youth 
Organisation 
(OTRM) 
Branches in all 6 
sectors which meet 
regularly. 
Membership of 
sector 5 around 
500. Has own 
central office.  
Small  Organisation 
exists 
Small  Organisation 
exists  
 
Table 4.8 represents the state of youth wings in the three localities studied in Romania. 
The contrast with the Polish situation is striking. Unlike in Poland, and consistent with 
the aggregate national data on membership numbers presented earlier in this chapter, 
youth wings of most parties are represented in both of the smaller localities as well as at 
sector level in Bucharest. In particular, the membership of the youth wing of the Social 
Democratic Party (PSD, TSD), and of the centre-right Democratic Party, (PD, OTPD), 
is  significant  in  all  three  localities.  This  confirms  the  strength  of  the  organisational 
inheritance of PSD (TSD) from the communist party. In order to compete with PSD, 
other Romanian parties such as PD have also had to build up significant local level 
organisation  which  is  reflected  in  the  membership  of  its  youth  wing  in  all  three 
localities.  Although  their  offices  are  not  always  as  centrally  located  as  PSD,  they 
usually  comprise  a  large  number  of  offices  and  meeting  rooms  and  it  is  frequently 
possible to locate youth wing leaders and members there, even if visiting unannounced. 146 
 
Thus in Romania, due to parties having large, well-marked buildings, youth wings enjoy 
a far greater visibility at local level than in Poland, perhaps facilitating recruitment.  
 
4.4 Who are Young Party Members and What Do they Do?  
 
Although an assessment of membership levels  and local level organisation gives an 
overview  of  the  youth  wings  in  Poland  and  Romania,  it  tells  us  little  about  the 
individual characteristics of members and what they actually do in the party. As party 
membership is generally a high cost activity, studies in established democracies have 
also found that members often have high levels of resources (Scarrow 1996, Whiteley et 
al. 1994, 2006). Studies of young party members in established democracies have found 
that high levels of educational resources and access to political networks through family 
are particularly important in predicting who will choose to join a party at a young age 
(Recchi 1999, Cross and Young 2008). The first part of this section assesses whether 
this is also applicable to young members in Poland and Romania.  
 
Another  characteristic  of  party  membership  emphasised  by  studies  in  established 
democracies is how levels of activity differs between members (Whiteley  and Seyd 
2002, Cross and Young 2004, Whiteley et al. 2006, Heider 2006). Research has shown 
that members in fact vary greatly in terms of how active they are in a party. This is 
measured by looking at the types of activities in which party members are involved.  
The second part of this section therefore looks at the activities of young party members 
in  Poland  and  Romania  and  compares  these  between  countries  and  with  studies  in 
established democracies.  
 
4.4a Educational  Resources 
 
In established democracies recent studies have suggested that educational levels may 
have become more important in determining youth party membership than was the case 
for older members (Recchi 1999, Cross and Young 2008). In Canada, for instance, a 
postal survey amongst Canadian party members between the ages of 18 and 25 found 
that 7 out of 10 respondents were currently students and out of the remainder 8 out of 10 
respondents  had  post-secondary  education  (Cross  and  Young  2008).  In  the  UK, 
Whiteley et al. (1994, 2006) have found that the political party with the lowest average 147 
 
age of members, the Liberal Democrats, also has the highest numbers of members of the 
three main parties who have obtained a university degree
110.  
 
Unfortunately, these rather tentative findings are not supported by any comprehensive 
comparative evidence of education levels of party members across different countries. 
However, that a higher level of education has become more important for young party 
members would correspond with the changes in parties across established democracies 
in recent decades. Particularly the shift from grass-roots style membership to a more 
professionalised, elite group of members could be expected to mean that those with 
higher levels of education would be better positioned to become involved (Leighley 
1995).  
 
If  this  is  the  case,  we  could  hypothesise  that  the  top-down  nature  of  many  post-
communist parties would also attract young members with high levels of educational 
resources. This is because the urban, elite nature of parties would mean that it was much 
easier for young people already involved in education or finished education to access 
formal political networks.  However, this may differ depending on country and party. 
Thus, the development of many Polish parties as urban based, elite organisations would 
suggest that here educational resources may be particularly important
111. The exception 
to this could be the Polish People’s Party (PSL), which has a more rural grass-roots 
membership  (Szczerbiak  2001b).  In  Romania,  the  local  level  penetration  of  many 
parties could mean that education is less significant. It could be hypothesised that this 
would be particularly the case for the regime successor party, the Social Democratic 
Party (PSD) which has a comparatively developed grass–roots membership structure. In 
the absence of large-scale survey data on young party members in Poland and Romania, 
an  assessment  of  educational  resources  of  members  must  be  made  through  media 
reports, interview response and anecdotal evidence.  
 
In Poland, media reports suggest that young party members generally have high levels 
of educational resources. For instance, an article published in the magazine Polityka in 
                                                           
110 The average age of a Conservative member  in the UK was found to be 62 years while over half of all 
members were over 66 (Whiteley et al. 1994). The average age of a Liberal Democrat member is 59 years 
and 36% are over 66 years (Whiteley et al. 2006). 
111 This would also mirror findings of Raciborski’s (2007) study of government members in Poland which 
found that most cabinet ministers were highly educated.  148 
 
2005 (Rybak 2005) states that many young party members are studying or have studied 
for courses such as political science, law or economics. This was also supported by the 
comments  made  in  interviews  with  party  members,  who  themselves  were  generally 
highly educated (see Appendix B). Even in the mainly rural based youth wing of the 
Polish People’s Party (PSL, FML), having a higher level of education was seen as a 
necessary  qualification  for  many  young  activists.  Young  members  I  spoke  to 
emphasised  that  they  felt  politics  was  for  ‘professional  and  educated  people’. 
Particularly, one member of FML stated that he felt it was necessary for young people 
involved in politics to have been formally educated in the theory of democracy and to 
understand how a democracy can develop.  
 
In Romania, this was also a sentiment expressed by young members, many of whom 
were  also  highly  educated.  Indeed,  the  need  to  portray  politics  as  a  place  for 
professional and educated young people, was also summed up by a 2007 slogan of the 
Cluj-Napoca branch of the Democratic Youth Party Organisation (OTPD), ‘It’s time for 
youth, it’s time for professionals’
112 . A member of the Social Democratic Youth (PSD, 
TSD) in Oradea reiterated this image. He said,  
 
‘old  people  have  the  experience,  but  the  young  ones  have  the  knowledge  about 
democracy, know languages and have travelled’.   
 
If, as this evidence suggests,  young party activists in both Poland and Romania are 
indeed generally highly educated, one reason may be the structure of the youth wings 
themselves. Many of these youth organisations are concentrated in the urban centres and 
in particular in those places where there are a lot of students. This is most evident in 
Poland  if  we  compare  the  organisational  penetration  of  youth  wings  in  the  three 
localities studied. In Chełm, which has a very small number of students, there are also 
very few if any active youth organisations. Again in Bielsko-Biała, the youth wings are 
small,  one  reason  perhaps  being  that  the  university  in  the  town  mainly  focuses  on 
technical  subjects,  rather  than  politics,  law  and  economics.  The  importance  of  a 
connection with university was emphasised by members of the Federation of Young 
Social Democrats (SLD, FMS) in Warsaw who stated that they would not have known 
                                                           
112 From the Party Website. In Romanian, ‘e timpul tinerilor, e timpul profesioniştilor’ .  149 
 
how to join the party if they had not met people involved with the party at their place of 
study.  
 
In Romania, although youth organisations have generally greater local level penetration 
than in Poland, members also identified a connection between the place of study and 
joining  the  youth  wing.  In  Oradea,  a  member  of  the  Democratic  Party  Youth 
Organisation  (PD,  OTPD)  said  that  although  both  student  and  youth  organisations 
existed within the main party in the town, in reality the youth organisation was mainly 
made up of students. This corresponds with the findings of Russell (2005, p. 567) who 
looked at the structure of the youth organisation in the Liberal Democrats in the UK. He 
found that despite the name of the youth wing ‘Liberal Democrats Youth and Students 
(LDYS), it was mainly an organisation for ‘students, would- be students, and recently 
graduated students’.   
 
Educational level appears therefore to be important for young party activists in Poland 
and Romania. This is a similar finding to that of studies in established democracies and 
suggests  that  the  increased  elitism  and  professionalisation  of  parties  is  particularly 
evident in the youth organisations of parties in both established and newer democracies.  
 
4.4b Access to Political Networks through Family 
 
A link to political activism through family members has been found to be an important 
characteristic  of  young  party  members  in  studies  in  established  democracies.  In  the 
1960s, Abrams and Little (1965) found that four out of five young political activists in 
the UK came from families with a history of political activism. More recently, this 
finding has been replicated by Recchi (1999) in his study of Italian youth activists and 
Cross and Young (2008) in their research on Canadian young party members. There are 
a  number  of probable  reasons  for  this.  Having  a  family  member already  in a party 
means greater access to knowledge about the party, how it works, how to join and what 
it does. It also provides access to ready made networks of other members which also 
makes it less daunting to join.  
 
As for educational resources, it is probable that as party membership shrinks and parties 
become more exclusive, access to political networks through family members may also 150 
 
increase in importance. Indeed, Cross and Young’s (2008, p. 354) study of Canadian 
young party members found that over half of the party members under 25 years were 
recruited through family connections compared to only eight percent of older members. 
In  this  case,  the  generational  contrast  is  striking.  It  suggests  that  the  role  of  these 
networks may have also strengthened as a result of the increased cynicism and dismissal 
of  formal  political  participation  by  young  people  in  general.  In  this  way,  family 
connections not only provide young people with an insight into political activism but 
also may be vital in counteracting the prevailing negative attitude of young people in 
established democracies towards formal political agents.  
 
There is reason to believe that these family connections may also be important factors in 
political  activism  of  young  people  in  post-communist  countries.  Certainly,  in  both 
Poland and Romania, there are high profile examples of young politicians who have 
family  connections  with  political  activism
113.  In  my  interviews  with  young  party 
members in both countries, the importance of such connections in facilitating young 
people to become party members was repeatedly confirmed. However, there appeared a 
marked contrast in the way in which these connections were viewed across different 
parties.  
 
A  family  connection  appeared  particularly  relevant  in  those  parties  which  stress 
tradition and national values such as the youth wing of the Polish People’s Party (FML). 
Here a recent party survey (2007) had revealed forty percent of youth wing members to 
have a family member  already in the party. Similar emphasis on the importance of 
family ties was also made by a spokesperson for the youth wing of the Greater Romania 
Party (OTRM), who stated that many members of the youth wing were following family 
tradition. In these parties, family connections appeared to be lauded, even encouraged, 
as part of the attraction of the party. They were seen as offering legitimacy and tradition 
in party systems which generally lacked such continuity and stability.  
 
In the youth wings of other parties which either wished to be seen as having broken 
with the past such as the regime successor parties, Democratic  Left Alliance (SLD, 
                                                           
113 In Poland, Jarosław Wałęsa, son of the famous Solidarity leader and former president, Lech Wałęsa, 
was elected to the parliament in 2005 as a deputy for Civic Platform (PO) at the age of 29 (Olczyk 2005). 
In  Romania,  Elena  Băsescu,  daughter  of  the  current  president,  Traian  Băsescu,  was  elected  General 
Secretary of the youth wing of the Democratic Party (OTPD) in 2008 (Ziua Online 2008). 151 
 
FMS) in Poland and the Social Democratic Party (PSD, TSD) in Romania, or those 
which  emphasised  individualism,  economic  liberalism  and  Europeanisation  such  as 
Civic  Platform  (PO,‘S’MD)  in  Poland  and  the  Democratic  Party  (PD,OTPD)  in 
Romania, family connections evidently existed but were not seen as an attraction for the 
party. Indeed, a family member being involved in politics was stated as a secondary 
reason for party activism amongst many of these members. For example, members of 
both the youth wings of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD, FMS) in Poland and the 
Social Democratic Party (PSD,TSD) in Romania said that although some members did 
had family connections, many joined primarily because of a friend already in the party. 
In  these  cases  members  appeared  to  be  downplaying  the  importance  of  family 
membership. Indeed, although they were keen to stress that many members initially 
joined because of a friend already in the party, they appeared more reluctant to speak 
about family connections.  
 
This appears to be a direct attempt by the members of the youth wings of the regime 
successor parties in both countries to counteract the negative perception of young party 
members promoted by the media and which is also prevalent amongst the young people 
generally  in  both  countries.  A  common  popular  image  in  Romania  of  young  party 
members  is  as  ‘puppets’  of  older  politicians  (Lazescu  2005)
114,  young  people  who 
cannot think for themselves but who  are controlled by  older members  in return for 
support. To acknowledge or encourage the existence of family connections and access 
to networks of older politicians would therefore go against the image of independence 
and professionalism which many of these young members wish to promote.  
 
4.4c What Do Members Do?  
 
Evidently in any political party there are a number of different ‘types’ of members. 
Particularly,  observers  often  identify  between  ‘active’  and  ‘inactive’  party  members 
(Whiteley and Seyd 2002, Cross and Young 2004, Heider 2006, Whiteley et al. 2006). 
The activity of the most ‘inactive’ members may  only amount to paying  an annual 
subscription  fee  or  attending  an  occasional  meeting,  while  an  ‘active’  member  may 
attend regular meetings, campaign rigorously at elections or even stand as a candidate 
                                                           
114 See for example the article by Dutulescu and Sutu (2007) in the daily newspaper, Cotidianul which 
reports on how Ion Iliescu and Adrian Năstase have made the young politician, Victor Ponta, their puppet.  152 
 
themselves. In their studies of party membership in the UK, Whiteley et al (2006) have 
found  that  the  majority  of  members  are  generally  ‘inactive’  where  only  one  in  ten 
members spends more than 10 hours on party activities per month.  
 
Such comprehensive studies of the activities of party members have not been conducted 
into youth party activists in established democracies. However, some studies on youth 
party activism suggest that the type of activities current members are involved in may 
differ substantially from those of young members in the past. In his overview of UK 
youth wings, Russell (2005) argues that the Young Conservatives have changed from 
being an organisation known for its dances and social activities in the 1950s to offering 
the main party a small but controlled group of ‘foot-soldiers’ during election campaigns 
nowadays. This element of control over activities by the main party also seems a feature 
of other youth wings in established democracies today. Youth organisations which in 
the  past  were  known  for  their  radical  activities  have  now  often  been  effectively 
subjugated to the main party
115.  
 
In Poland and Romania, as in established democracies, official party expectations for 
activity of regular members and youth members are generally set very low. Some youth 
wing statutes state they expect ‘regular’ participation from members
116 (although they 
do not define regular) while others simply demand monthly payment of the membership 
dues
117.  Evidently,  in  the  absence  of  comprehensive  survey  data  on  youth  party 
members establishing how ‘active’ members are is particularly subjective. Indeed, when 
I  asked  youth  party  members  in  both  countries  to  estimate  the  numbers  of  ‘active’ 
members in their organisations, the figures varied from around fifty percent down to 
around  seventeen  percent
118.  However,  it  was  suggested  that  this  number  may  vary 
dramatically  around  election  time  when,  as  in  established  democracies  (Cross  and 
Young 2004, Whiteley et al. 2006), young members become more active.  
 
                                                           
115 Some examples  include the  youth  wing of the  UK  Labour Party (Russell 2005) and the Belgian 
Christian Democrats (Hooghe et al. 2004). 
116 For example the youth wing of The Greater Romania Party (OTRM). 
117 For example the Conservative Party in Romania (PC). 
118 For instance, in Poland, a spokesperson from the youth wing of the Social Democratic Party (FMS) 
estimated that around 1000 of 6000 members were ‘active’. In Romania, the leader of OTRM in Sector 5 
Bucharest estimated that 100 out of his 200 members were ‘active’.  153 
 
There  were  a  number  of  contrasts  between  the  main  activities  undertaken  between 
elections  of  youth  party  activists  in  Poland  and  Romania.  Particularly,  activities  in 
Romania were generally more socially oriented and more visible to outsiders than in 
Poland. Although in both countries, youth wings follow a similar structure of regular 
(weekly or fortnightly) meetings and other activities such as debates and training days, 
the Romanian members emphasised the social activities involved
119. In addition, they 
also generally spent more time on the streets of smaller places, dressed in colourful 
party clothing than their Polish counterparts. Only in Warsaw, did young members say 
that  street  activities  were  an  important  feature  for  them.  For  example,  the  Warsaw 
branch of the Federation of Young Social Democrats (FMS) listed a number of recent 
activities such as handing out condoms with the FMS logo on them to encourage safe 
sex and campaigning for people to donate organs. In Romania, these activities appeared 
to  hold  more  importance,  as  even  at  local  level  street  campaigns  were  a  regular 
occurrence.  Examples  of  activities  included  handing  out  roses  on  Women’s  day, 
collecting signatures of support for candidates, handing out flyers, picking up litter and 
doing charity work for children.  
 
At election time, young party members in both countries explained that young people 
were especially active in the party’s  campaign.  In Poland,  an  example of what this 
entailed was given by a member of People’s Party Youth Forum (FML) who explained 
how at elections young members of the party were busy ‘night and day’ helping out 
with the campaign. A member of the Federation of Young Social Democrats (FMS) said 
that  they  did  the  ‘groundwork’  for  the  election  campaign  which  meant  organising 
meetings and events and handing out leaflets. In Romania, one member of the Social 
Democratic Youth (TSD) said that young members just had to accept that at election 
time  they  did  the  ‘dirty  work’  for  the  older  candidates.  This  included  handing  out 
leaflets and accompanying the candidates to villages to speak to the electorate.  
 
4.5 Motivations and Influence of Young Party Members 
 
Based on existing research in established democracies, there are three main reasons why 
young people generally choose to get involved in party activism. These are joining the 
                                                           
119 The role these play as an incentive to join a party is assessed further in Section 4.5b. 154 
 
party in order to build a career in politics, for social activities and for policy-seeking or 
ideological reasons (Recchi 1999, Hooghe et al. 2004, Russell 2005, Cross and Young 
2008). Given the contrasting party systems in Poland and Romania, I hypothesised that 
political parties in Poland would be more likely to be seen to offer opportunities to 
young people who are motivated by ideological and policy-seeking concerns but would 
be less likely to offer selective incentives such as social activities or access to jobs. In 
Romania, youth wings may be able to offer a greater range of selective benefits to their 
members but the clientelistic nature of the party system may deter young people who 
are ideologically motivated or policy-seeking.  
 
Within  the  individual  countries,  however,  it  is  also  possible  that  the  type  of 
opportunities which youth wings can offer their members could also vary depending on 
factors  such  as  local  level  penetration  and  party  family.  Evidently,  a  larger  party 
membership  at  local  level  could  potentially  offer  members  greater  access  to  ‘club’ 
goods such as social networks, training activities and parties than could a small party 
based only in large cities. Equally, the opportunities radical, nationalist youth wings 
such as All-Polish Youth (MW) in Poland and the Greater Romania Youth Organisation 
(OTRM) in Romania offer their members should be assessed separately as these parties 
are premised on a strongly ideological basis.  
 
4.5a Youth Wings as a Recruitment Channel and Training Ground for Party Elites 
 
One of the main purposes of youth wings is to act as a recruitment base for future 
politicians  (Scarrow  1996).  Indeed,  existing  research  has  shown  that  in  several 
established democracies youth wing activity acts as a particularly strong predictor of 
future political careerism (Recchi 1999, Hooghe et al. 2004, Russell 2005, Cross and 
Young 2008). For instance, Recchi (1999) found that the majority of Italian MPs had 
been  members  of  youth  wings  and  Hooghe  et  al.  (2004)  showed  41%  of  Belgian 
councillors to have started their political careers in party youth organisations. Evidently, 
comparative  data  on  the  recruitment  role  of  youth  wings  is  unavailable  for  post-
communist countries as many current senior politicians were politically socialised under 
communism and recruited during the formative period of the party system after 1989. 
However, data suggests a similar trend is already emerging with reference to younger 
politicians. 155 
 
 This appears to be particularly the case in Romania, when in October 2007, 63% of 
parliamentarians under the age of 35 years were either active, or had been active in 
youth wings
120.  The typical route for these young politicians was similar in all parties 
and generally consisted of moving up the ranks of the youth wing as local office holder, 
national office holder and then on to similar positions in the local, regional or national 
board of the main party.  
 
In Poland, a similar line of progression was less clear and in comparison to Romania 
only around 37%
121 of young parliamentarians in October 2007 had started their career 
in the youth wing. Of these just under half were those elected from the League of Polish 
Families  (LPR),  who  were  also  all  members  of  All-Polish  Youth  (MW).  These 
politicians have since all lost their parliamentary seats. This means the overall figure 
may over represent the importance of youth wing membership for other parties. Instead 
of building their career through the  youth wing, many parliamentarians had initially 
held positions in local self-government and in the local main party office
122. However, 
this  does  not  negate  the  relevance  of  youth  wings  in  Poland  for  starting  a political 
career. Indeed, it is likely that the main reason for the contrast with Romania is the 
lesser  degree  of  local  level  organisation  of  youth  wings  in  Poland,  meaning  that  a 
politically ambitious young person is obliged instead to join the main party straight 
away.  
 
4.5a(i) Building a Political Career as a Motivation to Join 
 
In established democracies, studies have shown that the possibility of building up a 
political career acts as  a strong motivator for  young people to join a party (Recchi 
1999). My research on young people in Poland and Romania found that while in Poland 
this was the case, in Romania this did not appear as important. In interviews with Polish 
young  party  members,  I  was  told  by  a  member  of  Law  and  Justice  Youth  Forum 
                                                           
120 This is based on my own survey of the CVs of Romanian parliamentarians as found on the website of 
the Romanian Parliament (www.parlament.ro) in October 2007.  
121 This is based on my own survey of the CVs of Polish parliamentarians in October 2007. The Polish 
Sejm website shows only the date of birth and occupation of Polish parliamentary deputies but most CVs 
of the younger deputies can be found on the internet through party websites.  
122Also see Dąbrowska and  Zagner (2007)  who state the typical career path  for  young  politicians is 
through the youth wing, local council, work in a deputies office or work as a deputy’s assistant. 
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(FMPiS)  in  Warsaw  that  the  ‘only  reason  to  join  a  youth  wing’  was  to  become  a 
politician. This was a sentiment also expressed by a member of the Federation of Young 
Social Democrats (FMS) in Warsaw who argued that most people joined the party to 
pursue a political career. 
 
In Romania, however, many of my interviewees saw building a career in politics as a 
secondary  part  of  being  in  a  youth  wing.  For  instance,  the  leader  of  the  Social 
Democratic Youth (TSD) in Oradea estimated that only around 10% of members joined 
with  ambitions  to  become  politicians.  A  member  of  the  Greater  Romania  Youth 
Organisation (OTRM) in Bucharest also shared these views, stating that most members 
had no desire to go into formal politics at all.  
 
There are a number of possible reasons for this difference between the views of Polish 
and  Romanian  respondents.  One  is  that  the  Polish  respondents  were  simply  more 
willing to admit to their political ambitions than the Romanians. Indeed, the more elite 
and urban nature of Polish youth party membership may mean those who join are more 
able to envisage being successful in pursuing a political career as they have greater 
access to influential politicians in the main parties. This especially appeared to be the 
case  for  the  members  of  Law  and  Justice  Youth  Forum  (FMPiS)  in  Warsaw  who 
regularly met with national level politicians inside the parliament where they held their 
meetings. 
 
However, it may not be this straightforward. In both countries, members told me of 
dramatic increases and decreases in youth wing membership levels directly before and 
after elections depending on the success of parties in the polls or with voters. In Poland, 
for  instance,  the  membership  of  the  Federation  of  Young  Social  Democrats  (FMS) 
decreased greatly from around 10,000 members nationwide in the period 2001-2004 to 
around 6000 after the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) was voted out of government in 
2005. In Romania, similar trends were noted by party members
123. Members in Poland 
told  me  that  these  fluctuations  were  because  young  people  perceived  a  change  in 
governing party as an opportunity to gain political positions. In Romania, the reasoning 
                                                           
123 For example, Social Democratic Youth (TSD) experienced a large decrease in members after the 2004 
elections  where  the  Social  Democratic  Party  (PSD)  was  voted  out  of  government.  In  contrast  the 
Democratic Party Youth Organisation (OTPD) had a dramatic increase in membership in the run up to the 
2004 elections when the Democratic Party (PD) was doing well in the polls.  157 
 
given by members was significantly different. They said that unlike in Poland, it was 
not so much the case of perceiving opportunities for political positions but access to 
other jobs and influential networks. One member of the Social Democratic Youth (TSD) 
in Oradea explained how many of the ‘new’ members in a party had in fact simply 
migrated from one party to another. She said this was normal practice and followed the 
example of members in the main parties. Her own father, a local councillor, had moved 
his membership from the Social Democratic Party (PSD) to the National Liberal Party 
(PNL) after the 2004 elections. She said that for him, like many others, this was the only 
way in which he could continue to access the money from central authorities to spend 
on developing infrastructure in his town.  Indeed, studies have also highlighted that this 
local level party migration is a relatively common place occurrence in Romania (Beers 
2004). This can be been explained through the clientelistic nature of the party system, 
which  means  that  with  political  power  comes  important  links  to  other  influential 
networks such as media and business (Warner 1997, Ioniţa  2004).  
 
These  fluctuations  in  membership  levels  could  be  said  to  show  a  high  degree  of 
instrumentalism amongst young people in both countries. Evidently, these young people 
perceive political opportunities at election time to benefit from party membership, either 
for building a career or for other selective incentives. However, from these findings 
alone,  it  is  not  clear  as  to  whether  this  is  simply  a  perception  or  whether  there  is 
evidence that these opportunities actually exist. One way of assessing this is to look at 
the relative power and influence of young people within parties. First, by assessing how 
well they are represented in electoral lists and secondly questioning the influence youth 
wings have over decision-making in the main party.  
 
4.5b Power and Influence of Youth in Parties 
 
4.5b(i) Poland  
 
There was a sense amongst the  young party members interviewed in  Poland that if 
someone was not prepared for the struggle to gain a political position then they would 
soon  leave  the  party.  For  instance,  a  member  of  the  Federation  of  Young  Social 
Democrats (FMS) in Warsaw stated that people who worked out that a political career 
was not for them generally left the party after ‘about three months’. These experiences 158 
 
afford us a very interesting insight into how the perceptions of opportunities to gain 
political positions through youth wing membership in Poland may diverge from reality. 
Indeed, this suggests that the current party system may in fact be more closed to young 
people  than  Raciborski  (2007)  found  in  his  study  of  political  recruitment  for  older 
politicians in two Polish governments. He argued that the lack of institutionalisation of 
the party system meant that positions in government were relatively open to people even 
at a low level in a party.  
 
One way to look at this in more detail is to assess the representation of young people on 
party lists in parliamentary elections. The further up the list a candidate is placed, the 
more likely they are to be elected. Thus, the numbers alone of young people on party 
lists tell us little about the opportunities for representation. However when these are 
compared with the numbers who are actually elected, we can start to build up a picture 
of de facto representation of young people within a given party.  1
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Table 4.9 shows these figures for the 2005 parliamentary election in Poland. The final 
column  shows  the  percentage  difference  between  listed  candidates  and  elected.  By 
looking at the percentage of elected candidates for the age group 20-29 years, we can 
see that for all parties except the Polish People’s Party (PSL) and the League of Polish 
Families (LPR), the representation of young members is very similar (at 2-3%). PSL has 
no  elected  20-29  year  olds  but  in  contrast  LPR  has  24%.  This  suggests  that 
opportunities in the 2005 elections for young people, with the exception of LPR, were 
relatively  low.  The  high  level  for  LPR  could  be  explained  through  the  exceptional 
nature of its success in these elections which was short lived. As such the success of this 
party was an example of the continued weakness of party system institutionalisation 
referred to by Raciborski (2007). For young members of All-Polish Youth (MW) and 
the League of Polish Families (LPR) it therefore meant an opening in opportunities for 
political  progression.  For  the  other  parties,  however,  particularly  those  which  have 
become more programmatic and stable like Civic Platform (PO) and the Polish People’s 
Party (PSL), the de facto opportunities for young members to progress politically appear 
less.  
 
To assess  whether these figures offer  an  accurate overview of the representation of 
young people within parties, it is necessary to try and build up a picture of the linkages 
between the youth wings and the main parties.  
 
Within  the  parties  in  Poland,  there  was  a  clear  division  between  the  larger,  more 
widespread regime successor parties and the newer centre-right parties. In the former, 
the youth wings were more independent of the main party.  
 
For instance, a member of the youth wing of PSL (FML) explained that although FML 
is part of PSL,  
 
‘the youth wing is independent of PSL, we criticise the party or not depending on the 
issue. Of course though we publicly support them and help them at election times’.  
 
This separation was  even more pronounced in the case of the  Federation of Young 
Social Democrats (FMS) and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). A member of FMS 
in Warsaw said that except for supporting the main party at election time and receiving 161 
 
funding,  the  youth  organisation  and  the  party  were  not  particularly  connected.  In 
addition, she pointed to a number of policy issues on which the youth wing and the 
main party publicly disagree
124. This rather difficult relationship could stem from the 
volatile history of FMS which has had to disband and reform in various ways as the 
main  party  has  reinvented  itself  (see  section  4.2a(i)).  As  a  result  of  this  continued 
reinvention, there are still pronounced divisions in the party between those who have 
more liberal, European oriented ideas and others who have a more traditional view of 
socialist ideas, often rooted in personal experiences of communism. 
 
This division is most evident between the youth wing and the main party. At first this 
also appears paradoxical as the present leaders of SLD itself are also young (see section 
4.2a(i)). It suggests that these young leaders may in fact act more as representatives of 
the party’s desired youthful image rather than a reflection of its member’s views or of 
the people within the party who hold the actual decision- making powers. This was also 
suggested by a member of FMS who highlighted a clear generational divide between the 
older members of the SLD and the younger ones. She said, ‘the older ones are a bit 
afraid of the younger ones because they have travelled, know languages and so are a bit 
of a threat.’ In such a case, it would follow that it was in the main party’s interests to 
only promote those young people who can be trusted to follow the party line and to 
keep de facto representation of the youth wing within the main party to a minimum. 
This is has also been found in studies on parties in established democracies where party 
members who deviate too far from the party line begin to act as a liability for the party 
and therefore have to be marginalised (Scarrow 1996, Russell 2005).  
 
In  contrast  to  the  communist  successor  parties,  the  youth  wings  of  the  centre-right 
parties appear to have a less problematic relationship with the main parties. This appears 
to be linked to the degree of independence the youth wing has from the main party. One 
member of the youth wing of Law and Justice (PiS, FMPiS) explained that the youth 
wing and the main party were not really very separate organisations and that after the 
leaders of FMPiS were elected into parliament in 2005, there remained little will to 
                                                           
124 These included supporting the rights of the LGBT community and in particular the introduction of 
marriage between homosexual people which she explained caused varying degrees of outrage amongst 
members  of  SLD.  Another  issue  mentioned  was  the  fact  that  the  youth  wing  had  not  supported  the 
sending of Polish troops to Iraq by the SLD government of the time. See also Kuligowski (2007) on the 
differences of opinion between FMS and SLD.  
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promote  the  youth  wing  as  an  independent  organisation.  She  suggested  instead  that 
young  people  could  just  join  the  main  party.  Similarly,  a  member  of  the  Young 
Democrats (‘S’MD) explained that the activities of the youth wing were strongly linked 
with those of the main party, Civic Platform (PO). In this case, it could be suggested 
that these parties would be more willing to support greater de facto representation of 
young people in the party and to promote them to higher posts. This is because the lack 
of independence granted to the youth wing means that its members could be seen as less 
of a threat than in the regime successor parties.  This is partly supported by the figures 
in table 4.9 which show that in the Polish People’s Party (PSL) and the Democratic Left 
Alliance  (SLD)  fewer  young  people  were  elected  than  in  the  centre–right  parties. 
However, this difference is not pronounced and other factors such as the make-up of the 
electorate and support base could also influence these figures.  
 
4.5b(ii) Romania  
  
In Romania, the views expressed about the difficulty in pursuing a political career were 
similar  to  those  given  by  interviewees  in  Poland.  For  instance,  one  member  of  the 
Democratic Party Youth Organisation (OTPD) in Oradea gave the following overview 
of her experience.  
 
‘The party is very time consuming. At the beginning I had some dream of being a deputy 
or a senator but I didn’t realise how difficult it was and I simply do not have the time 
with work and family etc.’ 
 
However, in contrast to Poland, there was also a sense amongst young members that 
parties were less closed to young people and that there were opportunities for young 
people  to  have  significant  leverage  within  parties.  For  instance,  a  member  of 
Democratic Party Youth Organisation (OTPD) in Alexandria stated that she felt that 
young  people  in  Romania  still  had  a  possibility  to  influence  politics,  unlike  in 
established democracies where she saw the system was already closed to new people. 
One way of assessing the nature of this possible influence and comparing it to Poland, is 
to look at the representation of Romanian young members in party lists.   
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Table 4.10 : Romanian Candidates (cand.) and Elected Representatives (elec.) by Age 
Group (%) and Party for the 2004 Parliamentary Elections 
 
 
  PNL-PD  PSD- PUR  PRM  UDMR 
Age   Cand  Elec  Diff  Cand  Elec  Diff  Cand  Elec  Diff  Cand  Elec  Diff 
20-29  11  7  -4  12  4  -8  12  2  -10  37  5  -32 
30-39  24  25  +1  22  22  0  22  25  +3  24  18  -6 
40-49  39  38  -1  30  33  +3  24  15  -9  14  27  +13 
50-59  23  25  +2  29  34  +5  30  33  +3  17  45  +28 
60+  3  5  +2  7  7  0  12  25  +13  8  5  -3 
Totals  100  100    100  100    100  100    100  100   
(Note: Diff is the difference between the number of candidates on the list and the number elected for each 
age  group.  PNL-PD:  Democratic  Party  and  National  Liberal  Party  Alliance,  PSD-PUR:  Social 
Democratic Party and Conservative Party Alliance, PRM: Greater Romania Party, UDMR: Democratic 
Union of Hungarians in Romania Source: Romanian Election Bureau 2004) 
 
 
Table 4.10 sets out the candidate lists by age group for each of the main party groups
125 
in the 2004 Romanian Parliamentary elections. The first observation which can be made 
is that compared to the results in Poland, the percentages of 20-29 year old candidates 
elected were generally higher. In the case of the Democratic Party and Liberal Party 
Alliance  (PD-PNL)  this  age  group  represented  7%  of  the  elected  candidates.  This 
contrast is more evident if we compare the 30-39 year age group in each country. Here 
only  the  Polish  Law  and  Justice  (PiS)  and  League  of  Polish  Families  (LPR)  have 
percentages which are comparable to those of the Romanian parties. This suggests that 
the opportunities for representation and influence of young people in parties may be 
greater in Romania. Although the party system has not been as volatile as in Poland, the 
parties remain less programmatic and therefore more focused on short term gains. This 
may mean that the opportunities for young people to progress in these parties are left 
more open.  
 
                                                           
125 The parties are not listed separately because PD and PNL competed as an alliance as did PSD-PUR.  164 
 
 
In  comparison  with  Poland,  the  youth  wings  of  all  parties  appear  to  have  greater 
influence over decisions made within the larger party. Often this is because the large 
membership of the youth wing means that if older politicians can gain the backing of 
young  members,  then  they  have  a  support  base  within  the  party.  This  is  especially 
important when there are internal party power battles between older politicians (Lazescu 
2005). In this case, different party factions may attempt to consolidate their positions 
within the party through endorsement by members. The youth wing therefore offers a 
ready-made supply for this support.  
 
One consequence of this is the prominence youth wings appear to be granted within the 
main parties. This is most obvious at times such as the summer schools held by the 
youth wings, where prominent older politicians compete to ingratiate themselves with 
younger members. Evidently, this relationship has to be reciprocal. In return for their 
backing,  specific  young  members  are  rapidly  promoted  through  the  party  ranks 
(Lazescu 2005). The existence of such relationships was supported by a member of the 
Social Democratic Youth (TSD) in Oradea who explained,  
 
‘I don’t care so much for a party position. I have been here (in the party) for 5 years 
now and don’t have a position. There are others though who are here for 2 months and 
yes of course they have a position if they want one. It all just depends who you support’.  
 
This suggests that in Romania, the sheer number of young members means that they 
cannot  simply  be  ignored  by  the  main  parties  and  older  politicians.  Indeed,  older 
politicians  need  them  to  reinforce  their  own  power  within  the  party.  However,  this 
representation within the party also comes at a cost. The prevalence of such reciprocal 
agreements between older politicians and  young aspiring members suggests that the 
party is also able to effectively minimise representation of those young members who 
do not take part in such alliances. Indeed, the weak influence of young members in 
general decision-making within the party was stressed by a number of interviewees. For 
instance, one member of the Democratic Party Youth Organisation (OTPD) in Oradea 
explained that the main party ‘rarely listen to the ideas of the youth wing’. She said that 
although the youth wing had representatives on the main board of the party, they were 
seldom given an opportunity to speak. She explained,  165 
 
 
‘There is a strange atmosphere at the moment. Young people often know more than the 
older ones but they are not trusted because they don’t have experience’.  
 
The apparently unequal representation of young people in parties in Romania supports 
the hypothesis that the clientelistic party system means that parties and politicians are 
often in a position to offer young people selective benefits in return for support.  In 
Poland,  it  appears  that  the  influence  young  members  have  in  main  parties  differs 
depending  on  party  family.  However,  the  findings  suggest  that  the  path  for  young 
people  to  gain  representation  in  the  main  party  generally  follows  a  clearer  set  of 
predefined  steps  than  in  Romania.  This  indicates  that,  as  hypothesised,  the  more 
programmatic party system means that parties are less able to rely on selective benefits 
to gain support from young members.  
 
4.5c Opportunities to Access Social and Other Incentives  
 
As explained above, other incentives may also play a part in motivating young people to 
join political parties. These may take the form  of ‘club’  goods like social activities 
offered by the party or they may be other kinds of selective benefits such as access to 
non-political jobs or networks.  
 
The prevailing party system could be hypothesised to have an impact on which of these 
incentives can be offered to members. As hypothesised in chapter two, parties which 
make up a programmatic party system, as generally the case in Poland, are less likely to 
have access to incentives which they can pass on to their members. In contrast, parties 
in a clientelistic party system, like in Romania, will generally derive their support from 
a complex network of relationships where the political parties can offer members and 
supporters benefits in return.  
 
Although  the  party  system  in  a  country  could  be  expected  to  have  an  important 
influence over the practices of individual parties within it, access to certain ‘club’ goods 
and  selective  incentives  such  as  social  activities  offered  by  parties  may  also  be 
determined by the size and nature of different parties within a given country. Thus, a 
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to offer its members more in the way of social activities than a small, urban based party. 
This was the case, for instance, for the large post-war Young Conservatives in the UK, 
who were renowned for the social occasions organised for members (Abrams and Little 
1965, Holroyd-Doveton 1996, Russell 2005). In this case, we could hypothesise that the 
youth  wings  of  parties  in  Romania  would  generally  be  better  placed  than  those  in 
Poland to offer their members access to social activities.  
 
4.5c (i) Access to Social Activities in Poland and Romania 
 
Based on interviews with young party members, the most socially active youth wings in 
Poland appeared to be the regime successor parties (SLD, PSL) and the youth wing of 
Civic Platform (PO, ‘S’MD). The members of these parties mentioned socialising with 
other similar minded young people as one attraction of membership. However, even in 
these parties it was stressed that social activities were secondary to political goals and 
incentives.  In the smaller, more urban based  youth wing of  Law and  Justice Youth 
Forum (PiS, FMPiS), socialising with other members was a negligible part of party 
activity.  
 
In contrast, in Romania, members of the youth wing of the Social Democratic Party 
(PSD, TSD) in particular stressed that social networks were a significant attraction of 
the youth wing. For instance, one member in Oradea emphasised, ‘if you join a political 
party you meet new people and make new friends’. She said that because of the party 
she has ‘a friend in every county’ and added that there is ‘not a city in this country 
where I wouldn’t have a place to sleep’. Even for the smaller parties such as the youth 
wing of the National Liberal Party (PNL,TNL) socialising appeared high on the agenda 
of youth activities in Romania. At a TNL meeting, members I spoke to stressed that the 
most important part of going to the meetings was ‘for the drink with friends afterwards’.  
 
The importance of social activities was such for some members in Romania, that they 
were stated as the main reason for joining the party and as reasons for continuing with 
party activism even when they had no personal political ambitions. This was summed 
up by a member of the Democratic Party Youth Organisation (OTPD) in Alexandria 
who said,   
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‘The reasons for being a member are many. There is nothing for young people to do 
here but if they come to the party they can meet people and have opportunities to travel 
also’ 
 
The importance of ‘club’ goods to young party members in Romania appears to mirror 
those offered by youth wings in the past in established democracies. In this way they 
offer a service to young people in places which lack other opportunities. However, this 
does not tell us about the influence  of the clientelistic party system on  youth party 
membership in Romania. Rather it shows that youth wings, through their size and local 
level penetration, are in a position to offer social opportunities to young people which 
otherwise would not exist.  
 
4.5c (ii) Access to other Selective Benefits in Poland and Romania 
 
To understand the impact of the different party systems on the motivations of young 
people to join political parties in Poland and Romania, we must try and assess whether 
membership offers perceived or real opportunities to access other selective benefits such 
as non-political jobs and networks. However, accurately measuring the existence of how 
these  goods  are  offered  to  party  members  is  extremely  problematic  as  people  are 
generally hesitant to divulge such information (Kopecký 2006, Uslaner 2008). 
 
Therefore, in my interviews with party members in both countries, it was unsurprising 
that they did not directly provide information about selective incentives gained as a 
result  of  party  membership.  However,  as  the  perception  of  the  availability  of  these 
goods could be as persuasive a reason to join as the actual existence of such incentives, 
the opinions of non-members are also important. If access to selective incentives is seen 
as an opportunity provided by membership of youth wings by non members it is likely 
that this perception may also attract some members in the first place. 
 
In Poland, focus group respondents did not see youth party membership as a way to 
gaining non-political jobs or power in other spheres outside politics. Indeed, several 
respondents  stressed  that  youth  party  membership  could  actually  be  detrimental  for 
prospects  in  gaining  non-political  jobs.  One  respondent  in  Bielsko-Biala  (m,18) 
explained,  168 
 
 
‘you would have to be very sure you wanted to be involved in politics to join a party 
otherwise it could be a problem for work later’.  
 
This was supported by another in Warsaw (m,17) who said, 
 
‘people have to leave politics if they get a job somewhere else because that is not a 
good connection’.  
 
This therefore corresponds with the findings in Section 4.5a(i) that building a political 
career acts as a very important incentive for joining a youth wing in Poland and that 
those who decide that a political career is not for them generally leave the party. It also 
represents a significant contrast with the response from non-members in Romania.  
 
In Romania, youth party activism was seen by many focus group respondents as a way 
to gain contacts with local business, media and also to get into fields such as diplomacy.  
One respondent in Oradea (f,17) summed up, ‘young people join parties for money and 
connections mostly’. Instead of membership being detrimental to job prospects as in 
Poland, it was seen as generally facilitating as another respondent stated (Oradea, m, 
25),  
 
‘they join because they see some personal benefit in the long term, like a way to get a 
good job in business or something’ .  
 
Indeed,  when  probed,  some  young  party  members  in  Romania  also  spoke  of  the 
potentially  beneficial  links  between  politics,  media  and  business.  For  instance,  a 
member of Social Democratic Youth (TSD) in Alexandria said that he had found it 
much easier to get his job in the local media because he got to know the right people 
through politics.  Also, a young member of the Conservative party (PC) in Bucharest 
explained that it was seen as the ‘business’ party
126 and through the party you were able 
to set up contacts with many influential business people. Members of National Liberal 
Youth (TNL) and Social Democratic Youth (TSD) in Bucharest both stated that being in 
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a party was seen as a good way to gain contacts for acquiring a job in diplomacy or 
international relations.  
 
Although these findings do not provide conclusive evidence of selective benefits being 
offered to young party activists in Romania, they do suggest that the clientelistic party 
system may influence some of those who choose to join a party as they perceive that 
membership will open up these opportunities for them.  
 
4.5d Ideological/Policy-Seeking Opportunities 
 
One of the main incentives to join a particular party in established democracies is that 
the party is seen to represent the ideological views or policy beliefs held by that member 
(Cross 2004, Whiteley et al. 2006). The degree to which this matters as an incentive 
does  however  vary  from  party  to  party  and  members  of  parties  with  a  strong 
nationalistic character will, for example, generally place ideological concerns higher 
than members of more middle of the road parties (Cross 2004). Over time, researchers 
of parties in established democracies have shown that party members often hold more 
radical ideological views than do their voters (Whiteley et al. 1994, Hooghe et al. 2004). 
This can mean that members with strong ideological motivations are seen as a liability 
within the party, especially as parties adopt a more ‘catch-all’ approach to attracting 
voters. This has been found to be particularly relevant for certain youth organisations in 
established democracies (Scarrow 1996, p.40). For instance, in their study of Belgian 
youth wings, Hooghe et al. (2004) cite the example of the youth wing of the Christian 
Democratic Party which during the 1970s took on a radical Flemish character which 
damaged relations between the main party  and the French speaking communities in 
Flanders.  Since  then  the  youth  wing  has  shrunk  in  size  and  lost  its  radical  profile. 
Similar examples have also been cited in the UK and in Canada (Cross 2004, Russell 
2005).   
 
The role of ideology in party membership in the newer democracies of post-communist 
Europe is more difficult to qualify. This is partly because the ideological and policy 170 
 
basis of many parties themselves is less clear
127. The degree to which voters can identify 
particular parties on a left/right scale has also been found to differ across the newer 
democracies
128.  Given  the  more  programmatic  nature  of  parties  in  Poland,  it  is 
hypothesised that parties may hold more appeal for ideologically motivated and policy-
seeking young people than in Romania. However, this also depends on whether political 
parties are perceived by young people as satisfactory platforms for their ideology or 
policies, or whether, as has been found in established democracies, they prefer to choose 
other  organisations  for  this purpose  instead.  It  is  also  expected  that  the  clientelistic 
nature of the party system in Romania may in fact deter those young people who are 
ideologically motivated or policy-seeking from joining a party.  
 
In  general,  youth  wing  members  interviewed  were  more  likely  in  Poland  than  in 
Romania to state that they joined a party for ideological or policy reasons. They were 
also, with some exceptions, able to set out where they felt their party fell on a left/right 
divide. As such, one member of the People’s Party Youth Forum (FML) placed the 
Polish People’s Party (PSL) as a centre-left party which supported the protection of the 
agricultural sector but also the free market
129. A member of the Federation of Young 
Social Democrats (FMS) said he joined a left wing party because he believed in social 
democratic ideas such as the separation of politics and the church. Similarly, a member 
of ‘S’MD said she believed in the liberalisation of markets and positive Europeanisation 
which made Civic Platform (PO) a centre-right party. One exception was given by a 
member of Law and Justice Youth Forum (FMPiS) who said the party had no specific 
left/right ideology, but its policies were determined by Catholic values. However, she 
also  stated  that  the  party  was  in  support  of  policies  which  would  ‘decommunise’ 
political and public life. The views given here correspond to the mixture of various 
ideological cleavages in Polish parties and society which have been found by previous 
                                                           
127  Particularly,  studies  have  found  that  the  traditional  left/right  classification  of  parties  used  in 
established democracies is often less relevant in newer democracies (Zarycki 2000). Indeed researchers of 
parties in post-communist countries have tended to divide voter preferences into cleavages based on other 
categories such as between regime successor parties and parties which developed out of dissident groups 
such as Solidarity in Poland (Zarycki 2000, Szczerbiak 2001, Raciborski 2007). 
128  In  Poland,  for  instance,  studies  have  found  that,  despite  electoral  and  party  volatility,  Poles  are 
generally familiar with the notions of left and right and can place individual parties under these headings, 
although  the  meanings  they  attach  to  these  labels  probably  differs  from  those  given  by  citizens  in 
established democracies (Szczerbiak 2001). In contrast, Romanian voters have been found to be generally 
less  familiar  with  the  idea  of  a  left/right  ideological  divide  than  people  in  all  other  post-communist 
countries except some former USSR states and Bulgaria (Rotariu and Comşa 2006). 
129 An internal study of FML members conducted in 2007 also found that the majority had joined because 
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studies.  Thus,  they  refer  to  the  divide  between  regime  successor  parties  and  ’new’ 
parties formed after 1989 (Lewis 2000, Raciborski 2007) and a divide based on moral or 
religious grounds (Zarycki 2000).  
 
In  Romania,  interviewees  did  not  generally  see  ideology  as  an  incentive  to  join  a 
political party. Only the members of the youth wing of the Social Democratic Party 
(TSD) stated that they had joined a left wing party for social democratic ideals such as 
free healthcare and education for the underprivileged. Members of other parties rarely 
stated any ideological reasons for becoming involved in a particular party and instead of 
examples  of  policies  or  programme  simply  listed  social  activities  or  campaigns 
undertaken  by  the  youth  wing  at  local  or  national  level.  Indeed,  members  of  the 
Conservative Party (PC) explicitly said that they had no idea of the ideology supported 
by the party and could not place it on a left/right axis or even compare the party’s 
ideological basis to that of other parties.  
 
4.5d(i) How Well do Parties satisfy Ideological Demands?  
 
a. Poland  
 
In Poland, members of youth wings appeared generally satisfied with the way in which 
their parties operated as a platform for their beliefs. However, this was less the case for 
some  members  of  the  youth  wing  of  the  regime  successor  party,  Democratic  Left 
Alliance (SLD, FMS) who felt that the policies of the main party were less radical than 
they  would  like.  These  differences  in  opinion  can  be  partly  explained  by  the 
independence of the youth wing from the main party (See Section 4.5b(i)).  
 
b. Romania  
 
In Romania, there was some evidence that for those who were ideologically motivated 
or policy-seeking, being in the party was more of struggle. Indeed, the views expressed 
by some youth wing members suggested a distinct separation between their ideological 
beliefs and what parties could offer them. An example of this was given by a member of 
the Social Democratic Youth (TSD) in Oradea. He explained,  
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‘It can be disappointing, I can tell you. I have had moments that you get a kick in the 
ass then it is hard to continue but you have to if you really believe in a thing that 
actually doesn’t exist in Romania in the parties. They don’t have one idea, they don’t 
care about it. For example liberals, democrats or social democrats they don’t believe in 
such subjects most of them. Most of them where the power is where I want to go and 
that’s something the new generation, the youth should start or try to change’.  
 
Another who joined the Conservative Party (PC) in Bucharest was also disappointed by 
the lack of ideology and policy making in the party. He stated,  
 
‘The problem is quite a lot of those lazy guys are in a party because they see this guy in 
the city earns quite a lot of money through politics and maybe I could too……they don’t 
chose a party because it offers them something to believe in because all the parties are 
the same’  
 
These views of young party members in Romania are very interesting for a number of 
reasons. First, the references they make to the lack of programme and ideology together 
with the suggestion that people join parties in order to make money and gain power 
implies that they see the prevailing party system as a barrier to developing parties along 
the  lines  of  ideology  and  programme.  This  corresponds  with  the  findings  of  other 
studies into clientelistic party systems, which have found that the clientelistic practices 
of parties are likely in the long term to alienate their supporters within the party and 
from  the  electorate
130.  This  is  because  they  can  only  offer  short  term  benefits  to 
supporters. This puts them in an unstable situation because if the benefits then dry up 
many supporters will simply move to another party. As we saw in Section 4.5a(i), this 
party migration appears to be a prominent feature not only of main parties in Romania 
but also across youth wings. In turn, this means that parties necessarily attract many 
opportunists, after short term benefits, such as power or money.  
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4.5e. The Radical Nationalist Exception 
 
Although the role of ideology generally contrasts importantly for youth members across 
Poland  and  Romania,  the  youth  wings  of parties  which  support  a  strong  nationalist 
agenda  constitute  an  exception.  In  both  All-Polish  Youth  (MW)  in  Poland  and  the 
Greater  Romania  Youth  Organisation  (OTRM)  in  Romania,  members  cite 
traditionalism, nationalism and religion as incentives for joining the youth wing. Studies 
on extremism in Eastern Europe, have found that young people are often attracted to 
these  groups  (Minkenberg  2002,  Kopecký  2003,  Kurti  2003,  Mudde  2005)  for  the 
reasons that they offer a definite ideological stance and use direct methods of activism. 
However, as both of these parties have now lost all seats in the national parliaments, the 
popularity  of  these  youth  wings  is probably  considerably  less  than portrayed in the 
media.  
 
In particular, when these parties achieved some degree of electoral success in Poland 
and Romania, their ability to persist on ideological stance  alone was questioned. In 
Poland, for instance the electoral success of the  League of Polish Families in 2005 
(LPR) intensified divisions between the main party and the youth wing. Although many 
LPR positions in the parliament were taken up by former members of MW
131, there 
ensued  an  ideological  battle  between  LPR  who  increasingly  did  not  want  to  be 
associated with the extremism of MW
132.  On the side of MW, many members felt that 
LPR had become too liberal after being elected
133.  
 
4.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter had two central aims. First, it aimed to outline the level and nature of youth 
party membership in Poland and Romania. Second, it endeavoured to analyse the logics 
behind this type of participation and to reach an understanding of how these compared 
between the two countries and with existing study in established democracies.  The 
chapter tested two main comparative hypotheses. These centred on differing political 
                                                           
131 See section 4.5b(i). 
132 See Footnote 87. 
133 In Romania also, internal divisions between the youth wing and the main party have also resulted in 
high profile disputes. One example of this was the resignation of the leader of the Greater Romania Youth 
Organisation (OTRM), Lia Olguţa Vasilescu in 2007. She decided to join the Social Democratic Party 
(PSD) instead (See România Liberă (19
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opportunities  offered  for  youth  participation  in  parties  created  by  administrative 
decentralisation reform and the prevailing party system. Therefore, I expected that in 
Poland, greater decentralisation and the development of a programmatic party system 
would  mean  more  open  channels  for  formal  participation  in  parties.  In  Romania,  I 
expected that the clientelistic party system would mean greater opportunities for parties 
to offer members selective benefits but that channels for participation on ideological or 
policy-seeking  grounds  would  be  ‘blocked’.  The  findings  of  this  chapter  broadly 
support these hypotheses.  
 
Youth party membership levels in Poland were found to be notably low in comparison 
to  Romania  and  also  to  established  democracies.  The  local  level  structure  of  youth 
wings was also largely undeveloped and most members were based in the large urban 
centres. As in established democracies, young members were generally highly educated 
and  often  have  links  to  parties  through  family  members.  The  incentives  for  young 
people in Poland to join parties were mainly based on building a political career. There 
was little evidence that young members joined for other selective benefits such as short-
term access to power or money and social benefits were negligible. The power of young 
people  within  parties  varied  depending  on  party  family,  where  the  de  facto 
representation  of  young  people  in  the  centre-right  parties  is  higher  than  that  in  the 
regime successor parties. However, this also appears to stem from the higher degree of 
control which the centre-right parties exert over their youth wings. This suggests that 
the young people who climb party ranks are also often those which pose the party no 
threat. In addition, the de facto representation of young people in all parties was found 
to be relatively low in comparison to Romania, suggesting that only those young people 
who are determined to build a political career will be motivated to join and remain a 
member of a political party.  
 
In Romania, the higher level of youth membership in parties was coupled with a greater 
local level penetration of youth wings across the country. This meant the resources of 
the  members  are  more  varied  than  in  Poland,  where  young  members  generally 
constituted an urbanised elite of young people. I found a broader range of incentives for 
participation in parties in Romania. As hypothesised, members joined for social reasons 
and  for  other  selective  benefits.  Yet,  there  was  less  emphasis  on joining  to build a 
political career. This appears paradoxical as the de facto representation of young people 175 
 
in main parties was found to be higher than in Poland. However, influence of young 
people within parties was also often limited to acting as ‘puppets’ for older politicians 
and  factions  within  the  main  party.  This  meant  that  channels  for  policy-seeking  or 
ideological  motivated  participation  were  often  ‘blocked’.  This  was  reflected  in  the 
findings  that  few  members  joined  for  these  reasons,  and  those  who  did  were  often 
disappointed. In turn this suggests that although parties in Romania are able to make use 
of clientelistic networks to offer young people selective incentives, this is only offered 
to those who will provide support for older politicians but will not challenge the status 
quo.   
 
The findings of this chapter therefore suggest that youth political participation in formal 
modes  of  involvement  in  Poland  and  Romania  are  significantly  influenced  by  the 
prevailing  party  systems  in  each  country.  This  means  that  in  Poland,  the  political 
opportunities to participate are more similar to in established democracies. However, 
these opportunities are often only recognised by young people who have high levels of 
resources and are particularly politically motivated. This appears to be a product of the 
top-down  development  of  Polish  post-communist  political  parties  and  in  turn  this 
suggests that this elitism in the party system will persevere. In Romania, the widespread 
clientelism  in  the  party  system  ‘blocks’  the  channels  for  formal  youth  political 
participation. However, this is often masked by the larger numbers of young people who 
join political parties for social reasons and selective benefits.  
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CHAPTER FIVE – INFORMAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In  the  two  previous  chapters,  I  assessed  youth  political  participation  in  Poland  and 
Romania in the two main traditional forms of political involvement, voting and party 
membership. However, as explained in chapter one, political participation is made up of 
a  broad  range  of  activities,  of  which  traditional  forms  constitute  only  one  part.  To 
understand the reasons behind youth political participation patterns it is therefore also 
imperative  to  look  at  whether  and  how  young  people  engage  in  informal  modes of 
political involvement. In this chapter I focus on explaining and analysing two types of 
informal  youth  political  participation  in  Poland  and  Romania,  volunteering  and 
involvement in single-issue protest activities such as demonstrating and petitioning. 
 
As outlined in chapter one and reiterated in chapter three, recent studies in established 
democracies have found that while young people appear to have become less interested 
and participative in the traditional forms of political involvement, they have shown an 
increasing interest in informal forms of participation (Norris 2002, 2003, Kimberlee 
2002, Shea and Green 2006, Quintelier 2007, Sloam 2007). Norris (2003) argues that as 
the range of repertoires (methods of participation) and agencies (organisations through 
which  people  participate)  commonly  used  in  political  participation  in  established 
democracies  has  expanded,  informal  activities  have  become  increasingly 
‘normalised’
134. This has made them more accessible to a wider range of young people 
by reducing the individual ‘costs’ and resources required to participate. In turn, it has 
been suggested that informal forms of participation may act as an alternative to voting 
and party membership as they create a ‘voice’ for young people who feel alienated and 
unrepresented by formal political agents (Norris 2003). However, as already outlined in 
chapter three, this is a problematic assumption. Indeed, it is unclear whether there is 
such  a  trade-off  between  youth  involvement  in  informal  forms  and  engagement  in 
traditional forms (Henn et al. 2005). It could be that the young people who are involved 
in all types of political participation make up a small politically active core of young 
                                                           
134 For a discussion of the ‘normalisation’ of protest and protestors in established democracies see Van 
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people,  whereas  the  majority  remain  inactive  and  have  chosen  to  ‘exit’  political 
involvement altogether (Sloam 2007, Cross and Young 2008)
135. In this case, it would 
suggest  that  despite  increased  interest  and  participation  in  informal  forms  of 
participation, the gap between young people who participate politically and those who 
are inactive is actually widening (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001).  
 
In newer democracies, such as Poland and Romania, this gap between politically active 
and inactive citizens may be even more pronounced as studies have found generally low 
levels of participation in informal forms of political involvement across all age groups 
(Smolar 1996, Ekiert and Kubik 1998, Mudde 2003, Howard 2003, Vanhuysse 2004, 
Rose-Ackerman 2005, Bernhagen and Marsh 2007). Several different factors have been 
cited  to  explain  this.  The  most  straightforward  explanation  is  that  lower  levels  of 
socioeconomic resources mean people have less time and money to  get involved in 
informal forms of political participation in newer democracies (Lewis 1997, Bernhagen 
and Marsh 2007). However, this theory fails to account for the argument that people 
with fewer resources often have less to lose from involvement in informal activities and 
so  theoretically  would  be  more  likely  to  seize  external  political  opportunities  to 
participate than those with resources (Tarrow 1998). To address this, more complex 
explanations focus on the constraints placed on participation by the legacy of ‘forced’ 
participation  in  voluntary  activities  during  communism  which  mean  people  often 
continue to favour private family and friends networks over participation in the public 
sphere (Smolar 1996, Howard 2003, Mudde 2003). Other approaches cite the post-1989 
institutionalisation of anti-communist movements such as Solidarity in Poland as having 
diffused political opportunities for protest (Tarrow 1998, Ost 2005, Della Porta and 
Diani 2006)
136.  
 
However, the degree to which these factors influence the participation of the present 
young cohort in informal forms of political involvement in newer democracies remains 
unclear. As they had no direct experience of living through communism, the way in 
                                                           
135 In his qualitative study of young activists (NGOs, political parties and informal forms) and non-active 
people in the UK, Sloam (2007) found that activists had a different conception of politics from that of 
non-activists and were likely to be involved in a large range of different activities whereas non-activists 
had ‘exited’ political participation in favour of civic volunteerism or inaction.  
136 As protest declines and movements become absorbed by elites the resources and opportunities to 
participate in protest activities also diminish and action becomes more costly for participants (Tarrow 
1998, p. 89, Della Porta and Diani 2006, p.224).  178 
 
which legacies from this time impact on their political participation patterns is likely to 
differ from that of older age groups. Indeed, one of the predictions made by scholars 
(Szompta 1996, Berglund et al. 2001, Howard 2003) studying participation in informal 
forms of political involvement in post-communist countries over the last two decades 
has  been  that  over  time  and  with  generational  replacement,  the  influence  of  these 
legacies  will diminish and that participation patterns will start then to  more closely 
relate  to  those  in  established  democracies  (Sztompka  1996,  Howard  2003).  The 
emergence of this new cohort of young people in Poland and Romania therefore offers 
us an invaluable opportunity to assess whether in their choices and attitudes towards 
participation  in  informal  forms  there  is  indeed  evidence  that  these  predictions  are 
beginning to come to fruition.  
 
5.1a Hypotheses Tested in Chapter Five 
 
This chapter tests the following comparative hypotheses as set out in chapter two:  
 
H1. Contrasting legacies of anti-communist dissidence and repression of dissidence are 
likely  to  have  differing  impacts  on  youth  participation  in  informal  forms  today.  In 
Poland (H1.1) the legacy of organised and peaceful dissidence is hypothesised to mean 
the existence of greater political opportunities to participate. In Romania (H1.2) lack of 
organised dissidence followed by post-communist violent repression of protest is likely 
to mean less political opportunities to participate, but that there may be potential for 
more radicalised and intense youth protest than in Poland.   
 
H4.  Higher  socioeconomic  levels  in  Poland  could  be  expected  to  mean  that  young 
people  have  greater  resources  to  participate  in  informal  forms  of  participation.  In 
Romania the opposite could be expected.  
 
5.1b Chapter Outline  
 
This chapter is separated into two main sections. The first analyses the participation of 
youth in Poland and Romania in non-governmental voluntary organisations. Here, I start 
by comparing and contrasting the nature of volunteering in these countries with that in 
established democracies and across different age groups within each country. I use this 179 
 
to question the relationships between different types of volunteering (civic and cause-
oriented) and youth political participation in general and to analyse the logics behind 
youth participation and non-participation in voluntary activities. 
 
The  second  section  assesses  youth  participation  and  non-participation  in  protest 
activities in Poland and Romania. First, I employ descriptive statistics and findings from 
qualitative  research  to  outline  how  much  and  in  what  ways  young  people  in  these 
countries participate in protest activities. Then, by using focus group data and country-
specific examples, I question how the logics behind youth protest participation and non-
participation compare between Poland and Romania and with findings in established 
democracies.  
 
5.2.Youth Participation in Voluntary Organisations 
 
5.2a. What kind of Volunteering?  
 
In their survey of political participation in America, Verba et al (1995) renewed the 
Tocquevillian  idea  of  civic  voluntarism  which  suggests  a  positive  link  between 
voluntary activity and political action. Social capital theory has built on this, arguing 
that  involvement  in  voluntary  organisations  increases  individual  levels  of  trust  and 
access to social networks which through processes of socialisation make people more 
likely to participate in traditional forms of political participation (Putnam 1993, 2000). 
However,  recent  studies  have  suggested  that  different  types  of  volunteering  have 
different relationships with political action (Van Deth et al. 2007, Van Der Meer and 
Van Ingen 2009). Indeed, civic volunteering, that is volunteering in church, community 
based  or  leisure  organisations  may  actually  represent  an  ‘exit’  from  political 
involvement or have no relationship with traditional forms of political participation. In 
contrast, volunteer work in ‘cause oriented’ groups such as interest groups and activist 
groups may have a positive correlation with political involvement in other forms (Van 
Der Meer and Van Ingen 2009). Van Der Meer and Van Ingen (2009) argue that the 
logic  behind  this  contrast  stems  from  the  goals  of  the  voluntary  organisation.  This 
means that only participants in those organisations which aim to change political policy 
are  likely  to  also  be  involved  in  other  forms  of  political  involvement.  Voluntary 
organisations  which  are  leisure  oriented  or  community  based  generally  focus  on 180 
 
providing a service and do not interact with formal politics. Thus they may provide an 
alternative  to  political  participation  rather  than  acting  as  a  basis  for  political 
mobilisation.   
 
This  separation  between  different  types  of  volunteering  (civic-oriented  and  cause-
oriented)  is  particularly  important  to  consider  when  assessing  youth  political 
participation. This is because although various studies in established democracies have 
highlighted the heightened interest and participation of young people in both types of 
voluntary organisation in comparison to involvement in formal political participation, 
there is a often a lack of systematic analysis of how these different types of volunteering 
relate to wider political participation (Jones 2000, Norris 2003, Fahmy 2006, Sloam 
2007).  
 
In  newer  democracies  the  effects  of  different  types  of  volunteering  on  wider  youth 
political participation are even less explored and such study is further complicated by 
some  specific  post-communist  factors.  Particularly  a  legacy  of  ‘forced’  voluntary 
activity  during  communism  has  left  older  people,  especially,  with  very  different 
connotations of volunteering from those in established democracies (Norris 2002, 2003, 
Howard 2003). This can either refer to the institutionalised volunteering in sports and 
youth clubs during communism or in some cases to military service
137. Volunteering in 
cause-oriented organisations which aim to change political policy through lobbying and 
other actions is therefore a relatively new concept in post-communist countries and the 
organisations which do exist have often been initiated and supported by western-based 
organisations (Mendelson and Glenn 2002). We could therefore hypothesise that levels 
of youth volunteering in cause-oriented organisations would be lower in Poland and 
Romania than in established democracies.  
 
5.2b Comparing Youth Volunteering in Poland and Romania 
 
In the following section I use descriptive statistics and national level surveys to outline 
levels of youth volunteering in Poland and Romania and to assess the nature of such 
participation. However, as interpretations of voluntary activity are likely to vary from 
                                                           
137 See Musiała (2005) who explains that the different interpretations of the Polish word ‘woluntariusz’ 
acts as a barrier to developing the youth voluntary sector in Poland.  181 
 
country  to  country  and  from person  to person,  this  is  difficult  to  measure  (Newton 
1999).  This  is  made  more  problematic  by  the  differences  between  involvement  in 
informal  and  formal  organisations  where  measuring  involvement  in  formal 
organisations such as trade unions or church organisations is more straightforward than 
in  informal  and  more  ad  hoc  cause-oriented  organisations  such  as  environmental 
pressure groups. In addition, it is impossible to infer from survey results alone whether 
volunteering  refers  to  participation  in  civic  organisations  or  cause-oriented  or  a 
combination. These difficulties mean that response to survey questions which ask about 
volunteering should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless they can provide us with a 
starting point for a general comparison of voluntary activity across different countries 
and age groups.  
 
Figure 5.1: Involved in Voluntary Activities in the past 12 Months by Country and  
                   Age Group     
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
% 
Under 25 26-35 36-55 Over 56 Mean
Age Groups
UK Germany Poland Romania
 
(Source: European Social Survey 2006 UK: N=2386, Germany: N= 2915, Poland: N= 1720, Romania: 
N= 2139) 
 
Figure 5.1 represents the response to the European Social Survey (ESS) 2006 question, 
‘How often have you volunteered in the past 12 months?’ by country and age group. 
The  positive  response  represents  the  percentage  of  those  who  stated  they  had 
volunteered regularly or occasionally during the past year. According to the figures, as 182 
 
could be expected from findings of previous studies on newer democracies (Howard 
2003,  Tworzecki  2008),  Poles  and  Romanians  appear  less  likely  to  volunteer  than 
respondents in the established democracies. This is particularly pronounced in the case 
of Poland and again this corresponds with existing study which has found Poles to be 
generally less involved in volunteering than other nationalities in Europe (Kolarska-
Bobińska 2007, Tworzecki 2008). However, it can be noted that, in Poland, in contrast 
to the other countries represented, the percentages of people volunteering decreases with 
age with the youngest cohort the most likely to volunteer. This is an interesting finding 
and as such requires greater analysis.  
 
5.2b (i) Poland  
 
In Poland the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) (2003) report on youth found 
that most young volunteers were involved in sports organisations and church related 
groups, with only 1% of volunteers involved in other types of organisation. The findings 
of  a  report  by  the  Polish  Centre  for  Volunteering  (Gumkowska  and  Herbst  2006) 
supported this and found that volunteers were mainly involved in organisations which 
help underprivileged people, religious organisations or local level groups such as the 
volunteer fire fighters.  
 
Indeed, the most significant voluntary participation amongst young people in Poland 
appears to be in organisations linked to the Catholic Church. As explained in chapter 
three, the organisational strength of the Catholic Church associations in Poland is well 
documented, and is often attributed to the role the Church played in supporting anti-
communist dissidence during the 1970s and 1980s. By the early 1990s, the church had 
established itself as the ‘largest actor in the voluntary sector’ (Millard 1999, p.119, 
Herbert 2003). In addition, the importance of these Catholic organisations for young 
people may be growing. For instance, the largest Catholic charity, Caritas Polski which 
helps the poor and elderly, estimated that its number of young volunteers had doubled 
between 2004-2006 (Najfeld 2006
138). Certainly, the involvement of young people in 
charitable  organisations  connected  to  the  church  was  confirmed  by  focus  group 
                                                           
138 However, this is also disputed by other studies which have suggested that the social organisations 
connected to the Catholic Church are becoming less attractive to young people (Sowa 2007). See chapter 
three section 3.3c(ii) for a discussion of young people and religious activity in Poland.  183 
 
respondents, a number of whom had participated in fund raising and helping out at 
hospitals. As discussed in chapter three there was some evidence that these volunteers 
were choosing this type of activity as an alternative to formal political participation and 
that their involvement had actually made them feel even more alienated from political 
agents as they felt that politicians simply did not care for the poor and needy
139.  
 
Youth participation in ‘cause-oriented’ organisations in Poland therefore appears very 
limited and according to the Polish Opinion Research Center (CBOS) (2003) Report 
constitutes less than one percent of those young people who volunteer. However despite 
this, studies suggest youth have a greater representation in interest groups and activist 
organisations than older cohorts (Gliński 1994, 2000 Klon/Jawor 2004).  For instance, 
the Klon/Jawor (2004) report on NGOs in Poland found that 61% of volunteers in these 
organisations  were  less  than  30  years  old.  This  suggests  that  although  youth 
participation in such organisations may be very low, it could be gradually increasing in 
comparison to older cohorts as the data in Figure 5.1 suggested.  
 
In contrast to the views of those who were involved in civic volunteering, the young 
people I interviewed who volunteered in interest groups or activist organisations were 
generally also politically motivated. One example was given by one of the founders (f, 
23  Warsaw)  of  Wybieram,pl
140  which  is  a  Warsaw  based  organisation  designed  to 
mobilise young people to vote. She explained that although she felt that politicians and 
political parties were unrepresentative of young people and that they often did not listen 
to the needs of the  electorate, that it was important that  young people realised that 
voting in an election was a democratic duty. She stated that she was not interested in 
joining a political party or becoming a politician but that her work for Wybieram.pl had 
made her more convinced of the need to be interested in political issues. A similar 
sentiment  was  expressed by  a  focus  group  respondent  in  Warsaw (m,  17) who had 
become  involved  in  the  NGO,  Centre  for  Citizenship  Education
141  which  organises 
various events across Poland to get young people involved in civic participation and 
voting.  He also said that this activity had made him more likely to vote and to follow 
                                                           
139 See section 3.3c(i) of chapter three.  
140 This translates as ‘I choose’. Wybieram. pl was founded before the 2005 elections and has gained a 
prominent public profile through TV adverts on MTV Polska, celebrity endorsement and road shows at 
summer music festivals.  
141 In Polish: Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej which has its headquarters in Warsaw.  184 
 
political issues, but again he did not envisage joining a party. These examples support 
the findings of studies in established democracies which have found that young people 
who  are  involved  in  organisations  which  have  specific  political  or  policy  goals  are 
likely to also be more interested and participative in political discussion and elections 
(Cross and Young 2008, Van Der Meer and Van Ingen 2009). However, although this 
suggests a link between voting and cause-oriented volunteering, as Cross and Young 
(2008) also found in their study of youth activists in Canada, volunteering does appear 
to act as an alternative rather than a supplement to party membership.  
 
5.2b (ii) Romania  
 
The  European  Social  Survey  (ESS)  2006  results  for  volunteering  in  Romania  (see 
Figure 5.1) are more difficult to interpret as they seem to follow more closely the trends 
in  the  established  democracies  than  in  Poland
142.  As  in  the  UK  and  Germany, 
volunteering  seems  to  peak  in  middle  age
143,  however  the  percentage  of  people 
volunteering differs little across age groups. This is an interesting finding as it contrasts 
with  Romanian  national  level  studies  which  have  found  a  much  lower  level  of 
volunteering in Romania among the youngest cohorts. For instance, the National Youth 
Authority (ANT)
144 (2007) Report found that only 11% of young people between 14-35 
years  had  ever  volunteered  and  the  British  Council/Gallup  (2004)  Report  on  young 
people between the ages of 15-35 found that only 13% of respondents had worked in a 
voluntary  organisation  over  the  last  12  months.  These  discrepancies  between  the 
European Social Survey (ESS) 2006 results and national data may be due to different 
interpretations of what is meant by volunteering. Indeed, from national level studies 
(Arpad/Pro Democracy 2008
145) it appears that the main types of volunteering, as in 
Poland, are civic or leisure based rather than cause-oriented. A possibility for the high 
                                                           
142 The higher percentage of positive response  for Romanians could be partly explained through  the 
numbers of Romanians who are members of trade unions. The Civil Society Development Foundation 
(CSDF) Report (2005) states that it has been estimated that up to a half of the working population in 
Romania is a  member of a trade union,  making this one of the highest trade union  memberships in 
Europe. 
143  This  corresponds  to  Norris’s  (2003)  study  of  established  democracies  which  found  volunteering 
peaked in middle age creating a curvilinear effect which suggested that the likelihood of volunteering was 
linked to the position of someone in their life-cycle.  
144 Autoritatea Naţională pentru Tineret. 
145 The Arpad/ Pro-Democracy (2008) report found that the most common types of voluntary organisation 
in  Romania  are  connected  with  sports  or  culture  (26%  of  the  total),  with  only  5%  concerned  with 
environmental protection, 7% with Human Rights and 3% with religion. 185 
 
level  of  positive  response  in  the  ESS  2006  would  therefore  be  that  respondents 
interpreted  the  question  as  including  sports  associations  and  cultural  organisations. 
Studies of young people in Romania have also confirmed that most volunteering is civic 
or leisure oriented. For instance, the National Youth Authority (ANT ) (2007) Report 
also found that the main types of volunteering for young people were in student and 
school organisations, sports associations and humanitarian organisations
146. Religious 
groups were less important as were ecological groups.  
 
In focus groups, similarly to in Poland, Romanian respondents who took part in civic 
volunteering  stressed  that  they  chose  this  because  they  felt  that  it  could  make  a 
difference  to  other  people’s  lives  and  because  they  felt  that  political  agents  were 
uninterested.  For  instance,  one  respondent  (f,18)  in  Oradea  explained  that  she 
volunteered  with  an  association  which  helped  people  by  going  into  hospitals.  She 
explained that her motivation was that the patients appreciated her work especially as no 
one  in  authority  cared  about  them.  She  said  that  she  felt  voting  could  make  no 
difference to the way politicians behave. This again suggests that civic volunteering 
could be seen as an ‘exit’ from political participation and in that instead of mobilising 
young volunteers to become more politically interested and involved, it may actually 
have the opposite effect.  
 
In contrast, although the numbers of young Romanians involved in interest groups and 
activist organisations appears low, as in Poland, qualitative findings suggest a positive 
link between  such  activity  and political  interest  and participation.  For  instance,  one 
interviewee  (f,18,  Oradea)  in  Romania  who  took  part  in  a  local-level  ecological 
organisation called Ecotop explained that her involvement in this group had made her 
realise that the activities of the organisation (demonstrations on Earth Day, cleaning up 
of local streams and attracting local press coverage) had two specific outcomes. One 
was that it had ‘awakened’ local people to environmental issues and the second that 
local politicians had been forced to take some notice. She claimed as a result it had 
made her more aware of local political issues and more inclined to vote.  
 
                                                           
146  The  Arpad/Pro-Democracy  (2008)  report  argues  that  the  prevalence  of  sports  and  culture 
organisations in Romania is due to the popularity of these during communism which has persisted, aided 
by the infrastructure which they enjoy at local level.  
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Similarly, young volunteers in all three localities who were involved in the national 
level association Pro-Democraţia (Pro-Democracy) which is concerned with increasing 
transparency  in  political  life  and  monitoring  of  elections,  also  stressed  that  their 
involvement in this organisation had increased their political awareness and interest. 
One volunteer (f, 22 Bucharest) explained why she felt young people were particularly 
attracted to Pro-Democraţia. She said that although it was structured like a political 
party, the attraction was that it was not involved in formal politics or tied to a particular 
party.  She  added  that  sometimes  party  members  also  took  part  in  Pro-Democraţia 
projects  but  that  young  people  very  rarely  moved  from  Pro-Democraţia  into  party 
activities.  This  supports  findings  in  established  democracies  and  in  Poland  which 
suggest  that  although  volunteering  in  cause-oriented  organisations  may  encourage 
greater political interest and participation, there is little evidence of a crossover from 
such activity to formal party membership (Cross and Young 2008).  
 
5.2c. Reasons for Low Levels of Cause-Oriented Volunteering in Poland and Romania  
 
From my qualitative research, two main reasons for such low levels of cause-oriented 
volunteering in Poland and Romania amongst young people can be identified. First, in 
both countries there is a notable lack of structure for such organisations particularly 
outside  the  capital  cities.  Second,  in  newer  democracies  democratic  voluntary 
participation  remains  a  relatively  new  concept  and  the  lack  of  experience  of  older 
cohorts in such activity means that the young cohort does not have the same degree of 
socialisation in this kind of participation as in established democracies.   
 
5.2c(i) Lack of Organisational Structure 
 
In their study of youth and social action in the UK, Roker and Eden (2002) found that 
young people very rarely formed their own voluntary organisations, even at local level. 
Indeed, the structure invariably was set up by a more formal organisation run by older 
people.  Therefore,  in  Poland  and  Romania  where  the  majority  of  cause-oriented 
organisations which do exist are concentrated in the capital cities or other areas with 187 
 
high levels of socioeconomic resources
147 the lack of local level organisational structure 
could be expected to pose an even greater barrier to youth involvement.  Indeed, this 
was supported by the respondents in focus groups in the smaller and less economically 
developed localities of Chełm in Poland and Alexandria in Romania, For instance, in 
Chełm, respondents said that apart from church charity groups, they did not know of 
any  other  type  of  organisation  in  the  locality.  In  Romania,  a  respondent  gave  the 
following opinion on the situation in Alexandria,  
 
‘Volunteering is good because you gain a lot of experience but there are not so many of 
these groups in Alexandria’. (f.17,Alexandria) 
 
The result of this concentration of voluntary organisations in large cities or in areas 
which have high levels of social and economic resources is that the young people who 
are involved in these organisations are also often those with high levels of resources. In 
both countries studies have confirmed that volunteers generally have very high levels of 
educational  attainment  (Klon/Jawor  2004,  Civil  Society  Development  Foundation 
(CSDF) 2005). This suggests that as in established democracies, the young people who 
are involved in cause-oriented volunteering often constitute a specific elite of politically 
motivated young people. However, in newer democracies the concentration of these 
organisations in large urban areas and the dearth of such structure at local level may 
mean the gap in resources between those who participate and those who do not is even 
wider. This is particularly problematic given that at local level the only organisations 
for young people are often leisure or civic based and as suggested in section 5.2b, this 
participation may actually serve to increase alienation from political agents and make 
young volunteers more inclined to opt out of political participation altogether. 
 
 
 
                                                           
147 In both countries studies have shown that around one third of the total voluntary organisations which 
exist  are  located  in  the  capital.  In  Poland  the  Klon/Jawor  (2004)  study  of  NGOs  and  voluntary 
associations  found  that  18%  of  these  were  based  in  Warsaw.  Similarly,  in  Romania,  the  2005  Civil 
Society  Development  Foundation  (CSDF)  Report  found  that  two  thirds  of  the  total  voluntary 
organisations are based in urban centres and of these around 18% are based in Bucharest. It also found 
that 20% of the organisations were based in the North-West of Romania.  
147 The Civil Society Development Foundation (CDSF) (2007) Report found that over 20% of voluntary 
organisations were based in the North West, which is higher than in Bucharest (18%). 188 
 
5.2c (ii) Lack of Experience 
 
In post-communist countries, the lack of organisational structure of interest groups and 
activist  organisations  is  coupled  with  the  legacy  of  forced  participation  during 
communist  times  which  means  that  cause-oriented  volunteering  remains  a  relatively 
new  concept  in  Poland  and  Romania.  For  example,  Musiała  (2005)  describes  how, 
despite laws which recognise volunteering in Poland, the societal transition to accepting 
voluntary  activity  as  part  of  a  functioning  democracy  is  an  ongoing  process.  In 
particular, it is suggested that the lack of experience of older people means that younger 
cohorts do not have the same possibilities for discussing and learning about this kind of 
participation from parents as in established democracies (Youniss et al. 2002, Horowitz 
2005).  In  established  democracies,  research  suggests  that  political  socialisation 
processes through parents who have existing experience in cause-oriented participation 
are important pre-cursors to youth involvement (Cross and Young 2008). 
 
Certainly, the low levels of older people participating in cause-oriented volunteering in 
Poland and Romania support this argument of a ‘vacuum’ in experience (Mendelson 
and Glenn 2002, Howard 2003, Rose-Ackerman 2005). However the extent to which 
this impacts on the participation of young people is debatable. In interviews in both 
Poland and Romania, people involved in such voluntary organisations argued that the 
lack of experience of older people could act as a barrier to young people becoming 
involved. This was particularly the case in Romania, where volunteers in Youth Action 
for Peace, an NGO in Oradea designed to promote tolerance and fight racism stressed 
that it was very difficult to recruit young volunteers as their parents often tried to stop 
them becoming involved as they saw such activity as a waste of time. Yet, even in 
established  democracies  the  strength  of  parents  as  political  socialisation  agents  is 
questionable (Hahn 1998). Indeed, it is often contended that a wide range of interrelated 
factors  can  contribute  to  how  a  young person  learns  about  and  experiences politics 
(Hahn 1998, Shea and Green 2006).  In newer democracies, the relative strengths of 
these factors remains understudied. In particular, it has been suggested that schools and 
the  media  may  have  a  substantially  different  role  in  mobilising  young  people  to 
participate to that in established democracies (Horowitz 2005, Hahn and Alviar-Martin 
2008).  This is a question which requires in-depth and detailed research beyond the 
remit of the present study. However, these findings suggest that both structural and 189 
 
cultural factors play a role in explaining the reasons behind the widespread ‘exit’ from 
cause-oriented volunteering amongst young people in Poland and Romania.  
 
This section has shown that, as hypothesised, levels of youth participation in voluntary 
activities in both Poland and Romania are generally low in comparison to established 
democracies.  In  addition,  the  voluntary  activities  young  people  are  most  likely  to 
participate in are those of a civic nature rather than cause-oriented. The findings suggest 
that  the  reasons  for  low  levels  of  cause-oriented  volunteering  are  similar  in  both 
countries and are mainly based on the lack of organisational structure at local level and 
the ongoing legacies of forced participation during communism. My findings give little 
support for the hypothesis that higher socioeconomic levels in Poland  would mean 
higher levels of youth informal participation. However, they do suggest that in both 
countries socioeconomic resources are important factors in determining participation in 
cause-oriented volunteering.   
 
5.3 Youth Participation in Protest Activities  
 
As discussed in Section 5.1, different theories exist as to why people are mobilised to 
protest at certain times. These often focus on the role of individual resources and on 
political  opportunity  structures  and  constraints
148  which  can  enable  or  suppress 
mobilisation. The stable elements of political opportunity structures vary from country 
to  country  and  have  an  important  influence  on  the  possibilities  for  mobilisation 
(Gamson and Meyer 1996, Klandermans 1997, Tarrow 1998, Della Porta and Diani 
2006). Thus, in countries with a history of protest and where protest is not severely 
curtailed  by  the  authorities,  political  opportunities  to  participate  should  be  more 
favourable than in countries with a history of repression and authoritarianism (Tarrow 
1998). However, this opening up of political opportunities does not necessarily lead to 
collective  action.  Indeed,  in  established  democracies,  studies  have  pointed  to  a 
‘normalisation’ of protest over recent decades, where authorities have learned to accept 
protest  as  part  of  everyday  activity  (Van  Aelst  and  Walgrave  2001,  Tarrow  1998). 
                                                           
148 Political opportunity structures can be understood as a range of different institutional, cultural and 
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involvement (Gamson and Meyer 1996, Tarrow 1998, Tilly 2004). Over time these opportunities may 
increase or decrease depending on the existence of constraints such as political repression which can act 
to contract opportunities and instability in political leadership which is likely to increase opportunities 
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Although this lowers individual costs and risks for participants, it is argued that it also 
means protest is often less contentious than in a country where the costs and risks of 
participation  are  higher.  Indeed  in  countries  where  participation  channels  are  more 
‘blocked’ by political constraints such as repression and corruption by authorities, the 
potential  for  contentious  mobilisation  and  revolutionary  activities  may  be  higher 
(Tarrow 1998, Tucker 2007
149). 
 
In post-communist democracies, the transition to democracy necessarily opened formal 
channels for democratic protest activities, however the extent to which these activities 
have become ‘normalised’ as in established democracies is less clear. In addition, there 
is  little  understanding  as  to  whether  the  attitudes  towards  protest  are  changing  in 
relation to the youngest cohorts. Existing studies have argued that a legacy of repression 
of dissidence during communism have left post-communist citizens reluctant to become 
involved  in public protest  unless  it  is  for  industrial  action  (Ekiert  and  Kubik 1998, 
Kramer 2002, Bernhagen and Marsh 2007). However, as explained in section 5.1, this 
could  also  be  expected  to  differ  depending  on  country-specific  factors  such  as 
organisation of dissidence during communism and the nature of repression of protest by 
authorities.  As such, this section will test the hypothesis that successful and organised 
anti-communist dissidence in Poland opened up political opportunity structures which 
give potential for ‘normalised’ protest activities. In Romania, in contrast, the lack of 
organised dissidence during communism, followed by violently repressed protest in the 
early  1990s  continues  to  place  constraints  on  protest  participation  amongst  young 
people.   
 
The following section first employs descriptive statistics, qualitative data and findings 
of existing studies to outline how the levels and nature of youth participation in protest 
activities in Poland and Romania compare to those of older age groups and participation 
rates  in  established  democracies.  Then,  using  qualitative  data,  I  assess  the  reasons 
behind these participation patterns and test the hypothesis that contrasting legacies of 
anti-communist  dissidence  and  post-communist  political  contexts  in  Poland  and 
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Ukraine  and  Kyrgyzstan  between  2000  and  2005  where  political  constraints  had  depressed  political 
participation by prohibitively increasing costs for participants but then disputed elections and widespread 
electoral fraud triggered mass unrest and collective action. 191 
 
Romania provide different sets of political opportunity structures and constraints for 
youth protest participation in each country.  
 
5.3a. How Participation in Protest Compares across Countries and Age Groups  
 
In established democracies studies have shown a rise in recent years in the participation 
of  people  of  all  ages,  and  particularly  young  people
150  in  protest  activities  such  as 
demonstrating, petitioning and boycotting (Tarrow 1998, Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001, 
Norris 2002, Bernhagen and Marsh 2007). This is in stark contrast to falling rates of 
involvement  in  formal  political  participation  and  in  particular  in  political  party 
membership.  However,  in  newer  democracies,  research  has  suggested  that  over  the 
same period, involvement in protest activities, which was already at low levels, has 
fallen amongst the adult population (Bernhagen and Marsh 2007). As there is a lack of 
study  of  protest  participation  over  time  across  the  youngest  cohorts  in  newer 
democracies, it is not clear whether this trend can also be observed for this age group. 
Indeed,  measuring  participation  in  protest  activities  at  a  given  time  is  made  more 
problematic by the nature of this type of involvement. Participation in protest is likely to 
be episodic and to vary significantly in intensity from low-cost (signing a petition) to 
high-cost (organising a demonstration)
151. However, by combining quantitative survey 
response and qualitative data, I aim to control for some of these variations and draw up 
a  comparative  overview  of  protest  participation  by  young  people  in  Poland  and 
Romania.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
150 For example see Norris (2002, 2003), Kimberlee (2002), Quintelier (2007), Shea and Green (2006), 
Sloam (2007). 
151 Protest is often seen to come in cycles of contention which increase rapidly and then later disperse 
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Figure 5.2: Participated in a Lawful Demonstration in last 12 Months by Country and  
                   Age Group 
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(Source: European Social Survey 2006UK: N=2386, Germany: N= 2915, Poland: N= 1720, 
 Romania: N= 2139) 
Figure 5.3: Signed a Petition in last 12 Months by Country and Age Group 
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(Source: European Social Survey 2006 UK: N=2386, Germany: N= 2915, Poland: N= 1720,  
Romania: N= 2139) 193 
 
Figure 5.4: Boycotted a Product in the last 12 months by Country and Age Group 
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(Source:  European  Social  Survey  2006UK:  N=2386,  Germany:  N=2915,  Poland:  N=1720,  Romania: 
N=2139) 
 
The three figures above show the results for the European Social Survey (ESS) 2006 
questions  on  involvement  in  the  last  12  months  in  three  types  of  protest  actions, 
participation in a lawful demonstration (Figure 5.2), signing a petition (Figure 5.3) and 
boycotting a product (Figure 5.4). These are shown for the UK, Germany, Poland and 
Romania and by age group. We can see that participation is higher in the established 
democracies than in Poland and Romania for all three types of action, and that this is 
particularly pronounced for petitioning and boycotting. These findings support existing 
studies which have shown the most frequent type of protest action in newer democracies 
to be demonstrations and strikes with very low levels of participation in more ‘modern’ 
types of protest such as petitions and boycotts (Ekiert and Kubik 1998, Kideckel 2001, 
Sum and Bădescu 2004).  In Romania, the most frequent type of protest activity is 
demonstrating, while levels of response for signing a petition and boycotting a product 
are very low. In Poland, levels of demonstrating appear lower than in Romania, but 
there is relatively more participation in petitions and boycotting.  
 
For  all  three  types  of  action,  the  figures  suggest  that  although  young  people  in 
established democracies are not necessarily participating more than older cohorts, the 194 
 
difference in participation levels between age groups is much less pronounced than for 
political party membership
152. This gives support to the argument that young people 
may  be  more  interested  in  this  type  of  direct  action  than  in  traditional  forms  of 
participation.  In  the  newer  democracies,  however,  such  trends  are  less  pronounced. 
Indeed, in Poland, as for volunteering (see figure 5.1), the figures suggest that young 
people are more participative in all three types of protest actions than older age groups. 
In Romania, the levels of participation in the more ‘modern’ types of protest (signing a 
petition  and  boycotting)  are  similarly  low  for  all  age  groups  and  the  youngest  age 
groups  appear  to  have  similar  levels  of  demonstrating  as  older  age  groups.  These 
findings suggest that the way  in which  young people in Poland  are participating in 
protest may contrast slightly with that of older age groups. This possibility is explored 
further in section 5.3d. For Romania, the findings suggest a universally high level of 
‘exit’ from protest activities across all age groups. The reasons behind this are assessed 
in more detail in section 5.3e. 
 
5.3b. Nature of Youth Protest in Poland and Romania 
 
Although rates of youth participation in protest actions in Poland and Romania appear 
notably low in comparison to rates in established democracies, it is still necessary to try 
and establish what types of issue are likely to provoke protest amongst young people in 
these countries.  
 
The most well publicised protest actions involving youth in both Poland and Romania 
are the periodic and controversial street demonstrations carried out by far right wing 
organisations  (Minkenberg  2002,  Kopecký  2003,  Mudde  2005).  Particularly,  these 
groups  are  known  for  their  nationalistic  and  homophobic  demonstrations  which  are 
often  staged  as  a  reaction  to  gay  pride  marches
153.  However,  the  number  of  young 
people who actually engage in such activities is believed to be limited and as such the 
                                                           
152 See chapter four, section 4.3a(i).  
153 In Poland these are known as ‘Normality’ parades and are often counter-demonstrations to Tolerance 
Parades organised by LGBT groups. They include members of the far right organisation, National Radical 
Camp (ONR). Gazeta Wyborcza reports that at the 2005 Normality Parade skin heads dressed in black 
carried Polish flags, shouted ‘Zero tolerance for homosexuals’ and carried placards which read, ‘deviants’ 
and other homophobic slogans (Szacki 2005). The Romanian parades are also organised as a reaction to 
LGBT parades and are often attended by the far right group, Noua Dreaptă. Of the 2007 parades, the 
media reported that they were attended by young people who were hooded, dressed all in black who 
threw stones, eggs, rubbish and tomatoes (Iancu and Popescu 2007).  195 
 
media reports can be seen to exaggerate the representation of young people who are 
involved (Mudde 2005). Indeed, the minority nature of these groups was also supported 
by focus group respondents who saw the activists in these organisations as comprising 
an isolated group of anti-democratic extremists. Only in Oradea in Romania, did some 
respondents  know  about  the  existence  of  such  organisations  at  a  local  level.  One 
respondent explained,  
 
‘There is something called the New Right, its kind of neo- Nazi. Its just a few people, I 
don’t  like  it,  they  are  very young. I  don’t  know  what  they  do. I suppose  they fight 
against things, they find something to fight against. I think they are foolish. They wear 
some army clothes and things like that. Very immature’ (f,18, Oradea) 
 
In the other localities, the respondents only knew of far right organisations involving 
young people from media reports. 
 
The  other  causes  mentioned  by  focus  group  respondents  in  Poland  which  have 
mobilised  collective  protest  action  amongst  young  people  were  the  2006  student 
demonstrations  against  the  appointment  of  the  new  education  minister,  Roman 
Giertych
154, and anti-abortion demonstrations.  
 
In Romania, focus group participants in both Oradea and Bucharest explained that the 
most common cause for participation in demonstrations or signing petitions amongst 
young  people  was  for  the  improvement  of  services  to  students.  For  instance,  one 
respondent described such a protest in which he had been involved,  
 
‘We have never had a demonstration on the streets but in the students association we 
had a protest across the whole country about problems in universities and we decided 
to make that protest on paper. It was like a petition, we tried to get some signatures 
from some people in other cities who were protesting about the same things’  
(m, 20, Oradea) 
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When asked about participation in protests for causes of ‘new social movements’ such 
as the environment or anti-globalisation, the focus groups in both countries stated that 
they had no personal experience of participating in these and they were unaware of them 
happening in their localities.  
 
5.3c. Why such Low Levels of Involvement in Protest Activities?  
 
As we have seen, young people in both Poland and Romania have generally very low 
rates  of  involvement  in  protest  activities  in  comparison  to  their  counterparts  in 
established democracies. However, at least in Poland, there is limited evidence that the 
present  young  cohort,  who  are  too  young  to  have  been  politically  socialised  under 
communism may be more likely to participate in such actions than older cohorts. In 
Romania,  young  people  do  not  generally  show  a  similar  tendency.  The  following 
section  first  assesses  the  general  reasons  behind  such  low  levels  of  involvement  in 
protest activities amongst young people in Poland and Romania. Then, by analysing the 
case study of the 2006 demonstrations against the appointment of the new education 
minister in Poland, I question whether this episode represents a turning point in how 
young people in Poland participate politically. Finally, I assess some country-specific 
factors  which  help  to  explain  the  low  rates  of  protest  participation  amongst  young 
people in Romania.  
 
5.3c(i) Association with Labour Disputes/Protests by Economic ‘Losers’ 
 
In  both  Poland  and  Romania,  focus  groups  respondents  predominately  associated 
protest activities with economic or labour disputes by disadvantaged workers rather than 
with the causes of new social movements. In both countries, these workers’ protests 
were often seen as desperate acts by people who faced with job cuts or low wages, had 
nothing more to lose. In Romania, in particular, respondents were quick to stress that 
they felt protesting was a last resort activity. For example, one respondent stated,  
 
‘People who protest are desperate, they haven’t got enough money’ (m. 18, Oradea) 
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Another explained,  
 
‘The only time to protest is if things get so bad and your job won’t be there any more’ 
(f. 23, Oradea)  
 
In Poland, respondents also illustrated how they mainly associated protesting with 
labour disputes. One explained,  
 
‘Some people  do  that  kind  of  thing (protesting) if  there  is  a problem  about pay or 
something, but it doesn’t really make much difference’ (m. 29 Chełm) 
 
Another said,  
 
‘Doctors and nurses have been protesting for weeks about pay and the government does 
nothing.  In  fact  they  went  on  holiday  and  said  nothing  could  be  done  until  after, 
basically they said we don’t care, work for nothing, go piss off to England’ (m. 25 
Bielsko-Biała) 
 
This linking of protest in newer democracies with labour disputes rather than for any 
other aim reflects the experience of post-communist societies which have necessarily 
faced radical changes in the industrial and public sectors which have in turn led to large 
scale  redundancies  and  economic  hardship.  Indeed,  in  the  first  period  of  post-
communism, these societies faced regular strikes and demonstrations by workers (Ekiert 
and Kubik 1998, Kideckel 2001, Kramer 2002). However, it is also evident from the 
statements above that these young people do not associate themselves with the people 
who take part in these labour disputes. Indeed they appear to see them as economic 
‘losers’ who are protesting to desperately plead with the authorities to give them their 
jobs back. This may indicate a generational contrast between how young people see 
their own identity and how they view older cohorts. This is particularly evident in how 
they  see  themselves  in  relation  to  political  agents  (politicians  and  political  parties). 
Although many young people in Poland and Romania, like older cohorts, frequently feel 
dissatisfied and unrepresented by political agents
155, the nature of this dissatisfaction 
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appears  to  contrast  with  the  findings  of  existing  studies  on  older  people  in  post-
communist countries (Rose and Munro 2003, Tworzecki 2003, Howard 2003). Unlike 
older people who often had great hopes for life after communism, these young people 
do not feel the bitter disappointment brought on by the economic difficulties of life 
under post-communism. Instead as they have no basis for contrast, they appear to show 
a greater acceptance that they can only rely on themselves to make changes for their 
own lives. In this way, they appear to expect even less of political agents than older 
cohorts, and this often manifests itself in a complete ‘exit’ from political participation in 
favour of concentration on their private lives. One of the clearest ways in which this was 
expressed in focus groups in both countries was the ability for young people to decide 
on  their  own  future  by  migrating  abroad.  For  instance,  in  Poland,  one  respondent 
explained,  
 
‘There is no point in doing much here just now. It is better to go away to another 
country and find work and make money for yourself and your family’ (f, 25, Chełm) 
 
Similarly in Romania, a focus group respondent explained,  
 
‘The old people – they just moan and they don’t want to try and change anything for 
themselves. They just want things to be as they were and to stay like that. That’s why 
young people, the smart ones, go abroad’ (f, 17, Oradea) 
 
These  views  suggest  that  instead  of  seeing  themselves  as  dependent  on  policies  of 
political agents, these young people feel that, as politicians and parties can do nothing 
for them, their decisions in life should be taken independently of wider politics. This 
supports  earlier  findings  of  a  ‘separation’  between  politics  and  society  in  post-
communist countries (Howard 2003). However this adamant rejection of people who 
protest  for  economic  reasons  as  desperate  and  dependent  on  political  agents  also 
indicates that this gap may be increasing with generational renewal.  
 
5.3c(ii) ‘New Social Movement’ Protests as a Luxury for Prosperous Times  
 
In  both  countries,  a  number  of  focus  group  respondents  expressed  the  opinion  that 
protesting for non-economic causes was generally something that people did in other, 199 
 
richer countries and that at present people in their countries were more concerned with 
immediate issues such as making money. For example, one respondent in Poland gave 
the following opinion,  
 
‘It’s not a priority to demonstrate and things now, when things get better for jobs etc. 
then it might change’ (m, 20 Warsaw) 
 
Similar views were given by respondents in Romania,  
 
‘There is even less point in that. The problem is economic. People need better jobs and 
more money and if we can’t change that then  why spend time protesting about the 
environment’ (m, 18, Bucharest) 
 
‘People campaigning about environmental problems is something that happens in 
richer countries, there is no point in that here. It is about jobs here’ (f,18 Oradea) 
  
These materialist views, in that they stress the importance of basic living and working 
conditions,  of  these  young  people  in  Poland  and  Romania  provide  an  interesting 
contrast with that of the findings of studies in established democracies which stress an 
increasing  interest  in  participation  in  activities  which  reflect  post-material  value 
systems, particularly amongst younger and more educated citizens (Inglehart 1997, Van 
Aelst and Walgrave 2001, Norris 2002, Della Porta and Diani 2006). Indeed, that these 
young people would have more materialistic views than their counterparts in established 
democracies could be expected given the more difficult economic and social situation 
(Arts and Halman 2004). However, it is particularly interesting to note how these young 
people, many of whom are well-educated, and have had a much broader access to media 
and travel than the older cohorts, do not appear to identify any closer with post-material 
protestors  in  the  established  democracies  than  with  those  who protest  for  economic 
reasons in their own countries. One explanation for this may be that as protest activities 
have  not  reached  the  same  level  of  normalisation  in  Poland  and  Romania  as  in 
established  democracies,  young  people  do  not  perceive  the  same  opportunities  to 
participate in such activities. Indeed, reports have suggested that the media coverage of 
protest  in  these  countries  tends  to  focus  on  economic  protest  and  to  frame  these 200 
 
protesters as rebellious and anti-democratic (Bush 2004, Ost 2005
156). This is a contrast 
with  the  situation  in  established  democracies  where  the  normalisation  of  protest 
activities has arguably  made protest seem an integral part of democracy rather than 
acting as a threat to its existence (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001, Della Porta and Diani 
2006).  
 
This association of protest activities with either economic ‘losers’ or with people in 
richer countries means many young people in Poland and Romania simply ‘exit’ from 
such participation, preferring instead to concentrate on their private lives. However, in 
spite of these general similarities between the countries, it is also necessary to assess 
how  the  potential  for  young  people  to  become  more  involved  in  protest  activities 
compares  in  each  country.  To  do  this,  in  the  following  sections  I  look  at  country-
specific factors which analyse the different political opportunities and constraints on 
participation which exist in Poland and Romania.  
 
5.3d  A  Case  Study:  The  2006  Student  Demonstrations  in  Poland  against  the 
Appointment of Roman Giertych as Education Minister 
 
The  student  demonstrations  against  the  appointment  of  the  new  education  minister, 
Roman Giertych, across Poland during 2006 provide a rare example of mass collective 
action  by  young  people.  In  the  following  sections  I  first  outline  and  analyse  the 
background to these protests and question which factors, given the generally very low 
levels  of  youth  participation  in  protest  activities  in  Poland,  came  together  in  this 
instance  to  mobilise  young  people  into  collective  action.  I  then  assess  whether  this 
episode suggests the potential for a change in the way in which young people in Poland 
conceive of and interact with politics. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
156  Ost  (2005)  explains  how  participants  in  workers  protests  are  portrayed  by  the  Polish  media  as 
‘irrational hotheads’ and an anti-democratic force, In Romania, the violent methods used by miners both 
in the crushing of student anti-government protests in 1990 and later in economic protests has meant that 
this media portrayal of protestors as rebellious and anti-democratic is even more stark than in Poland 
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5.3d(i) The Background  
 
In September 2005, the Polish parliamentary elections were won by two centre-right, 
post-Solidarity parties, Law and Justice (PiS) and Civic Platform (PO). By November 
2005, these parties had failed to negotiate a coalition government and as a result PiS 
formed a minority government supported by two smaller radical parties, the agrarian–
based,  populist,  Samoobrona  and  the  right-wing,  nationalistic,  League  of  Polish 
Families  (LPR)
157.  In  May  2006,  these  three  parties  formally  created  a  coalition 
government. The policies of this new government were controversial (Jasiewicz 2008). 
It relied on a rhetoric which emphasised the need for the return to traditional, catholic 
morals and the purging of communist elements from Polish society.  They were also 
seen as anti-European and distrustful of civil society. This rhetoric which attacked what 
Law  and  Justice  (PiS)  saw  as  ‘liberal’  elements  of  Polish  society,  created  a  clear 
separation within the Polish political classes which in turn resonated with particular 
groups in society (Szczerbiak 2007). Kolarska–Bobińska (2007) argues that for the first 
time since 1989, the rhetoric used by the PiS-led government meant many educated 
people  with  liberal  values  across  Poland  felt  their  core  values  and  beliefs  were 
threatened. In particular, groups of public sector workers such as teachers, on hearing 
this rhetoric, began to fear that the new government’s policies would infringe on their 
autonomy.  As a result, from 2005, collective actions such as demonstrations and open-
letters by this educated, middle class increased. Unlike the more common economic 
protests, these had broader ideological demands based on human rights, tolerance and 
the freedom of civil society. However, despite this important increase and change in 
generalised collective action, it was the appointment of the leader of the League of 
Polish Families (LPR), Roman Giertych, as new education minister in May 2006 which 
was to produce the most intensive protests and importantly signal the beginning of a 
period of collective mobilisation amongst young people.  
 
Giertych was already a well known figure, having refounded the nationalist, right wing 
youth party, All-Polish Youth (MW) in 1989. He held a reputation as a supporter of 
conservative Catholicism and was an out-spoken homophobe and anti-abortionist. There 
were  also  suggestions  of  him  being  an  anti-semite  (Repa  2006).  The  day  after  his 
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appointment,  several  hundred  young  demonstrators  marched  through  Warsaw 
demanding  his  removal  from  the  post  (Czeladko  and  Kwaśniewski  2006).  In  the 
following months the demonstrations in Warsaw grew and protests by school students 
and university students as well as some teachers erupted across the country. Reports 
suggest  that  these  protests  varied  from  a  few  hundred  people  to  a  few  thousand 
participants
158.As  these  demonstrations  multiplied,  there  were  also  counter 
demonstrations  organised  by  supporters  of  The  League  of  Polish  Families  (LPR), 
members of All-Polish Youth and students in favour of Giertych. However, these were 
generally on a smaller scale than the anti-Giertych movement
159.  
 
Although the fervour and size of the demonstrations in May and June died down after it 
became evident that Giertych was to stay as minister, in the months which followed his 
educational policy changes provoked further protest. A last minute alteration to the high 
school  leaving  exam,  the  Matura,  again  saw  protest  by  school  students  across  the 
country and his pledges to keep homophobia out of schools and to customise reading 
lists to make sure Polish children only read books which were ‘suitable’ and promoted 
patriotism continued to anger many young people (Kość 2006).  
 
Many  of  the  student  demonstrations  were  organised  under  the  auspices  of  the 
organisation,  Student’s  Initiative  (IU)  but  numerous  other  movements  also  emerged 
such as ‘Giertych Must Go’
160. Characteristically these demonstrations were organised 
through the internet and by SMS (Czeladko and Kwaśniewski 2006)
161. Along with the 
demonstrations, an open letter was organised through the internet and sent to the Prime 
Minister demanding the resignation of Roman Giertych. It had around 60000 signatures 
which  were  mainly  school  and  university  students  but  also  included  politicians, 
academics and writers (Czeladko 2006). 
 
 
                                                           
158 For example, the second protest in Warsaw attracted around 2000 people and one in Katowice around 
1000. See Czeladko (2006) and Czeladko and Kwaśniewski (2006). 
159 Wprost (20th May 2006) reports that pro-Giertych demonstrations  took place in  various cities  in 
Poland. Common slogans at these read, ‘Giertych must stay’, ‘Stop Left-wing Indoctrination’ and ‘the 
Education  Minister  is  100%  right’.  They  were  generally  of  a  smaller  scale  than  the  anti-Giertych 
demonstrations, attracting a few hundred people at most.  
160 In Polish Giertych Musi Odejść. 
161  Organisation  through  the  internet  involved  sending  multiple  emails  and  also  the  Polish  social 
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5.3d(iii) Why did such Mobilisation Occur?  
 
The  appointment  of  Roman  Giertych  as  Education  Minister  acted  as  a  trigger  for 
sustained collective mobilisation by young people in Poland. Given the generally high 
levels of ‘exit’ amongst young people from all forms of political participation, it is 
important to understand which factors interrelated in this unique instance to provoke 
such  action.  One  way  of  unpacking  these  factors  is  to  employ  Norris’s  (2003) 
framework  of  targets,  repertoires  and  agencies.  This  can  help  to  explain  how  this 
specific combination of individuals, organisations and events resulted in young Poles 
taking to the streets.   
 
The initial target of the protests in 2006 was the new Education Minister, Giertych. The 
main demand made by demonstrators was for his immediate resignation
162. However, as 
the protests intensified the targets also broadened. In addition to Giertych’s resignation, 
protestors  began  to  also  target  the  wider  policies  of  the  Law  and  Justice  (PiS)-led 
government  and  to  demand  respect  of  human  rights  and  tolerance  (Czeladko  and 
Kwaśniewski 2006). This signified the transition from a contentious episode to a more 
sustained social movement (Tarrow 1998). This expansion in the range of targets was 
achieved through a well-organised structure of effective repertoires and agencies.  
 
One of the reasons for the successful mobilisation of young people was the affiliations 
and networks which formed between the organisations and groups (agencies) behind the 
demonstrations.  The  organisation  Student’s  Initiative  (IU)  which  brought  together 
school students into a wider association prided itself on being non-hierarchical, self-
governing  and  making  it  straightforward  for  interested  parties  to  form  their  own 
sections across the country. By providing a support mechanism for young people to 
organise  protests,  this  organisation  effectively  reduced  the  costs  and  obstacles  for 
individual  young people  to participate.  In  addition,  it  formed  loose  affiliations with 
other  organisations  such  as  the  Federation  of  Anarchists,  the  Red  Collective  (an 
alternative Socialist organisation) and the Young Greens all of which took part in the 
various anti-Giertych demonstrations. Such networks have long been found to be crucial 
elements  in  recruiting  participants  and  in  sustaining  contentious  activity  (Diani  and 
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McAdam 2003, Della Porta and Diani 2006). Unusually, the appointment of Roman 
Giertych appears to have offered this usually diverse range of youth organisations a 
common target. One key to how this issue had become such a hot topic capable of 
encouraging  such  mobilisation  is  in  the  way  in  which  these  organisations  used  the 
media and other forms of mass communication (repertoires) to link the appointment of 
Giertych to wider issues of tolerance and human rights and to make these seem personal 
to young people.  
 
Young  people  were  mobilised  to  protest  through  new  technologies  such  as  mobile 
phones and the internet as well as through word of mouth. However, it was the use of 
the more traditional forms of media, such as newspapers and television which created 
the sense of urgency and collective involvement so vital for developing and sustaining 
mass contentious action (Gamson and Meyer 1996, Tarrow 1998). The liberal press, and 
in particular, the popular daily newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza seized the opportunity of 
the rise in demonstrations by young people to report extensively on the threat Giertych’s 
policies and actions posed for liberal democracy (Kość 2006). Although much of this 
was done through ridicule of Mr. Giertych and the Kaczyński twins, leaders of Law and 
Justice  (PiS),  it  still  managed  to  create  a  sense  that  for  young  people  ousting  this 
government  was  a  priority.  Particularly,  the  intolerance  and  anti-Europeanisation  of  
Law and Justice (PiS) and the League of Polish Families (LPR) was seen by many 
young people, at this point so close after accession to the European Union in 2004, as 
potentially  threatening  to  democracy  in  Poland  and  therefore  to  their  own  personal 
futures. Suggestions of how these issues had resonated with young people were given 
by respondents in my focus groups.  
 
For instance one respondent in Warsaw stated,  
 
‘It is shameful that people like him (Giertych) are allowed to represent Poland. It makes 
everyone think that Polish people are racist and homophobic’ (m. 17, Warsaw) 
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Another explained,  
 
‘We can be seen as a bit of joke. Did you see that our government wanted to ban a 
children’s cartoon because they thought it was gay? But there are more serious things 
behind that’ (m. 18, Bielsko- Biała) 
 
These views suggest that the artificial cleavage in Polish society between liberal and 
social elements
163 which had emerged as a result of the election of Law and Justice 
(PiS),  provided  a  ready-made  frame  for  the  opinions  of  young  people  towards 
politicians at the time. However, it was only when Giertych was elected and young 
people felt that their own futures were threatened did these factors combine to produce 
mass mobilisation amongst youth.  
 
5.23(iv) Legacies of the Anti-Giertych Protests for Polish Youth   
 
An episode of sustained mass protest such as in Poland in 2006 is likely to open up 
political opportunities to a range of other actors such as counter–protestors and elites 
who may also seize these opportunities (Tarrow 1998). It may also leave legacies for 
future cycles of contention, where similar, practised repertoires are used to form the 
basis  for  mobilisation  against  different  targets  (Koopmans  2004).  The  student 
demonstrations  of  2006  in  Poland  offered  a  rare  instance  where  young  people 
recognised and acted upon expanding political opportunities to participate politically. 
However, the degree to which this can be seen as a turning point for how young people 
interact with politics is debatable.  
 
First, there is some evidence that the protests also opened up opportunities for young 
counter-protestors who supported the conservative, patriotic policies of the Law and 
Justice (PiS)–led government
164. This, ‘them and us’ division amongst young people, of 
those who were ‘for’ Giertych and those who were ‘against’ Giertych appeared, at least 
amongst focus group participants, to have had the effect of promoting greater debate 
and  discussion  on  political  issues.  For  instance,  one  focus  group  participant  (m,18 
Warsaw) explained that he felt it was right that Giertych promoted a greater degree of 
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patriotism and respect for religion within schools; however he did not agree with the 
‘censorship’ of which books should be read in classrooms. This point of view was then 
disputed  by  another  focus  group  member  and  an  active  discussion  ensued.  One 
participant explained to me,  
 
‘Sorry, this is what we are like now, always arguing about these things’ (f, 18, Warsaw) 
 
Another consequence of this heightened interest in political issues and debate may be 
seen  in  the  considerably  higher  turnout  of  young  people  in  the  2007  parliamentary 
elections which ousted Law and Justice (PiS) and its coalition partners from power
165. 
Young people became involved in numerous campaigns on the internet and by SMS to 
mobilise the vote against PiS
166. In this way, these elections can be seen as an extension 
of  the  liberal-based  protest  against  Law  and  Justice  (PiS).  Indeed,  this  was  also 
supported  by  my  qualitative  research  during  2006/2007  where  many  focus  group 
respondents who were sceptical about the PiS-led government’s policies indicated that 
these protests and the ensuing polarised debate meant that they would be more likely to 
turn out to vote against PiS and its coalition partners at the next election.  
 
However, given the unique circumstances of the anti-Giertych demonstrations which 
provided a clear target for young people in the shape of the appointment of an extremely 
controversial education minister, it seems unlikely that these protests alone will have 
been able to counteract the reasons behind the generally very low levels of political 
participation  amongst  Polish  youth.    In  addition,  although  these  protests  took  place 
across the country, the protestors were mainly those young people with high levels of 
educational resources. Therefore these protests can tell us little about the potential for 
more  wide-ranging  youth  participation  across  all  social  groups.  Nonetheless,  these 
demonstrations do illustrate a potential for a well-resourced group of young people to 
become  politically  active  when  they  feel  sufficiently  interested  and  engaged  in  a 
particular issue. They also provide a concrete example of the existence of channels for 
democratic  and peaceful  informal participation  amongst  young people  in  Poland.  In 
turn, this supports the hypothesis that political opportunities created by the legacy of 
                                                           
165 See chapter three, section 3.2c(i) for the estimated turnout figures, also see Kotowicz (2007). 
166 There were many examples of such campaigns. Some of these are explained in Gazeta Wyborcza (16
th 
Oct. 2007). One example was an SMS message campaign started by a 27 year old computer technician. It 
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peaceful  and  organised  dissidence  under  communism  continue  to  offer  a  basis  for 
potential youth informal political participation. These favourable political opportunities 
appeared to be also recognised by some focus group participants who were proud of 
Solidarity and the legacy it had left for peaceful protest in Poland. For instance, one 
explained,  
 
‘We have a great tradition of protest in Poland. It is how we got rid of communism and 
still now there is a chance to really change things this way’ (m, 17, Warsaw) 
 
This view suggests that although young people in Poland may not always recognise 
opportunities for protest, they do not feel inhibited from participating through fear of 
repression by authorities or by the possibility of negative repercussions in the future.  
 
5.3e. Romania: ‘blocked’ Political Opportunities for Youth Protest?  
  
As discussed in section 5.3a, as in Poland, youth involvement in protest activities in 
Romania  is  generally  at  very  low  levels.  Communist  legacies  and  post-communist 
political and socioeconomic change have meant that young people continue to associate 
protest  with  economic  losers  or  with  post-materialist  richer  countries  in  the  West. 
However,  despite  these  important  similarities  between  the  situation  in  Poland  and 
Romania, my qualitative research also highlighted country-specific reasons for the low 
levels of protest amongst young people. In particular, unlike in Poland where the recent 
student  protests  signal  a  potential  for  active  informal  participation  amongst  young 
people, in Romania I found no evidence of similar possible openings in participation 
channels. Indeed, widespread corruption and clientelism, combined with the legacies of 
failed student protest in the 1990s and repression of dissidence from authorities appears 
to  have  effectively  ‘blocked’  channels  for  both  formal  and  informal  participation 
amongst  young  people.  In  the  following  section,  I  first  unpack  the  nature  of  these 
‘blockages’ and second discuss the potential for such blockages to ultimately lead to 
more radicalised youth protest.  
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5.3e(i) The nature of the ‘blockages’ 
 
There  are  two  main  factors  which  mean  that  young  people  in  Romania  perceive 
channels for informal participation to be ‘blocked’. The first stems from the legacy of 
failed  protest  in  the  1990s  and  from  the  violent  repression  of  dissidence  by  the 
authorities during communism and in the early period of post-communism. The second 
relates  to  the  common  perception  that  political  corruption  and  clientelism  pervades 
public life, effectively rendering young people as completely powerless in the face of 
authority.  
 
5.3e(ii) Legacies of Violent Repression and Failed Protests 
 
The crushing of dissidence by the authorities during communism and in the early period 
of post-communism in Romania appears to have left young people with a view that 
protesting is a risky activity. Although they may not fear violent repression, focus group 
respondents  expressed  that  they  felt  protesting  was  still  something  which  was  not 
necessarily governed by clear legal norms. As such, they suggested that the reactions of 
authorities to protesting remained highly unpredictable. In turn, it was suggested that 
involvement in such activities could mean perverse effects for the participants
167. 
 
One respondent in Oradea gave an example of why he felt people were fearful of the 
personal consequences of protest,  
 
‘I remember that people tried to start a protest in Oradea because they don’t like the 
new pedestrian area and hundreds of people said yes let’s start this but no one was in 
the street, people don’t protest because they are afraid of losing their jobs’ (m, 22, 
Oradea) 
 
It appears that this fear often stems from the lack of knowledge and trust of the legal 
rules on protest. For instance, some respondents explained that authorities prevented 
protest  happening  legally  by  refusing  organisers  permission  to  take  to  the  streets. 
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Another participant suggested that the law changed depending on circumstances. He 
stated,  
 
‘The law here is not fixed. Someone in power could kill someone and get away with it 
but if we protested about it, we could end up in jail’ (m, 17, Oradea) 
 
To check whether in fact the legal rules on organising peaceful protest in Romania were 
so changeable I asked a number of NGO activists and academics how difficult it was to 
get  permission  to  protest.  I  was  told  by  the  leader  of  the  Pro-Democraţia  (Pro-
Democracy) organisation in Oradea that it was actually very simple to gain permission 
to hold a demonstration but that the general perception in society was that it would be 
stopped by the authorities. An academic in the political science department in Babeş-
Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca supported this and said that the only protests which 
were banned by authorities were the Equality parades in Bucharest. It therefore appears 
likely  that  the  views  of  young  people  towards  the  legal  basis  for  protest  activities 
derives more from a perception of constraints rather than their existence. This may stem 
from a lack of experience with democratic protest and from the legacies of repression by 
the authorities of protests in the early 1990s.  However, these views may also be a 
product  of  a broader perception  that  widespread political  corruption  and  clientelism 
mean young people are powerless in the face of authority.  
 
5.3e(ii)  The Penetration  of  Corruption  and  Clientelism  throughout Public Life as a 
Constraint on Protest 
 
The perception that corruption, scandals and clientelism are part of daily political and 
public life in Romania is one which appeared widespread amongst the young people in 
my focus groups. Particularly, as shown in the section above, they stressed that those 
who made public decisions were in the privileged position to be able to make the law 
and then ignore it, behaving however they desired. They suggested that ordinary people 
have little say in what is decided in the country and that instead people in power lack 
accountability  and  can  freely  behave  in  an  illegal  manner  and  escape  justice.  This 
perception  appears to reflect media  reporting in Romania, which has been found to 
particularly focus on sensationalist scandals involving politicians and others in public 
life (Nicolae 2006). This is accentuated by the degree of political interference in the 210 
 
Romanian  media  which  often  leads  to  biased  and  exaggerated  reporting  (Vasilescu 
2004,  Gross  2008).  By  emphasising  corruption  scandals  and  highlighting  apparent 
political  immunity,  the  media  can  be  seen  as  instrumental  in  shaping  these  public 
perceptions.   
 
This perception of politicians as ‘above the law’ appears to have important ramifications 
for  the  way  in  which  young  people  perceive  the  opportunities  to  participate  in 
contentious politics. A common factor mentioned by focus group respondents was the 
role  of  money  in  influencing  change  in  Romanian  public  life.  Many  gave  opinions 
which showed that they saw Romanian society as divided into two parts, one rich and 
one poor. For instance,  
 
‘People in this country are either poor or rich. The poor ones can’t do anything and the 
rich ones just want to get richer’ (f.17, Alexandria) 
 
The rich people were frequently seen to be those in power and particularly politicians. 
One respondent explained,  
 
‘In our country the political class are the wealthy class and the financial men of this 
country. I think we need something like a dictator to take over for 10 years and in 10 
years it would mean Romania would have some rules, stop politicians from stealing 
money to stop corruption and poverty. Because at the moment all of the politicians are 
really powerful, they have written the laws and what is needed is for the corrupt people 
to be arrested, not just the small people but the sharks’ (m,18, Alexandria) 
 
This ‘black and white’ view of Romanian society is significant as it means that people 
outside political circles often see a distinct separation between their lives and political 
life. In this way they feel largely removed from influencing decision-making unless they 
are prepared to engage in corrupt practices themselves (Heidenheimer and Johnstone 
2001). In turn this makes legitimate and public methods, such as demonstrations and 
petitions,  appear  futile  and  potentially  risky  as  would  place  the  participant  in  a 
vulnerable situation (Grødeland 2007). Indeed, the following statement explicitly links 
these perceptions of political corruption with participation in protests.  
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‘They (protests) are not so effective, because there is nothing from a material sense. 
They do not pay. They don’t pay the people, who change things so I don’t think they 
change anything’ (m,17, Oradea) 
 
These views support existing study on public perceptions of corruption in Romania. For 
instance Bădescu (2007) found that 38% of Romanian people perceived that corruption 
was the worst problem in society. This was a substantially greater percentage than in 
many other countries studied and crucially was significantly more than in Poland where 
only  2%  of  respondents  felt  corruption  was  the  most  important problem  in  society. 
Uslaner’s (2008) recent study  also stressed the strength of this public perception in 
Romania. He showed how this was based on both the existence of everyday corruption 
and of higher level political corruption. Despite warning that these perceptions were, in 
some cases, exaggerated, he saw these as particularly damaging for levels of political 
trust and for building linkages between society and political agents. Faced with this 
inequality in public life, many people simply choose to ‘exit’ from participation.   
 
In the case of young people, there may also be a generational aspect to these perceptions 
as they often ascribe the perpetuation of corruption to communist elements in public 
life.  An  example  of  this  point  of  view  was  given  by  a  focus  group  respondent  in 
Alexandria who stated, 
 
‘There are changes here since communism but these are really in theory and not in 
practice because the older politicians are not interested in losing their lifestyles’  
(f,17 Alexandria) 
 
Indeed, this supports findings by Grødeland’s (2007) study into informal networks and 
politics  in  the  Czech  Republic,  Slovenia,  Bulgaria  and  Romania.  She  found  that, 
particularly in Romania, the perception of old ‘communist’ ways in public life was one 
which had endured into the youngest cohort. One reason for this could be the relative 
lack of accounting for communist-era activity in Romania, where unlike in some other 
post-communist countries there has been little in the way of lustration (Stan 2006).   
 
These perceptions mean that for many young people in Romania, the costs, in terms of 
time, effort and risk, of participating in protest are perceived as simply too high.   212 
 
5.2e (iv) Potential for a Revolution?  
 
According to conventional social movement theory, blockages of participation channels 
as found in Romania could be expected in time to lead to more radicalised forms of 
protest than in countries where there are fewer constraints on such activity (Tarrow 
1998, Koopmans 2004). If indeed the obstacles to informal youth participation are as 
considerable  as  the  views  of  focus  group  participants  suggest,  then  we  should  ask 
whether these could be seen to potentially trigger a youth-led rebellion as in the recent 
coloured revolutions of Ukraine, Serbia and Georgia or indeed radicalised youth protest 
as is common in centralised established democracies such as France (Koopmans 2004). 
There are two main reasons why this is unlikely.  
 
First, as argued by Tucker (2007) in his study of the coloured revolutions, the trigger for 
each of these contentious episodes was a stolen election by an autocratic government. 
Such a blatant abuse of power at election time is seen to lower the costs and increase 
potential benefits of protest. He contends that although citizens in a corrupt state may 
have deep-rooted grievances against the government, this alone will not be sufficient to 
trigger  widespread  collective  action.  To  do  this,  a  significant  event  such  as  serious 
electoral fraud is required. However, the situation in Romania differs significantly from 
the countries where these coloured revolutions took place. First, despite considerable 
clientelism and corruption which pervades public life, the relatively stable party system, 
generally  pro-European  parties  and  mainly  free  elections  mean  that  political 
opportunities for radicalisation against a particular target are lacking. Indeed, unlike in 
the Ukraine and Georgia, where youth NGOs and grass-roots activists were supported 
by the West in overthrowing authoritarian regimes (Way 2008), it seems very unlikely 
that there will be international interest in supporting mass collective action within an 
already Pro-European state which is a member of NATO and of the European Union.  
 
However, despite the lack of potential for rebellion by young people in the same way as 
in the coloured revolutions, it also seems unlikely that the blockages in participation 
channels will mean Romanian young people will take to frequent, radicalised protest as 
is common in highly centralised, established democracies such as France (Koopmans 
2004). This is because the lack of experience in democratic protest by young people in 
Romania  means  that,  unlike  in  established  democracies,  there  are  no past  cycles of 213 
 
contention to shape the repertoires and agencies of future protest actions. This is a stark 
contrast  with  the  situation  in  Poland  where  the  experience  of  organised,  peaceful 
dissidence under communism means that there is a basis for potential future democratic 
protest by young people.  
 
5.4 Conclusions  
 
The central aim of this chapter was to outline and analyse the extent and nature of youth 
political participation in informal forms in Poland and Romania and to compare this 
with findings in established democracies. The first part of the chapter assessed the level 
and nature of youth participation and non-participation in volunteering in NGOS. The 
second part looked at involvement in protest activities. The chapter tested two main 
comparative hypotheses. First, that higher socioeconomic levels in Poland would mean 
higher levels of informal participation than in Romania. Second, that different legacies 
of  anti-communist  dissidence  would  have  created  contrasting  political  opportunity 
structures and constraints for youth informal participation today.  
 
I found that levels of youth participation in informal modes in Poland and Romania 
were notably low in comparison to established democracies. This was both in cause-
oriented  volunteering  and  in  protest  activities  such  as  petitioning,  boycotting  and 
demonstrating. To explain such high levels of non-participation, I pinpointed a number 
of common reasons across both countries. In the case of cause-oriented volunteering, 
the main reasons stemmed from lack of organisational structure, particularly, at local 
level and a lack of experience in such participation. These explanations suggest legacies 
of  forced  volunteerism  during  communism,  and  that  post-communist  political  and 
socioeconomic change have an enduring influence on the channels for youth informal 
participation. In both countries explanations behind low rates of participation in protest 
activities were based on  the associations which young people make between protest and 
economic ‘losers’ on one hand, and with richer, post-materialist countries on the other. 
As  a  consequence,  many  young  people  feel  disconnected  with  such  forms  of 
participation, and coupled with feelings of alienation from political agents and formal 
political  processes,  they  often  choose  to  exit  political  participation  altogether.  This 
represents  an  important  contrast  with  established  democracies  where  studies  have 214 
 
suggested that young people are increasingly opting to participate in informal forms 
which can give them a ‘voice’.  
 
However, despite these general similarities my research also highlighted some country-
specific factors which suggested, as hypothesised, that the political opportunities for 
youth informal participation in Poland and Romania contrast importantly.   
 
First, I found that in Poland channels for informal participation, and particularly for 
democratic, peaceful protest, were more open than in Romania. A concrete example of 
this was given by the case study of the anti-Giertych protests in 2006. Although this 
episode was a rare example of such collective mobilisation amongst youth in Poland, it 
highlighted the existence of opportunities for young people to participate in informal 
forms when they feel sufficiently involved in a specific political issue. As such, it also 
suggested  that  there  is  potential  for  future  youth  participation  in  Poland  which 
resembles more closely that in established democracies.  
 
In contrast, in Romania, as hypothesised, the legacies of failed protest and repression by 
authorities  continue  to  negatively  influence  the  perception  of  many  young  people 
towards protest activities. They see them as risky and costly activities. In addition, the 
widespread  public  perceptions  of  corruption  in  all  areas  of  public  life  serve  to 
effectively ‘block’ participation channels by making young people feel powerless in the 
face of authorities. However, there is no evidence at present that these blockages will 
ultimately lead to more radicalised youth protest as has happened in more authoritarian 
states or alternatively in centralised established democracies such as France.  
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CHAPTER SIX - CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The central aim of this thesis was to address the following research question: how do 
the reasons behind the political participation patterns of young people in newer post-
communist  democracies  compare  to  those  behind  youth  political  engagement  in 
established democracies? More specifically, as explained in chapter one, I asked how 
youth political participation in newer post-communist democracies might be understood 
in terms of Hirschman’s (1970) theoretical framework of exit, voice and loyalty and 
how this contrasts with the findings of existing studies of youth political involvement in 
established democracies.  To address these questions  in chapter two I developed a set of 
comparative  hypotheses  based  on  the  contrasting  communist  and  post-communist 
political and socioeconomic contexts in Poland and Romania which were then tested 
and expanded on in chapters 3-5 which assessed youth political participation in three 
main forms: voting, political party membership and participation in informal forms of 
political  involvement.  My  study  used  a  multi-method  comparative  approach  which 
employed sub-national case studies to control for local variation and to contextualise the 
paired country comparison between Poland and Romania. 
 
In this concluding chapter I have four main aims. First, I bring together the findings of 
the individual chapters to give an overview of youth political participation and non-
participation in Poland and Romania and address the extent to which the comparative 
hypotheses set out in chapter two were met. Second, I analyse how the interactions and 
trade-offs  between  the  different  forms  of  political  participation  in  the  newer 
democracies contrast with existing study in established democracies and what this can 
tell us about exit, voice and loyalty. Third, I assess the implications of my findings for 
the improvement in the quality of democracy in Poland and Romania and finally, I 
suggest some potential avenues for further research.  
 
6.1 How Youth Political Participation in Poland and Romania Compares 
 
This thesis found that, as broadly hypothesised, youth political participation levels in 
general are very low in Poland and Romania in comparison to levels in established 216 
 
democracies. In particular, I found that very limited numbers of young people in these 
countries turn out to vote or become involved in forms of informal participation such as 
cause-oriented  volunteering  and  protest  activities.  Crucially,  in  contrast  with  the 
situation  in  established  democracies,  the  differences  between  the  levels  of  political 
participation of the young cohort and older cohorts were less pronounced. This suggests 
that  some  region-specific  factors  such  as  communist  legacies  and  post-communist 
political  and  socioeconomic  contexts  remain  important  in  understanding  the reasons 
behind  youth  political  participation  and  non-participation.  However,  my  study  also 
highlighted important and unexpected exceptions to this picture. For instance, it found 
relatively high levels of youth political party membership in Romania in comparison to 
both Poland and many established democracies. These differences can, however, also be 
explained  by  the  comparative  hypotheses  presented  in  chapter  two,  which  are 
summarised in table 6.1. The following sections review the findings in the light of these 
hypotheses in more detail. 
 
Table 6.1: Comparative hypotheses and where they are tested in the thesis.  
 
Hypothesis  Chapter  3: 
Electoral Turnout 
Chapter  4:Party 
Membership 
Chapter  5:  
Informal Forms 
H1-legacies  of 
dissidence  
    X 
H2- 
decentralisation 
X  X   
H3- party systems  X  X   
H4- socioeconomic 
resources 
X  X  X 
 
 
6.1a.  The  Impact  of  Differing  Legacies  of  Anti-Communist  Dissidence  on  Youth 
Political Participation (H1) 
 
My study found levels of youth participation in informal forms (volunteering in cause-
oriented organisations and protest activities) in both Romania and Poland to be low in 
comparison  to  established  democracies.  This  finding  appears  to  contradict  my 
hypothesis that legacies of organised anti-communist dissidence in Poland would mean 
greater and more open political space for youth participation in informal forms than in 
Romania.  However,  I  also  found  that  despite  the  similarly  low  levels  of  youth 217 
 
involvement, the channels for informal youth participation in Poland are substantially 
less ‘blocked’ than in Romania.  For example, in Poland, the constraints on informal 
participation relate mainly to a lack of structure of relevant cause-oriented organisations 
at local levels, rather than fear of repression or of potentially negative consequences for 
later life. In Romania, similarly to Poland, there is a lack of organisational structure for 
informal  youth  participation.  However,  in  addition,  the  legacies  of  an  absence  of 
organised dissidence during communism and violent repression of protest in the 1990s, 
coupled with widespread clientelism and corruption in public life, mean that for the 
majority  of  Romanian  young  people  the  costs  of  informal  participation  are  seen  as 
simply too high.   
 
These findings suggest that despite current similar low levels of informal participation 
in both countries, differing legacies of dissidence and communist regime type do indeed 
continue to influence the potential for such involvement. In Poland, for instance, the 
recent student protests in 2006 highlighted the possibility for peaceful and sustained 
youth  protest  when  a  specific  combination  of  factors  come  together  and  create  a 
collective  identity  under  which  young  people  are  mobilised.  This  was  a  concrete 
example of how favourable opportunity structures for youth informal participation in 
Poland do exist, even if they are not generally perceived by young people, who feel that 
protesting is largely ineffective.  In Romania, my findings are consistent with the view 
that legacies of weak and largely unorganised dissidence and strong state repression 
mean continued constraints on youth informal participation today. We could therefore 
expect that the nature of potential informal youth participation is different. Unlike in 
Poland where more open political space means greater possibilities for the development 
of ‘normalised’ informal participation of the kind that exists in established democracies, 
the  blockages  of  these  participation  channels  in  Romania  suggest  the  theoretical 
potential  for  more  contentious  youth  mobilisation,  aimed  at  challenging  corrupt 
leadership such as in the recent coloured revolutions in the Ukraine, Georgia and Serbia. 
However,  from  my  study,  there  is  little  current  evidence  of  such  intent.  Indeed,  at 
present the majority of Romanian young people opt instead to ‘exit’ the public sphere 
altogether, preferring to concentrate on private concerns.   
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6.1b The Impact of Decentralisation Reform on Youth Political Participation (H2) 
 
Contrary to my hypothesis that more developed administrative decentralisation reform 
would have heightened levels of youth political participation in Poland, I found that 
young people  in both  Poland  and  Romania  had  similarly  low  levels  of  interest  and 
participation in local elections as in national elections. However, in Romania, levels of 
youth  party  membership  and  organisation  at  both  national  and  local  level  were 
considerably higher than in Poland and in many established democracies. In Poland 
levels  of  youth  party  membership  at  national  and  local  level  were  very  low  in 
comparison  to  established  democracies.  These  findings  only  partly  supported  my 
hypothesis,  but  they  do  suggest  that  Romanian  political  parties  are  seen  by  young 
people as offering greater opportunities than in Poland.  
 
In  both  countries,  the  feelings  of  young  people  about  opportunities  to  participate 
electorally were similar for local and national elections. Many young people felt that 
there was a lack of choice between suitable candidates at all elections and that their vote 
could make little difference to policy change at any level. Politicians at both local and 
national level were seen as self-serving, unrepresentative and untrustworthy. Similar to 
the position in established democracies, many young people in Poland and Romania felt 
alienated from politicians and the electoral process and as a result made a reasoned 
choice to abstain from voting. This finding was similar in both countries suggesting that 
wider European youth-related factors such as feelings of alienation from political agents 
and processes can better explain  youth voting patterns in Poland and Romania than 
relative levels of decentralisation in public administration.  
 
However my findings on levels of youth party membership, suggest that the level of 
effective administrative decentralisation is important in helping to explain opportunities 
for participation in this form. In Poland, at both national and local level, youth party 
membership  levels  were  low  and  this  was  particularly  evident  outside  large  urban 
centres. Local level party youth organisations were generally underdeveloped and had 
limited internal power and membership. As a result, young people with policy-seeking 
or ideological motivations either chose to join the main party or to work independently 
for local level politicians. In Romania, in contrast, many youth wings of political parties 
have a well developed organisational structure at local level. Unlike in Poland, members 219 
 
were usually motivated to become involved for a wide variety of different selective 
incentives such as opportunities to socialise, career enhancement and access to local and 
national power structures. Membership for policy-seeking or ideologically motivated 
reasons was far less common.  
 
Despite the low levels of youth party membership in Poland, these findings do partly 
support my  hypothesis  on administrative decentralisation. As the literature suggests, 
effective administrative decentralisation can render national party politics at local level 
less important and as a result open up opportunities to a wider range of citizens to 
participate at this level (Parry et al. 1992, Putnam 1993, Nations in Transit 2006). In 
turn, this diminishes the possibility for selective incentives to be offered by parties to 
members at local level. This was supported by my findings that young people in Poland 
perceived party  membership  as  only  for  those  young people  with policy-seeking or 
ideological motivations. However, it was also clear that young people did not generally 
recognise the wider opportunities for political participation at local level engendered by 
self-government. Instead, the majority felt that even at local level, people involved in 
politics were unrepresentative and uncaring about their needs.  
 
In Romania, the continued attraction of selective benefits for young party members, 
especially  at  local  level,  highlights  that  effective  regulation  of  clientelism  and 
corruption  is  still  lacking.  Incomplete  administrative  decentralisation  means  that 
political party groupings are still able to use their organisational structure and influence 
to dominate and control local level decision–making.  Although, on the surface, this 
appears  to  open  up  opportunities  for  young  people  to  become  involved  in  political 
parties, in fact it lowers the quality of participation by ‘blocking’ policy-seeking or 
ideologically motivated individuals from participating.  
 
6.1c Contrasting Post-communist Party Systems as Opportunity Structures for Youth 
Political Participation (H3)  
 
My findings partly supported the hypothesis that different party systems would provide 
for contrasting political opportunity structures for youth political participation in Poland 
and Romania. Whereas in both countries levels of youth participation in elections and in 
informal forms were lower than in established democracies, youth party membership 220 
 
levels in Romania were high in comparison to levels in established democracies and in 
Poland.  
 
As  explained  in  section  6.1b,  the  large  scale  ‘exit’  amongst  young  people  in  both 
countries from electoral participation can be explained mainly through alienation from 
politicians and political parties (political agents) whom they feel are unrepresentative 
and self-serving. This corresponds to similar trends found in established democracies. 
This conclusion is supported by the finding that even those young people who do vote 
often also feel alienated from political agents but feel it is a moral and democratic duty 
to  vote  at  elections.  This  suggests  that  in  the  newer  democracies,  as  in  established 
democracies,  factors  such  as  the  increasing  professionalisation  of  political  parties, 
which have meant a widening gap between political agents and citizens in general, and 
youth in particular, are important in explaining patterns of youth electoral participation.  
 
In comparison, I found that the logics behind youth party membership in Poland and 
Romania derive more from country-specific factors such as the prevailing party system.  
As explained in section 6.1b, the higher levels of youth party membership in Romania 
can  be  explained  by  the  selective  incentives  such  as  social  activities,  career 
enhancement and access to power structures, made available to members. In Poland, in 
contrast, the main incentives offered by political parties to young people are for those 
who are policy-seeking or ideologically motivated. This finding supports the hypothesis 
that  although  the  more  clientelistic  party  system  in  Romania  provides  greater 
opportunities  for  access  to  selective  benefits,  it  also  places  constraints  on  formal 
participation channels for young people who are interested in participating for policy-
seeking or ideological reasons.  In Poland, in  contrast, the more programmatic party 
system means greater opportunities for young people to participate. However in Poland, 
these  opportunities,  as  in  established  democracies,  are  largely  unrecognised  and 
unexploited by  young people. In part this can be explained by general Europe-wide 
alienation felt by young people towards political agents. In Poland though, this also 
reflects the specific post-communist mistrust and separation from political parties and 
politics felt by the population as a whole. This is exemplified by the notably high levels 
of people in all cohorts who choose to ‘exit’ from participation in political parties in 
contrast with established democracies.  
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I found that differing party systems can also help to explain the reasons behind patterns 
of  youth  involvement  in  informal  forms  of  political  participation  in  Poland  and 
Romania. As assessed in section 6.1a, although the levels of participation in these forms 
were low in both countries, the political space for participation was less ‘blocked’ in 
Poland. In Romania, the clientelistic party system not only places constraints on formal 
channels for participation such as through political parties, but also extends to channels 
for informal participation. This is because the relative lack of regulation of the party 
system means that party politics are able to dominate public life and to control access to 
media and other resources vital for sustaining informal participation.  
 
6.1d The Impact of Socioeconomic Factors on Youth Political Participation (H4) 
 
This study found that, as hypothesised, higher levels of socioeconomic resources are 
associated  with  greater  access  to  possibilities  for  youth  political  participation.  In 
particular, in both countries, young people with higher levels of educational attainment 
were more likely to engage in all forms of participation: to vote, join political parties 
and to become involved in informal forms of participation. This pattern was especially 
pronounced in Poland, where there was evidence that politically active young people 
form a select core elite of highly educated and urbanised young people.  In Romania, 
the role of socioeconomic resources was less marked, with more geographically even 
patterns of youth political participation. This could be explained by the nature of the 
party system and the more developed nature of local level party organisations which can 
offer  young people  greater benefits  than  in  Poland.  The  finding  that  socioeconomic 
resources are important for explaining patterns of youth political participation confirms 
findings of the existing literature on political involvement and as such does not require 
further explanation (Verba and Nie 1972, McCarthy and Zald 1977, Barnes and Kaase 
1979).  
 
6.2  Trade–Offs  in  Youth  Political  Participation  in  Newer  Democracies  -  Exit, 
Loyalty and/or Voice? 
 
The main purpose of conducting a paired country comparative study of youth political 
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participation  in  Eastern  Europe  and  hence  to  allow  comparison  of  youth  political 
participation patterns in older West European and newer Eastern European democracies.  
 
My study suggests that young people in newer Eastern European democracies conceive 
of politics in similar ways to youth in established democracies. In particular, they tend 
to  interpret  ‘politics’  as  meaning  politicians  and  political  parties  rather  than  wider 
political and social issues and debates.  However, my qualitative research on young 
people  in  Poland  and  Romania  found  that,  as  in  established  democracies,  they  are 
frequently very interested in and knowledgeable about broader political issues. Yet, they 
do show a high level of alienation from political agents and formal political processes 
which they feel are unrepresentative of their needs.  
 
In comparison to the situation in established democracies, the findings of my study 
suggest that this alienation is also symptomatic of post-communist society as a whole 
rather than just particularly associated with young people. As such, despite similarities 
in the way in which young people conceive of politics, it would be incorrect to conclude 
that the reasons behind youth political participation patterns in newer and established 
European  democracies  are  similar.  Indeed,  my  findings  suggest  that  region-specific 
factors such as communist legacies and post-communist political and socioeconomic 
factors remain highly important for explaining present-day youth political involvement 
in Poland and Romania.  
 
This is evident in the finding that almost all young people in newer democracies simply 
choose to ‘exit’ political participation altogether. This is an important contrast with the 
findings of studies in established democracies which have suggested that a minority of 
young people, although alienated from formal political agents, are embracing informal 
forms of participation as an alternative to formal modes (Norris 2002, 2003, Kimberlee 
2002, Shea and Green 2006, Quintelier 2007, Sloam 2007). In other words, in newer 
democracies, there is little evidence of the existence of trade-offs between formal and 
informal  forms  of  participation  whereby  a  young  person  who  feels  alienated  from 
political agents chooses ‘exit’ over forms of ‘loyalty’ such as voting and political party 
membership  and  instead  opts  to  participate  informally  through  protest  activities  or 
volunteering in a cause-oriented organisation. Indeed, the findings of this thesis suggest 
that  in  both  Poland  and  Romania,  in  contrast  with  the  situation  in  established 223 
 
democracies, many young people are simply opting to ‘exit’ from political participation 
altogether.  
 
Crucially, the findings of this study suggest that the majority of young people in newer 
democracies do not associate informal forms of participation as potentially providing 
them with a ‘voice’. Indeed, they tend to relate these activities either with disgruntled 
economic  ‘losers’  in  their  own  countries,  or  as  something  which  occurs  only  in 
wealthier countries. Protest, in particular, is often seen as a last resort activity rather 
than something which makes up part of the ongoing democratic process. As such, there 
is no evidence that informal participation is becoming ‘normalised’ for young people in 
newer  democracies.  This  constitutes  an  important  contrast  with  the  situation  in 
established democracies and suggests that the deep-rooted separation between citizens 
and political agents and processes as found in  existing study of newer democracies 
(Smolar 1996, Howard 2003, Mudde 2003) has a continuing influence on the political 
activities of the youngest cohort.  
 
6.2a New Cohorts, Old Habits?   
 
The findings of this thesis suggest that, in Eastern European countries, the passing of 
time and increased democratic experience alone should not be taken as a guarantee of 
growing  societal  interest  and  participation  in  politics.  Indeed,  contrary  to  the 
expectations  of  some  academic  observers  (Sztompka  1996,  Berglund  et  al.  2001, 
Howard 2003), generational renewal has not led to a more politically active citizenry. 
Instead of the division between society and politics gradually closing, it appears that in 
the case of young people it may actually be widening. There are a number of possible 
interrelated reasons for this.  
 
First, unlike older cohorts who lived through communism, young people do not feel a 
personal level of disappointment with the transition to democracy. This has meant that 
many young people simply have no expectations of political agents, which in turn is 
seen to justify a complete ‘exit’ from political participation. Not only does this manifest 
itself in low youth voter turnout and in low levels of political party membership for 
ideological or policy- seeking reasons, but also is transferred to involvement in informal 
modes such as ‘cause-oriented’ volunteering and protest activities. This finding suggests 224 
 
that the legacies of communist experience have not only endured but also have become 
consolidated through  younger post-communist cohorts despite them lacking personal 
experience of communism. 
 
Second, the top-down, elite-centred development of post-communist political systems 
means that the distance between young people and political agents appears even greater 
than that in established democracies.  One consequence of this is that the majority of 
young  people  feel  that  they  have  little  or  no  personal  political  efficacy  and  that 
politicians remain wholly unaccountable to the electorate. As a result, in contrast to 
established democracies, not even informal participation is seen as an effective route to 
changing policy or influencing political decision making. In turn, this is seen to justify a 
complete ‘exit’ from political participation.  
 
6.3 Implications for Improvement of Democratic Quality in Poland and Romania 
 
Active political participation by citizens is a vital component in increasing the quality of 
democracy in any country.  Sustained citizen involvement helps to ensure accountability 
of politicians and parties both at and between elections, by providing for broader debate, 
challenges and discussion on policy making.  In newer democracies, there is limited 
experience of democratic process and elite-based political transformation which means 
encouraging  and  sustaining  citizen  involvement  remains  imperative  (Croissant  and 
Merkel 2004, Diamond and Morlino 2004, Svetlozar 2005). Engaging young people in 
active  political  participation  is  therefore  particularly  important,  as  shaping  their 
participation habits can help ensure a more active citizenry in the future (Franklin 2004, 
Fieldhouse et al. 2007).  
 
At  present,  neither  Poland  nor  Romania  supports  a  comprehensive  and  politically 
independent  programme  of  youth  policy  designed  to  encourage  greater  youth 
participation.  In  both  countries,  programmes  are  often  fragmented  in  scope  and  are 
frequently based on models imported from established democracies. This is particularly 
evident  in  Romania,  where  various  projects  designed  to  increase  youth  engagement 
have been initiated with the backing of international organisations (UNICEF and World 
Bank 2002, Civitas Foundation 2002). Although some of these such as the annual youth 
parliament  project  developed  by  the  Bucharest-based  NGO,  Pro-Democracy,  can  be 225 
 
seen  as  successful  in  encouraging  youth  involvement,  such  programmes  do  tend  to 
attract those young people who already possess high levels of resources and are thus 
likely participants.  
 
In  Poland,  greater  support  from  national  authorities
168  has  meant  that  some 
organisations have managed to develop programmes for youth engagement which are 
more attuned to the specifics of Polish youth rather than European youth in general. An 
example  of  this  is  the  Young  People  Vote  Programme  initiated  by  the  Centre  for 
Citizenship  Education.  Since  its  launch  in  1995,  this  programme  has  broadened  its 
target  base  to  now  include  young  people  from  a  wide  variety  of  socioeconomic 
backgrounds.  Nonetheless,  between  elections,  as  in  Romania,  youth  engagement 
programmes still tend to be urban-based and target primarily those young people who 
have high levels of socioeconomic resources. As such, by focussing on those young 
people  who  are  already  most  likely  to  participate,  these  programmes  may  actually 
further inequality between participants and non-participants rather than encourage more 
widespread involvement.  
 
6.3a Poland: Unexploited Opportunities 
 
The findings of this thesis suggest two important implications for the improvement in 
the quality of democracy in Poland. The first stems from the potentially widening gap 
between those who participate and those who do not, the second from the emerging 
changes in the way in which young people are choosing to participate politically.  
 
In  assessments  of  democratic  quality  using  quantitative  measures,  Poland  generally 
achieves  a  high  score  compared  to  other  post-communist  countries  (Schneider  and 
Schmitter 2004, Berg-Schlosser 2004). However, although institutional reforms such as 
electoral reform and administrative decentralisation have opened up formal channels for 
participation, this is not generally matched with active citizen participation. My study 
has shown that young people in Poland feel alienated and unrepresented by political 
agents who they view as self-serving and disinterested in their problems. As a result 
they often choose to ‘exit’ political participation altogether, even though opportunities 
                                                           
168 See for example the European Knowledge Centre for Youth Policy (2006) report on Poland which 
highlights the cooperation between central authorities and youth organisations.  226 
 
to  participate  exist.  This  has  left  a  small  but  distinctly  elite-based  group  of  young 
politically active people who are based in Warsaw or other large urban centres and are 
often highly educated.  
 
If the main political parties in Poland stabilise and consolidate further, the incentives for 
parties to recruit new  young members from these elite circles could be expected to 
increase. Given the low rates of youth participation in elections and in informal forms, 
this would serve to increase the division between politically active young people and the 
majority who ‘exit’ political involvement altogether. In turn, the costs in terms of time, 
money  and  education  required  to  participate  are  likely  to  accumulate,  meaning  that 
those with fewer resources will be further disadvantaged.  
 
To ensure improvement in the quality of Polish democracy in the future, it is critical 
that  policy  initiatives  to  encourage  and  develop  opportunities  for  youth  political 
participation  in  Poland  should  increasingly  focus  on  this  large  group  of  disengaged 
young  people.  Stoker’s  (2006)  warnings  that  formal  schemes  to  increase  political 
engagement  which  are  demanding  in  terms  of  personal  resources  can  exacerbate 
inequality  between  participants  and  non-participants  are  particularly  pertinent.  The 
focus must be on finding less costly, informal methods to engage non-participants.  
 
Despite this wide gap between politically active and inactive young people in Poland, 
my study also highlighted some potential for changes in the ways in which Polish young 
people  participate  politically.  The  large  turnout  of  young  people  in  the  2007 
parliamentary  elections  and  the  2006  student  protests  against  the  appointment  of  a 
Catholic fundamentalist education minister have shown that the barriers to participation 
in  Poland  may  be  relatively  low.  These  examples  highlight  the  potential  for  rapid 
opening  of  opportunity  structures  in  Poland,  and  show  that  given  conducive 
circumstances young people can be motivated to participate. Again, this highlights the 
need  for  youth  engagement  programmes  to  address  the  reasons  behind  youth  non-
participation in Poland in greater depth.  
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6.3b Romania: ‘Blocked’ Political Space  
 
Incomplete privatisation reform and administrative decentralisation and a perpetuation 
of clientelistic and corrupt practices at political level mean that formal and informal 
channels for political participation in Romania remain effectively ‘blocked’. Indeed, the 
findings of this thesis paint a rather bleak prospect for the future improvement in the 
quality of democracy in Romania through active youth participation.  The clientelistic 
links between politics, media and business at both national and local level continue to 
effectively place constraints on the participation of young people who are ideologically 
motivated or policy-seeking. Perceived costs (time, effort and moral compromise) of 
participating are such that many such young people choose to ‘exit’ completely from 
political life.  
 
However, as my findings show, the numbers of young people participating in political 
parties  in  Romania  compared  to  both  Poland  and  many  established  democracies  is 
rather  high.    This  can  appear  contradictory  given  the  continuation  of  clientelistic 
networks  in  Romania,  which  could  be  expected  to  block  many  young  people  from 
participating in political life.  However, this can be explained through the possibilities 
for  selective  incentives  and  ‘club’  goods  which  are  made  available  to  young  party 
members.  These  are  often  offered  in  return  for  supporting  older  politicians  and  for 
compliance with the practices of these politicians. Indeed, this exchange relationship 
helps to regulate that those young people who are incorporated into these clientelistic 
networks are those who are unlikely to challenge the status quo. In turn, the developed 
organisation and local level penetration of youth wings provides a ready-made structure 
for  sustaining  these  clientelistic  practices.  As  a  result,  these  habits  are  likely  to 
perpetuate  into  the  next  generation  of  young  politicians  which  is  particularly 
problematic for the improvement in the quality of democracy.  
 
Academic  literature  suggests  that  faced  with  these  blockages  of  formal  channels  to 
participate,  there  may  be  potential  for  young  people  to  participate  in  contentious 
collective action aimed at overthrowing corrupt authorities (Tarrow 1998). However, as 
stated in section 6.1a, my study suggests there is little evidence of the potential for this 
to happen in Romania. Indeed the relative stability of the party system, the generally 
pro-European  nature  of  political  parties  and  largely  free  elections  makes  the 228 
 
participation of young people in an uprising against political corruption in a similar way 
to in the ‘coloured’ revolutions of the Ukraine, Serbia and Georgia appear unlikely 
(Tucker 2007).  
 
As such, policy to encourage and develop opportunities for youth political participation 
in Romania must contend with the blockages in the formal channels and should focus 
on ways to develop the possibilities for young people to challenge the system through 
democratic informal methods. Indeed, the findings of this study serve to reiterate the 
need  for  wider  party  system  reform  in  Romania  which  aims  to  curb  and  control 
clientelism and political corruption and open up opportunities for citizen involvement.  
 
6.4 Avenues for Further Research 
 
This  thesis  has  given  a  comprehensive  study  of  youth political participation  in  two 
contrasting  Eastern  European  countries  addressing  a  near  total  absence  of  political 
science literature on youth participation in the region. However, it is essentially a pilot 
study. As such, there remains a need for further systematic and in-depth comparative 
studies and country case studies in the newer democracies of Eastern Europe. Given the 
finding that young people in newer Eastern European democracies, as in established 
democracies, have a narrow conception of politics, but in context-specific ways, such 
studies should use a multi-method approach. This work on Eastern Europe highlights 
that data from quantitative surveys must be contextualised with the use of qualitative 
data, including semi-structured in-depth interviews and focus groups.  
 
The thesis also highlights that civic education and youth engagement programmes in 
newer Eastern European democracies seeking to mobilise young people to participate 
politically are not generally founded on a sound knowledge base.  Given the potential 
importance of such education in post-communist democracies where older cohorts are 
also notably disengaged from political participation, this is an important weakness. As 
such,  there  is  a  critical  need  for  further  in-depth  and  systematic  research  on  youth 
political  participation  patterns  in  Eastern  European  countries  which  can  inform  the 
drawing up of viable civic education programmes in these newer democracies.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
Focus Groups  
 
Setting up Procedure 
 
In setting up my focus groups with young people in Poland and Romania, I attempted to have as 
broad sample of social backgrounds and characteristics as practical within certain constraints 
(time, money and geography). However, given that these groups were often set up through 
schools  and  colleges  there  was  inevitably  a  bias towards  participants  with  higher  levels  of 
education. In each country my aim was to hold two focus groups in each case study locality. 
One of these with younger participants 16-19 years, and the other with older participants 20-25 
years. In practice, I succeeded in setting up 5 focus groups in each country. In both countries, 
the missing focus group was that of the older age group in the capital city. The focus groups in 
Romania took place between November 2006 and March 2007 and in Poland between May 
2007 and November 2007.  
 
The focus groups were set up through contacts with schools, colleges, universities and local 
NGOs. They typically lasted between 1 and 2 hours and had between 5 and 8 participants.  
 
Participants were all made aware of the purposes of the research in advance of the discussion. 
Immediately before the discussion began, I reiterated this and explained that I was not looking 
for right or wrong answers but rather opinions and views. I assured participants that their views 
were for my research purposes only and that they would not be named in my thesis.  Before the 
discussion, I also gave the participants a very short questionnaire which asked them about their 
age, political interest and political participation habits and offered them the opportunity to ask 
questions.  
 
The focus groups were mainly conducted in English, with the exception of the older age group 
in Alexandria, Romania which was mainly conducted in Romanian. The discussions were taped 
and  afterwards  I  transcribed  them.  This allowed  me  to  code the responses and  to  compare 
findings.  
 
Each discussion followed the same general format. In each case if the discussion strayed too far 
from the core questions, I would direct it back. In each group I used some visual aids (pictures 230 
 
of  protests,  ballot  boxes  etc.)  to  generate  initial  discussion  and  focus  the  discussion.  The 
discussion themes and core questions are set out below.  
 
Figure A.1: Discussion Themes and Questions for Focus Groups 
 
1.  Politics in General 
a.  How interested are you in politics?  
b.  What do you think of when you hear the word ‘politics’? 
c.  Do you think young people are generally interested in politics? Why/Why not? 
d.  What  do  you  think  are  the  biggest  problems  for  young  people  in  (name  of 
town/country)? 
e.  Do  you  watch  programmes  about  politics  on  TV/read  about  politics  on  the 
internet/in newspapers? 
f.  What do you think of the image of politics in the media? 
 
2.  Voting 
a.  Is it important to vote at an election? Why/why not? 
b.  Do you see any difference between voting at local elections and national elections? 
c.  How much do you think family and friends influence voting?  
d.  Do you think it is important to discuss elections with family/friends? 
 
3.  Political Parties 
a.  Are youth parties in (name of town) active? (If yes, what do they do? what do you 
think of them? If no, why not?) 
b.  Why do you think people join political parties? 
c.  Are there any (young) politicians you admire? Why/why not? 
d.  What do you think is the purpose of political parties and politicians?  
e.  What kind of people do you think would be best at running the country? (examples: 
businessmen, celebrities, ‘ordinary’ people etc.) 
f.  Are you aware of any radical or extremist youth parties in (town, country)? 
 
4.  Informal Participation 
a.  Have you ever seen any protests in (name of town, country)? 
b.  Have you ever taken part in a protest of any kind? (give examples) 
c.  Is it important to protest when you disagree with something? Why/why not? 
d.  What do you think stops people from protesting in (name of town, country)? 
e.  Do you know of any ways in which to volunteer in your town?  231 
 
f.  What do you think are the benefits of volunteering? 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
 
During my fieldwork in Poland and Romania I conducted 30 semi-structured interviews in my 
case-study localities (18 in Romania, 12 in Poland) with young activists. In Romania, I also 
interviewed a number of people in Cluj-Napoca as test interviews. I defined activists as youth 
party members or leaders and young people involved in informal forms of participation such as 
social movements or voluntary groups.  
 
I set up the interviews by contacting political parties by telephone or by email, and through 
contacts I made at NGOs.  I then used a snowballing technique to contact further interviewees. 
For people involved in informal participation, I also made initial contact through speculative 
emails or telephone calls.  
 
In each case, I made clear to the prospective interviewee the purposes of my research. I assured 
them that they would not be named in my thesis, unless they specifically stated that this was 
acceptable. The interviewees who would be recognisable from my descriptions of their roles, 
are therefore those who had no objection to being identifiable. I also made clear that I was not 
looking for right’ or ‘wrong’ answers and that they were free to refuse to answer any questions 
for any reason.  
 
Each face-to face interview lasted between 45 minutes and 2 and half hours. These were mainly 
conducted in English. However, if they preferred they answered questions in their own language 
as my knowledge of Polish and Romanian meant I was able to understand the responses and 
check understanding through further questions. Immediately, after each interview, I wrote a 
detailed set of field notes. These were later coded and compared.  
 
The tables below set out the locality, age, educational level and organisational affiliation of the 
interviewees in Romania (Table B.1) and in Poland (Table B.2).  
 
Each interview was conducted within a broad framework of questions on motivations for and 
experiences of youth activism. However, I was flexible with the order in which the questions 
were asked in order to facilitate natural conversation and to allow the interviewee to expand on 
and  explain  matters  of  interest  to  them.    The  framework  of  interview  questions  for  young 
political party members is set out in Figure B.1.  233 
 
 
Table B.1: Semi-structured Interviews in Romania  
 
 
Locality  Age  Education 
Level 
Organisational Affiliation 
Oradea  25  Higher  Party member of Democratic Party Youth Organisation 
(OT-PD) 
Oradea  22  Higher  Party Member of Social Democratic Youth (TSD) 
Oradea  22  Higher  Party Member of National Liberal Youth (TNL) 
Oradea  24  Higher  Leader of Social Democratic Youth (TSD) 
Oradea  25  Medium  Involved with Democratic Union of Hungarians in 
Romania (UDMR) 
Oradea  23, 
26 
Higher  Members of Mişcarea Tinerilor pentru Pace Oradea 
(Youth for Peace Oradea) Organisation.  
Oradea   18  Medium   Member of Ecotop (environmental organisation) 
Oradea  26  Medium  Member of Pro-Democraţia (Pro-Democracy) 
Organisation 
Bucharest  22, 
24 
Higher  Members of Greater Romania Youth Organisation 
(OTRM) 
Bucharest  25  Higher  Member of Conservative Party (PC) 
Bucharest  26  Higher  Member of Social Democratic Youth (TSD) 
Bucharest  24  Higher  Member of Democratic Party Youth Organisation (OT-
PD) 
Bucharest  22  Higher  Member of Pro-Democraţia (Pro-Democracy) 
Organisation 
Alexandria  24  Medium  Member of Democratic Party Youth Organisation (OT-
PD) 
Alexandria  23  Higher  Member of National Liberal Youth (TNL) 
Alexandria  22  Medium  Member of Social Democratic Youth (TSD) 
Alexandria  26  Higher  Member of Pro-Democraţia (Pro-Democracy) 
Organisation 
By e-mail  25  Higher  Member of National Liberal Youth (TNL) in Bucharest 
Cluj-
Napoca 
23  Higher  Former member of Conservative Party (PC) 
Cluj-
Napoca 
22  Higher  Member of National Liberal Youth (TNL) 
Cluj-
Napoca 
24  Higher  Leader of Social Democratic Youth (TSD) 
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Table B.2: Semi-structured Interviews in Poland 
 
 
Locality  Age   Education Level  Organisational Affiliation 
Bielsko-Biała   25  Higher  Member of Federation of  Young Social 
Democrats (FMS) 
Bielsko-Biała  22  Higher  Member of Young Democrats (‘S’MD) 
Bielsko-Biała   18  Higher  Organiser of local anti-Giertych protests 
in 2006.  
Warsaw  25, 24  Higher  Members of Federation of Young Social 
Democrats (FMS) 
Warsaw  26  Higher  Member of People’s Party Youth Forum 
(FML) 
Warsaw  25  Higher  Member of  Young Democrats (‘S’MD) 
Warsaw  22  Higher  Member of Youth Forum of Law and 
Justice (FMPiS) 
Warsaw  23  Higher  Co-founder of Wybieram.pl (a Get out 
the Vote initiative for young people) 
Warsaw  18  Medium  Involved in several youth NGOs 
Chełm  25  Higher  Young member of Civic Platform (PO) 
Chełm  18  Medium  Volunteer for Catholic charity, Caritas 
Chełm  32  Higher  Mayor – former member of the 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD).  
 
 
 
Figure B.1: Interview Questions for Political Party Members 
 
 
Motivations  
 
1. What reasons did you have for becoming involved in the party? 
2. Why do you think other young people in the party joined?  
3. Do you think that young people have the same reasons as older members for joining? 
4. Do you think that people involved in politics share some common characteristics? (expand) 
5. How do you see your future in the party?  
6. Are your family/friends involved in politics? 
7. Do you discuss politics at home/with friends?  
8. Do you think young people in your country are generally interested/disinterested in politics?  
    Why/why not?  
 
Structure of Party 
 
1. How is the youth wing of your party organised?  
2. What is the hierarchical structure within the party? 
3. What is the relationship with the main party?  235 
 
4. How is your branch of the youth wing linked to other branches across the country? 
4. Does the party have links with other groups – NGOs, community groups, other parties etc?  
5. Does the party encourage young people to join? If yes – how? If no-why not?  
6. How do people in the party communicate? By phone, email etc. 
 
Activities  
 
1. What are the main activities of the youth wing (in your town/ in the country)?  
2. What is the role at election time?  
3. How often does the youth wing meet?  
4. What kind of activities does the youth wing do with the main party? 
 
Role 
 
1. What do you feel the role of the youth wing is – within the party? within society?  
2. What do you feel your role in the party is?  
 
Experiences 
 
1. What are the best aspects of being a member of the party? 
2. What are the worst aspects of being a member of the party?  
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